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The goal of this study is to better understand the dimensions of the digital divide in 
Tunisia in the context of the post-revolutionary phase. The significant role of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) during the revolution and in the post-revolution democracy 
process raises questions about the inclusiveness of the digital sphere to all Tunisian social groups 
and about the overall interactions with the ICT and their domestication into the Tunisian  
households. This study was designed to answer three main research questions: what are the 
implications of gender, age, and class for (1) ICT access and usage? (2) Attitudes towards ICT? 
And (3) ICT usage for political participation? An ethnographic semi-structured interview study 
was conducted in three neighborhoods of the city of Sousse in Tunisia over a two-week period of 
intensive field work, and was complemented by observations of the locals’ interactions with ICT 
during multiple visits to Tunisia. Respondents were recruited through snowball and convenience 
sampling. The study focused on those considered to be vulnerable social communities: women, 
the elderly, and socioeconomically disadvantaged Tunisians. The interview analysis revealed that 
demographic factors did not have a significant influence on the gaps between the users and non-
users, except for age in certain instances. The concept of social capital made the difference and 
had a significant effect on balancing issues related to economic and cultural capitals. For most of 
ix 
 
the informants, social capital, mainly family and community members, played an integral role in 
domesticating the technologies and brokering techno-competencies to those without economic 
and educational means. On the other hand, perceived relevance and cultural values emerged as 
the most significant divide factors. This project makes a theoretical contribution to the literature 
about the digital divide by emphasizing the role of the cultural values and the social landscape in 
reducing or widening the gap between the connected and non-connected. This dissertation 
stresses on the importance of conducting more ethnographic research in small Arab world 
community contexts in order to reveal more culturally embedded factors that directly affect the 
interaction between the culture and information technologies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
From December the 17th, 2010 to January the 14th, 2011 Tunisia witnessed an 
unprecedented uprising in the country that led to the overthrowing of a 27-year old oppressive 
regime. Scholarly research has established that information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and social network sites (SNS), especially Facebook, played an important role in the 
regime change and in the political and democracy process following the uprising (Bouhafa, 
2011; Kuebler, 2011; Cavatorta and Haugbolle, 2012; Dupuis, 2014; Zayani, 2015). Thus, I 
started to pay closer attention to the significance of ICT and SNS in the Tunisian new political 
and social scene. Being a Tunisian national, I have always followed closely the Tunisian social 
and political scenery as well as the overall ICT landscape. I noticed a rapid rise in access and 
ownership of ICT devices in the households I often visit and access, which gendered an interest 
in other Tunisian households from different economic and social levels. Furthermore, I was 
interested in learning about how different socioeconomic and age groups interact with ICTs for 
literacy and political participation purposes. Following the events of the uprising, several 
research studies and trade media articles focused on Tunisians’ ICT use during the events of the 
uprising and during the current democracy process.  However, knowing the disparities in access 
and use between different Tunisian demographic groups, I found the use of the word “Tunisians” 
to describe the online community problematic as it implies a generalization and a statement that 
all Tunisians (or the majority) are online. For instance, all statistics show that only half the 
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population- of 11 million Tunisians- is using the Internet (51.7% in 2013)1 and only two million 
Tunisians are on Facebook during the events of the uprising and three and a half million as of 
20132. Statistics also show that 20.2% of Tunisians own a personal computer3. 
My main concern was the potential exclusiveness of the new political scene to include 
only those who are connected and those who are media and digital literate.  For instance, out of 
the three and a half million Tunisians on Facebook, only 8% are over 45 years old. This leaves a 
big number of older people out of the Tunisian digital sphere. Thus, this project is primarily 
concerned with the issue of the digital divide, its prevalence in the Tunisian socio-technological 
scene, and its potential impact on the process of democratization following the revolution. 
Besides their effect on the political landscape, ICT are becoming significant and powerful on 
many levels of our daily lives. Research demonstrated their power to provide additional 
educational, income, and overall better well-being opportunities (DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2002; 
El Gody, 2006; Straubhaar, et al, 2012; Baueruschuster et al, 2014). Internet usage can facilitate 
maintenance and expansion of social networks and encourage self-expression, especially for 
vulnerable social groups such as women or the elderly, and increase social, human, and cultural 
capitals (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Antonio and Tuffley, 2014). However, both access and usage 
gaps create digital inequalities as those who effectively use the Internet will move ahead of those 
who do not on the social, economic, and political scales. As a matter of fact, the significance of 
ICT adoptions and usage is attributed to its ability to create and expand inequality gaps 
(Warschauer and Hargittai, 2002; Parayil, 2005; Anotnio and Tuffley, 2014) and reduce them 
(Warschauer, 2003) at the same time.  
                                                
1 http://www.mincom.tn/fileadmin/PDF/Indicateurs_TIC/Rapports/Stat_UIT_Ind.TIC_2009-2013-Ang.pdf 
2 http://www.wamda.com/2013/04/12-key-statistics-on-how-tunisians-use-social-media-infographic 
3 Tunisian Ministry of Communication, 2014.  
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The digital divide is an umbrella concept used to study issues of social inequalities in 
relation to ICT access and usage (Van Dijk, 2005). Vehovar et al (2006) reported the scholarly 
tendency to refer to the equipment or access divide (as often referred to in digital divide 
research) as the “first divide”, since the existence of such a gap eliminates all succeeding 
dimensions. In other words, only when researchers establish access to the equipment can they 
examine the extent of the second divide, i.e., the usage gap. The first wave of digital divide 
studies used to focus on demographic differences to measure the depth and the impact of the 
digital gaps. Researchers soon contended that demographic variables on their own do not reveal 
the complexities of the issue nor do they allow for a conceptualization of the digital technologies 
as they become increasingly part of the everyday life (Mehra, 2004; Van Dijk, 2005; Leaning 
2009).  
The new wave of research (since the early 2000s) developed new constructs to measure 
the digital divide, mainly in relation to usage, relevance, competencies, and benefits. DiMaggio 
and Hargittai (2001) identified the following five constructs as the main dimensions of the digital 
divide: (1) the equipment or the devices; (2) the autonomy of use; (3) the skills or competencies; 
(4) the social and cultural support; and (5) the relevance or the purpose from using the Internet. 
Each of these constructs engenders a different level of social inequality. In this research, I use the 
five categories to examine digital gaps among and within different demographic groups.  
While usage is related to enhanced life opportunities, it does not guarantee these rewards 
on an equal basis to all social groups. Research has shown the ICT provide higher rewards to 
some social groups vs. others (Rojas et al, 2001; DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2002; Straubhaar et al, 
2012). That is why studying the contextual layers that influence Internet access and the efficacy 
of usage are particularly important to the examination of the digital divide. Social factors such as 
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gender equity, socioeconomic stratifications, family history, community life, have direct 
influence on the quality and benefits of ICT use (Foley and Ferri, 2012; Straubhaar et al, 2012). 
The social aspect of the technology guides the design of this study. I build on social and media 
studies arguing that technologies are manipulated by human agents of a particular society for 
specific social situations, resulting in the creation of modes of usage that are specific to their 
social context (Bakardjieva, 2005; Leaning, 2009).  
I use a combination of demographic and social factors to explore the issues of access and 
usage in the Tunisian context. In his study of the pre-revolutionary digital culture in Tunisia, 
Zayani (2015) noticed the scarcity of research stemming from the Tunisian context. He stressed 
on the need for “historically grounded and theoretically informed analysis of micro-processes, 
cultural practices, and societal interactions that intersect with and are embedded in media usage, 
production, and consumption and anchored in evolving trends of socialized communication that 
are indissociable from everyday experiences and practices” (p. 13). Inspired by Zayani’s (and 
other Tunisian scholars’) call for more research about the Tunisian everyday experience with 
ICTs, I planned this study in order to understand the interaction of everyday Tunisians with 
digital technologies. My aim was to reveal trends and patterns of interactions with ICT that 
emerge as a product of the Tunisian context. In other words, what makes the Tunisian adopters 
and users experience and interaction with ICT different from adopters and users in different parts 
of the world?   
The overarching objective of in this study is to understand the digital divide. My goal is 
to identify the dimensions of the digital gap in my group of respondents through qualitative data 
collection. According to Van Dijk (2006), qualitative, small-community-focused research is a 
more appropriate framework for the examination and understanding of this globally persistent 
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issue. “Interviews are the digging tool of social science” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011, p. 171) as it 
allows for an in-depth examination of a particular problem with open ended questions that enable 
the respondents to freely discuss or talk about their experience or opinion about a certain topic. 
Besides, this method provides the researcher with great flexibility and can be easily adjusted to 
specific contexts and circumstances (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011). On another note, qualitative 
study is a process of inquiry that allows the researcher to include the context as a part of the 
research, and to use data collected beyond the tool itself such as the observations made during 
the interviews (Cresswell, 1998). Consequently, the qualitative method appears as the ideal tool 
to address the questions described above.  
To achieve my research aims an in-depth interview study was conducted in the region of 
Sousse in Tunisia to develop a qualitative understanding of the digital divide in Tunisia from 
three main perspectives. The first is the scope of the divide in terms of demographic and 
structural differences in technological adoption, mainly technological acquisition and access. The 
second perspective encompasses the dimensions of the usage gap in terms of technological 
competencies and skills, as well as differences in levels and modes of usage. The third 
perspective refers to the degree of ICT usage for political information and participation. Three 
main population groups are most pertinent to my study: low-income groups, women, and the 
elderly. The elderly are one of the most affected groups by the divide especially when age is 
combined with low income, few educational qualifications, and low literacy levels (Cullen, 
2001). Besides, they are particularly affected by the consequences of the new form of digital 
divide, i.e., lack of digital competencies given that younger generations develop digital and 
technological competencies in a faster rate than the older ones (Chen and Wellman, 2004; 
Correa, 2013). In general, the youths are more technology savvy than their elders who have 
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limited use of digital and new media technologies even when they have available access to the 
technology (Selwyn, 2004).  
The second group, women, is considered a vulnerable group not only in Tunisia but in 
most societies and cultures. Women in the MENA region are particularly vulnerable because of 
many historical, social and religious factors. El Gody (2006) argued that Arab countries must 
first address the issue of women's rights in order to bridge the digital gap between the Arab 
world and the rest of the world4. I am particularly interested in investigating whether this applies 
to Tunisian women given that Tunisia is known for having one of the most progressive women’s 
rights bill and one of the highest literacy rates in the region. Nevertheless, Tunisia is still a 
patriarchal society and women still hold the second position in the gender scale (Sinha, 2011), 
which leads me to suggest that gender may be an important factor in women’s digital media use.  
Finally, my research focuses on people from the less privileged socioeconomic groups. 
My aim is to understand the intersections between gender, social class, and age with the specific 
cultural and social context of Tunisia with regard to digital technology use. I conducted my 
interviews in two popular and one upscale - for comparative purposes- neighborhoods to 
examine their modes of interaction with technologies. For long, low socioeconomic status groups 
were categorized as the “have-nots.” This categorization soon proved to obscure complex digital 
experience of this social group that goes beyond the issue of access and Internet ownership 
(Mehra, 2004). On the one hand, as technologies become more affordable, ownership is no 
longer a measure of social class or social disadvantage. On the other, establishing ownership 
does not eliminate issues such as digital competencies, relevance, and attitudes that may hinder 
or promote advantageous usage of ICTs. That is why, the issue of the digital divide in regard to 
                                                
4 The Arab World has always scored significantly low on the digital divide index.  
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the less privileged social groups is increasingly important not only to ensure the inclusion of all 
social groups in the social sphere, but also ensure the access of these groups to an affordable and 
feasible means of empowerment.  
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1.2 LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In this section, I explain the theoretical significance of studying ICTs from a digital 
divide theoretical perspective. First, I explore modes of ICT usage in everyday life in everyday 
homes. I discuss their overall benefits and advantages to those who access and use them, and the 
problems they create for those who don’t. I explain how scholars defined and studied the issue, 
paying particular attention to the dimensions they used to examine this concept. In the final part 
of this section, I look at the digital divide from a political participation perspective and discuss 
ICT’s ability to foster democracy and political involvement, especially in relation to the Tunisian 
new-found democratic context.  
1.2.1 ICT at Home 
Digital technologies have become an undeniable part of the daily life of family 
households (Livingstone and Bober, 2006). Bakardjieva (2005) states that “as a direct reflection 
of the sweeping computerization of the institutions of production and education, computer 
technology had acquired imposed relevance in the everyday lives of people who were not 
necessarily ‘knowledge workers’ of high education and status” (p. 93). ICTs are part of most 
household everyday life system of education, leisure, work, and communication. However, 
households are divided in terms of ICT usage as there is substantial differences between the 
ways Internet shapes the lives of older vs. younger generations. Ever since its introduction in the 
family households, the Internet has become a fundamental and structural part of the young 
generations’ life (Prensky, 2001). On the other hand, older generations’ Internet usage and 
interaction depends on several social, educational, and psychological factors. Prensky explained 
that “as digital immigrants learn- like all immigrants, some better than others- to adapt to their 
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environment, they always retain, to some degree, their “accent,” that is, their foot in the past.” (p. 
2). On the other hand, technologies are a familiar domain to the young generations given that it’s 
their native land and language.  
This basic age-specific difference in the relationship between technologies and 
individuals results in significant gaps between the generations. While younger generations are 
known to be tech-savvy, the older generations adopt technologies at slower rates. In addition, the 
digital gap becomes even wider as the group becomes older. According to a report published in 
2012 by the Pew Research Center, half the American adults age 65 and older access and use the 
Internet on a regular basis.  However, the number drops to one third of the 75 and older age 
group. Once online, both age groups use the Internet for entertainment such as reading e-books, 
or for communication and socialization such as emails and Facebook (Pew Research Center, 
20125). The extent of similarities and differences between activities is often related to the older 
generation's’ values and cultures. For example, in Tunisia, younger generations are less attached 
to the traditional and patriarchal customs. On the other hand, older Tunisians are much more 
attached to their values and traditions which shape their attitudes and use of ICTs (Roy, 2012). 
This difference is an example of the ways in which the digital natives come in conflict with the 
digital immigrants (Prensky, 2001). It also constitutes one of the reasons for the persistence of 
the digital gap between the generations (Livingstone and Bober, 2006; Correa, 2013).  
The above goes in line with studies conducted in Western cultures about older versus 
younger generations’ interactions with the Internet. Livingstone and Bober (2006) examined the 
ways Internet shapes and is shaped by the family life, from a safety and parental regulation and 
control perspective. Their study revealed that both children and parents found the Internet to be 
                                                
5 http://www.sainetz.at/dokumente/Older_adults_and_Internet_use_2012.pdf 
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challenging, especially for the parents who view the Internet as a danger to their family values, 
and to the safety of their children (Livingstone and Bober, 2006; Correa, 2013). On the other 
hand, the interactions between the generations in regard to household digital technologies can 
take a beneficial and positive shape. Several studies examined the transfer of digital 
competencies from one generation to the other within the household. This line of research 
suggests that oftentimes, it is the offspring that play the role of brokers and transfer the digital 
competencies they acquired through formal education or through other community resources 
(cybercafé, youth centers, and other family members) to their parents and grandparents. This 
trend takes place particularly in socially disadvantaged and minority groups (Rojas et al, 2001; 
Bakardjieva, 2005; Correa et al, 2013; Straubhaar and Lu, 2014). Bakardjieva uses the term “the 
warm expert” to refer to the person who becomes the relative “digital expert” in her/his own 
household and engages in helping the digital novices of the family.  
In general, Bakardjieva (2005) accords greater agency to the Internet users at home. In 
her ethnographic study of the domestication of the Internet, she argues that unlike deterministic 
claims that the Internet will take over the everyday life of its users, the latters are aware of the 
array of usage and adoption options available to them and make informed choices about their 
interactions with the Internet and other digital technologies. Bakardjieva is part of a long line of 
research framework that views technology as a component of society that must be examined and 
understood as such (Qvortrup, 1984; Freeman, 1992; Miller and Slater, 2000; Leaning, 2009). 
Mehra (2004) refers to this perspective as the “situated approach,” (p. 795) which focuses on 
ways that technologies and societies shape each other. She argues that daily practice gives shape 
to the technology, while the technology simultaneously shapes social practices. In this regard, 
similar to Mehra, Brahimi and Babak (2015) explained that technology must be understood, 
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within the set of values, social structures and symbols, as the products of lived practices and 
experiences that shape and negotiate their meaning. On the other hand, the authors, like many 
other researchers, also point to the reciprocal shaping of the human experience by the 
technologies, which may provide positive or negative outcomes depending on usage, social, 
economic, and political factors.  
1.2.2 Internet and Empowerment  
The discourse about the Internet and social inclusion is strongly connected to the 
discourse about the Internet and social empowerment, particularly where social marginalization, 
low socioeconomic status, and a minority status are characteristics of the group under focus 
(Mehra, 2004). ICT do more than provide means of entertainment or channels of communication. 
They also provide means for social empowerment, access to education, and income-enhancing 
activities (Foley and Ferri, 2012; Antonio and Tuffley, 2014). Dewan and Riggins (2005) argued 
that ICT provide groups from low-income classes with opportunities to engage in economic 
activities such as online business and employment activities.  
Correa (2013) revealed that the Internet empowered women from lower socioeconomic 
status (in a study about Chilean families and techno-capital) with, for many, opportunities to 
expand and improve the quality of their small businesses, and more generally to improve their 
overall social and psychological being. In line with Correa, Mehra (2004) stated that Internet and 
other technologies usage has the potential to increase “feelings of self-worth and self-
empowerment” (p. 797). Antonio and Tuffley (2014) focused on SNS as a vehicle for women 
empowerment in developing countries. They argue that SNS and ICT in general allow women to 
form social groups online, and thus empower each other and develop ways to improve their 
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living situations. Additionally technologies foster self-expression and enable the emancipation 
from geographical and cultural and socioeconomic barriers (Foley and Ferri, 2012; Antonio and 
Tuffley, 2014).  
In the case of the elderly, studies, especially from the field of psychology, demonstrated 
that Internet use positively correlates with an overall sense of wellbeing. This research 
emphasizes the entertaining, socializing and educating features of the Internet, which provide 
older people with an enjoyable daily experience that improve their psychological state (Berkman 
and Glass, 2000; Chen and Parsson, 2002; Erickson and Johnson, 2011). Heo et al (2015) 
explored the relationship between the Internet usage and the elderly from a psychological 
perspective. Their study revealed that “higher levels of Internet use were significant predictors of 
higher levels of social support, reduced loneliness, and better life satisfaction and psychological 
well-being among older adults” (p. 268).  
However, these benefits of ICT usage are only accessible for those who are connected 
and using these technologies. Those who are not connected, remain excluded from the economic, 
educational, and entertaining opportunities that the digital sphere offers. In the following section, 
I examine the issue of the digital divide, how it has been framed theoretically, and how it has 
been researched in studies most relevant to my research.  
1.2.3 The digital divide: A barrier to social inclusion   
In the fast-changing media scenery, what is considered new media is context-related; 
what is new today will be old and traditional in the near future. According to Merrin (2009), 
today’s media experience is best understood within the digital paradigm. ICT in general are 
continuously changing the social order and the political, economic, and cultural scenery 
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(Castells, 1981). While access to ICTs provides a wide range of social benefits (DiMaggio and 
Hargittai, 2002; Foley and Ferri, 2012), it can also engender deep divides between the haves and 
have nots and between the users and the non-users. DiMaggio and Hargittai (2002) argue that the 
Internet in particular provides greater education, income, and health resources for users. 
However, the benefit to a society will only ensue with the inclusion of all its members in the 
digital circle in order to guarantee the equal access to the benefits of ICTs. This is still far from 
being achieved in most nations of the world, which resulted in a wave of study concerned with 
the concept of social inequality engendered by the digital divide (DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2002; 
Norris, 2001; Bakardjieva, 2005; Clayton and Macdonald, 2013; Antonio and Tuffley, 2014). 
This concept has proven to be complex and difficult to fit in one definition. The gap between 
those who have access to ICT and those who don’t was the most commonly used definition. This 
definition has informed the early wave of the digital divide research - given that it corresponded 
with the early stages of Internet diffusion. However, the lack of access to the technologies is no 
longer sufficient to explain the digital gap within and across populations or countries; other 
factors contribute as much as the lack of access to the digital divide.  
Scholars were concerned that the lack of access conceptualization would lead to thinking 
that the digital divide is simply a problem of material and physical acquisitions, and refers only 
to socio-economic inequalities (Van Dijk, 2006). Several researchers soon stated that access 
should not dominate the digital divide research and pointed out that the digital gap should also be 
studied among people with access to technology equipment and to the Internet (DiMaggio and 
Hargittai; Van Dijk, 2005). On the one hand, their concern about the “access” framing of digital 
divide research proved to be justified with the abundance of quantitative research stemming from 
socio-economic fields of studies. On the other hand, this line of “access” based research 
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pressured political and social decision makers to put the digital divide as an important issue in 
the development and policy agenda (Van Dijk, 2006). In his 2006 meta-analysis of digital divide 
studies, Van Dijk (2006) identified the lack of theories as one of the main problem of the 
research focusing on the digital divide, which is one of the reasons why the term “the digital 
divide” has proved hard to conceptualize. However, Van Dijk mentioned both a noticeable shift 
in the research focus, from physical access to the usage and the skills required to use ICT, and a 
persistent lack of focus on the key determinants of the digital divide such as economic, social, 
political and cultural factors.  
 In the coming section, I will summarize some of the factors and research studies that 
moved beyond the access component of the digital divide. Rojas et al. (2001) took a cultural and 
sociological approach in their analysis of poor and working class minority groups of Austin, 
Texas. They analyzed the intersection of the cultural and socio-economic factors, with the race, 
ethnicity, age, and gender factors to examine the social construction of ICT in the lives of the 
specific groups they chose to study. They focused mainly on Bourdieu’s concepts of techno-
disposition to understand how techno-capital is transferred across the generations (from the 
parents to the children and from the children to the parents). The term techno-disposition is 
central to the study of the interaction between social and technological factors and how they 
affect one another. They defined “techno-dispositions by the following indicators: practices, 
perceptions and attitudes, technical education, awareness of technology, desires for information, 
job requirements, social relations with community members and community organizations, and 
geographical location” (2001, p. 9). Rojas and her colleagues found that socio-economic status is 
still the main determinant of the acquisition of techno-capital, while the social capital- the 
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resources provided by one’s social networks/acquaintances- does not necessarily foster 
technological skills or usage.  
The usage construct can be studied from several perspectives. Some examined it in terms 
of information services and relevance to the users (Stanley, 2003; DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2002; 
Correa, 2013) while others examined usage in terms of “quality of use” (DiMaggio and Hargittai, 
2002). Stanley’s (2003) research findings- and approach- were similar to those of Rojas and her 
colleagues, as she found that culture was one of the key factors in the low usage and lack of 
computer competence of low income communities of San Diego, California, while access had a 
less significant impact. Moreover, Stanley attributed the lack of usage and willingness to learn 
and acquire computer competencies to psychological factors, which she classified into three 
main obstacles: (1) “relevance”, which is when the respondents didn’t feel that computer 
technologies will have a direct economic or social impact on their lives or future; (2) “comfort 
zone,” which refers to the refusal to challenge negative self-assessment and the unwillingness to 
alter daily routines; and (3) “self-concept,” which she uses to describe the belief that one is not 
the “type” of person to use a computer. In other words, being a “computer user” was not one of 
their possible selves (their visions about who and what they may become) (Stanley, 2003, p. 
412). The respondents perceived the medium- the computer- as highly complex which created 
anxiety stemming from feelings of “fear” to damage or wreck the device Both Stanley’s and 
Rojas et al.’s studies revealed that access was not the main attribute of the digital gap in the 
communities they studied; rather, it was the problem of usage and availability of the 
digital/computer competencies necessary to be able to use the technology.  
In their article/report “Confronting the challenges of participatory culture,” Jenkins et al. 
(2006) argue that digital competencies enable online political and social participation. Thus, the 
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lack of these competencies results in the lack of community involvement and engagement in the 
political and social life taking place online and even offline. An example to support Jenkins et 
al.’s claim would again be the case of pre-revolution Tunisia or Egypt, where the new media 
both facilitated and discouraged the acquisition of competencies and collective content 
production. Because of the government ban over political blogging and political websites, 
Tunisian and Egyptian youth were compelled to learn how to work their way around the 
government censorship, before the political change. Thus, they created affinity spaces and 
engaged in informal peer to peer learning where they taught each other how to use proxies, and 
learned how to download and store website pages under zipped files and share them among each 
other without being caught. They also learned how to encode and decode each other’s (and the 
popular bloggers) messages that were scripted to dodge the attention of government watchdogs. 
In other words, the same circumstances that put barriers on their content generation and political 
engagement stimulated their creativity and pushed them to acquire media and digital 
competencies and to engage in collaborative problem solving. This gave them an advantage over 
those who are “digitally illiterate” in following the political scene of their country. While the 
recent social movement studies focusing on the Arab world reported no significant gender 
differences in terms of online participation, other dimensions of the digital divide reveal a gender 
gap in terms of ICT usage.  
El Gody’s (2006) earlier study about Arab women and ICT access and use, shows that 
gender inequality is one of the main reasons for the digitally fragmented Arab society. He claims 
that social, cultural, and religious characteristics of the Arab world have greatly contributed to 
the marginalization of Arab women. In addition to the gender divide, El Gody (2006) identified 
illiteracy as one of the most important factors contributing to the digital divide in the Arab 
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societies. Coleman & Blumler (2009) argue that the outcome of public discussion and the notion 
of citizenship differ in a context where literacy rates are lower than the rest of the world, and 
where media literacy and digital competencies are not fully integrated in the educational system 
(The Knight Commission Report). Several illiteracy factors negatively impact ICT usage, but the 
issue of the lack of language proficiencies is particularly significant in the case of Internet use. El 
Gody explains that more than half the Arab population have little to no English language 
proficiency, which greatly affects their ability to navigate and use the Internet.  
The language barrier hinders the effectiveness of a universal solution to the digital divide, 
especially considering the enduring lack of domains, websites, and search engines that offer their 
services in Arabic (El Gody, 2006). Indeed, most popular websites in the Arab world are offered 
in English and Latin languages. Warschauer (2012), adds that for a long time, Internet remained 
an elitist medium in countries such as Egypt because of the lack of Arabic websites and the 
difficulties of typing in Arabic. However, in recent years, Internet has become a linguistically 
pluralist space with websites and services offered in multiple global languages. Yet, one of the 
persistent linguistic problems is the cross-language interactions as the popular groups, forums, 
services websites, are still provided only in English, which puts those who don’t speak or have 
little English proficiency at a global disadvantage. Hargittai and DiMaggio (2001) discussed this 
factor of lack of relevant content. They referred to the problem as the lack of “availability of 
suitable content” pointing out to its contribution to the creation of further social and linguistic-
based inequalities, which adds one more dimension to the problem of relevance.   
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1.2.4 ICT and Political Participation 
One thing ICT are doing to our world is blurring the line between the public and the 
private, and redefining the concept of citizenship. It has allowed the user to move from his/her 
stand as a spectator to take a seat around the virtual table (Coleman and Blumler, 2009) and 
become a political and civic participant. Political participation refers to citizens’ active 
involvement that aims at influencing decisions made by the governments and the outcome of 
official elections (Gustafsson, 2012; Zhang et al, 2010; Coleman and Blumler, 2009). Civic 
participation and engagement refer to the people’s willingness to volunteer for community 
actions through non-government means (e.g., building a homeless shelter) (Zhang et al, 2010). 
Accordingly, several media and social scholars foresaw the potential of the Internet and ICT to 
enhance democracy by fostering citizens’ participation (Dahlberg, 2001; Jenkins and Thorhurn, 
2003; Castells, 2009; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Brassari and Trere, 2012). In addition, the 
collective nature of the Internet offers the citizens low-cost engagement and expression tools, 
along with the opportunity for multi-directional communication (bottom-up, many-to-many, 
horizontal, peer-to-peer) that challenges the broadcast model (Coleman & Blumler, 2009; 
Merrin, 2009; Jenkins and Thorhurn, 2003; Resnik, 2001; Delli Carpini, 2000). Through its 
interactive features, Web 2.0- the new features of the web that allow users to produce and 
generate content not only consume them (O’Reilly, 2005)- is allowing an increased and 
continuous flow of personal information presenting the user with the ability to mass mediate 
themselves (Castells, 2009; Brasari and Trere, 2005). 
Today, ICT and new media are changing people’s sense of ourselves as members of the 
community, and their sense of communities as part of a bigger social group, i.e., a nation or 
nation -state (Jenkins and Thorburn, 2000). Dahlberg (2001) discusses the constructivist nature 
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of the relationship between the state and the citizens. The author argues that it is not a static 
predetermined relationship; rather, it is continuously evolving, redefined, and rearticulated by the 
emergent technology and the changing nature of the social and economic environment (Coleman 
& Blumler, 2009; Dahlberg, 2001). Buckingham (2009) also takes a postmodernist stand by 
questioning the fundamental epistemological assumptions on which traditional notions of 
citizenship are based. Briefly, the majority of scholars take a social constructivist view of ICT 
where the effects of the technology are constructed based on multiple elements and contexts 
rather than based on the technology itself. In fact, the theoretical narrative about ICT and social 
change is moving from questioning whether ICT foster political and social change, to identifying 
the nature of their role and the contexts in which they facilitate social change.  
1.3 THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: TUNISIA 
My focus is on how the social aspects of Tunisia shape the usage of computers and the 
Internet, especially in popular and middle class neighborhoods, and reciprocally, how 
technologies have shaped Tunisians’ daily life as well as their political attitudes and behaviors. 
Thus, in this section, I provide an overview of Tunisia and of the factors that inform my analysis, 
namely, the history, education, gender, and technological attributes of the country.  
1.3.1 History and Society  
Tunisia is a small North African country of 11 million citizens. It is a hybrid society with 
a blend of cultures and civilizations, and a multi-layered identity mixing Maghrebin, Arabic, 
Islamic, African and Mediterranean traits (Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 2012). It was a French colony 
from 1881 to 1956, which left visible and evident marks on the political and educational systems 
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as well as on the social and cultural life (Merone, 2015). The first president Habib Bourguiba, 
along with other independence struggle figures based their vision for building the country on the 
French ideologies. Their main goal was to modernize the Tunisian society through developing 
the economy and improving the social life (Merone, 2015). Bourguiba’s political vision was to 
create a nationalist, secularist, and a socialist society that supported free education and the 
emancipation of women and invested heavily in these two areas (Murphy, 2003; World Bank 
Report, 2005). Bourguiba was relatively successful in his vision and long term strategies, as 
Tunisia has become one of the most modernized Arbic societies with progressive women rights, 
high levels of literacy, and a stable agriculture, industry, and tourism economy (Ayeb, 2011). For 
years, Tunisia’s economy maintained a stable annual growth of 5%6. However, the country was 
hit by an economic recession following the 2011 revolution. The recession was marked mainly 
by price inflation and rising unemployment from an already high 13% in 2010 to 18% in 2011 
(Wolf and Lefèvre, 2012). Today unemployment remains high at 15.3% (World Bank, 2015).  
The inflation coupled with the unemployment rate had a particularly significant impact 
on the middle and lower socioeconomic classes of the country. However, it is difficult to find 
research that discusses the social stratification aspect of Tunisia. To my knowledge, very little 
empirical research from all fields has been undertaken in the area of social class in Tunisia. The 
few studies that discuss socioeconomic stratifications use national statistics to divide the 
Tunisian social classes. Based on these statistics, it is argued that up to 80% of Tunisians are 
considered middle class which is divided to the Tunisian upper middle class and the lower 
                                                
6 World Bank country overview: Tunisia, retrieved on 02/04/2016 from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/overview 
I would like to bring attention to the fact that most statistics about the country before the revolution were based on 
government data or were controlled by the government (in the case of NGO numbers). The government attempts to 
meet requirements of the economic partners (mainly the EU) through amplifying numbers and statistics that do not 
always reflect the social and economic status of the country. 
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middle class (Brown and Spilling, 2009). The authors, revealed a notable growth in the size of 
the lower middle class population following the recent recession (Brown and Spilling, 2009; 
Wolf and Lefèvre, 2012). Hasnaoui and Belhadj (2015) used a survey study of the Tunisian 
household (N = 11,281) conducted by the Tunisian Institute of Statistics in 2010 to explore the 
Tunisian social classes. The authors used categories such as socio-professional status, 
consumption of durable goods, family size, the place of residence, the employment status, the 
heritage, and the perceptions of belonging to the middle class. Their findings goe in line with the 
above mentioned studies. They argue that the middle class has reached 90% of the population. 
Within this class there are three main groups, the upper and middle groups constitute 80% and 
the low-middle class constitute about 12% of the middle class category. The latter group 
oscillates below and above the poverty line depending on the economic situation of the country. 
For instance, following the revolution and its consequential recession, poverty rates rose to reach 
7.6% in 2013, but started declining again to reach 7.1% in 2015 as a direct result of the steady 
and peaceful progress of the political transition (Worldbank.org). That being said, the national 
statistics mask significant regional divide. The rural areas poverty remains double the national 
average even though it is positively correlated with the national poverty rates (World Bank 
Report, 2005).  
Education, on the other hand, is a significant aspect of the Tunisian society and economy 
with 20% of the annual budget allocated to public education (Brown and Spilling, 2009). As a 
result, public education is free and standardized for all levels, and mandatory until the age of 16 
(Brown and Spilling, 2009). By 1995, Tunisia’s 6 year-olds were all enrolled in school, which 
was one of the Millennium Development Goals of universal primary education (World Bank 
Report, 2005). Moreover, the educational system does not discriminate between girls and boys, 
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with more than half the students registered in Tunisian colleges being women (World Bank 
Report; Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 2012).  
Tunisia is known as the most liberal country in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, because it is a regional leader in terms of gender equity (Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 
2012; World Bank Report). Tunisian women enjoy significant social and legal freedom 
articulated in the “Code of Personal Status” (CPS), a progressive set of laws instigated and 
implemented by Bourguiba in 1957 (Brown and Spilling, 2009; Ayeb, 2011; Tchaicha and 
Arfaoui, 2012). The CPS guarantees Tunisian women equal political rights (voting and 
candidacy), economic rights, reproductive rights (family planning and abortion), and civil and 
legal rights (children’s custody, divorce, etc.). The CPS also abolished polygamy, which makes 
Tunisia the first country and even to this date one of few exceptions among Arab countries, 
where polygamy is banned (World Bank Report, 2005; Brown and spilling, 2009; Charrad, 
2011). The 1993 reform under Ben Ali’s presidency gave equal authority rights to both the father 
and the mother and allowed Tunisian mother to transfer their nationality to their children 
regardless of the nationality of their husbands (Charrad, 2011). In addition, The early 
implementation of the family planning program (1964) resulted in a reduction of birth rate from 
7 to 1.7 children per woman (Brown and Spilling, 2008; Roy, 2012). The combination of these 
factors has transformed the essence of the Tunisian society; it is now based on nuclear families 
rather than extended families, with less children in each household, a husband and wife who are 
closer to each other in age and most often in educational and professional levels, and an 
abundance of technological and media devices in each household (Roy, 2012).  
Nevertheless, Tunisia is still a patriarchal society and Arab and Islamic traditions often 
hinder the full enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the CPS (Charrad, 2011; Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 
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2012). While pay equity is stipulated, men still hold the highest positions and advance faster than 
women in their work positions. The same applies to the family which still holds men in higher 
position, and holds females to higher moral and conduct expectations than their male 
counterparts (Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 2012). Research from Western cultures with similar defined 
gender roles showed a direct effect on the acquisition of ICT competencies, with women 
becoming skilled in technology use at a slower rate than their male counterparts (Van Dijk, 2005; 
Lu and Straubhaar, 2014). It would therefore be reasonable to anticipate a comparable impact of 
gender difference on ICT usage in Tunisia as well. 
1.3.2 ICT and Digital Divide in Tunisia  
Following the World Summit of 2005, the Tunisian government invested heavily in ICT 
infrastructure. By the end of the decade, Tunisia had become a leading country in ICT 
infrastructure in North Africa and the Arab world (Breuer and Groshek, 2014; Jelassi, 2010). In 
2001 the government launched an initiative called “The family computer program” to allow 
families to purchase computers at an affordable price. To insure a high penetration, the 
government offered low-cost access to the Internet by implementing the “5As strategy” which 
aims at providing, Accessible, Affordable ICTs, for Anyone, Anywhere, and Anytime (Breuer 
and Groshek, 2014; Jelassi, 2010). As a result of the 5As strategy, Tunisia today provides one of 
the lowest broadband prices in Africa with 84% of Tunisian users having access to the Internet at 
home. In addition, the Tunisian government implemented programs that aim at providing 
Tunisian youth with ICT and multimedia skills through national and regional computer centers 
that offer training for free (mostly) or for very low costs. Furthermore, educational institutions 
offer information and multimedia classes for students and pupils. Basic skill courses are usually 
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required, and advanced courses are optional or limited to specialized institutions (Ouerghi, 2007; 
Azouzi, 2009; World of telecommunication/ICT Development Report 2010).  
A more recent initiative called the “e-Tunisia” program was launched between 2005 and 
2011. The government took measures to “modernize the public administration in order to 
facilitate communications within government (G2G), between Government and citizens (G2C), 
government and employees (G2E) and between government and business section (G2B) 
(Ouerghi, 2014, p. 4). E-Tunisia also aimed at fully integrating ICT in all education levels, to 
digitize cultural and scientific resources, and popularize their use to facilitate the general public’s 
access to these resources (Ouerghi, 2014). This initiative has resulted in a highly connected 
population with a mobile phone penetration rate that surpassed the 100%  (Macharia, 2014), and 
an Internet penetration rate of 51% as of 20137. 
These numbers allowed Tunisia to rank among the top six African nations in terms of 
ICT penetration and infrastructure. On the other hand, they revealed that Tunisia still has many 
challenges to overcome, given that only half of the population is connected to the Internet, which 
is a low number compared to developed countries. As a matter of fact, it was clear after the 
events of the uprising that the official statistics reflecting Tunisian prosperity and stability were, 
to a large extent, a facade created by the government to mask major deficiencies, and maintain an 
appealing image of the country with respect to foreign economic partners’ sociopolitical 
requirements. Unfortunately, there is a limited number of in-depth scholarly studies that situate 
ICTs within the social context of Tunisia or the whole MENA region and explore exactly how 
the regional disparities, social problems, and political control affected ICT adoptions and usage 
in Tunisia (Zayani, 2015). Researchers still have to rely on government and NGO statistics about 
                                                
7 The Tunisian Ministry of Communication Technologies and Digital Economy.   
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ICTs, and build on existing divides and social problems in the region in order to develop some 
understanding of the Internet and digital media dynamic in the Arab world.  
The stability and prosperity facade concealed deep and serious social, economic, and 
political issues that led to the 2010 uprising (Zayani, 2015). For a long time, these problems were 
overlooked in the digital initiatives. However, the weight of these problems and the social divide 
started to shape the post-revolution planning for the future of ICT in Tunisia. Thus, the new 
initiative -Digital Tunisia 2018- which was developed in 2013 by the Tunisian Ministry of 
Communication Technologies and Digital Economy had as one of its main goals: “the reduction 
of regional and generational differences to insure access for all” (National ICT Regulatory 
Frameworks Report8; Tunisia, 2014, p. 5). Although, there are no official reports from the 
ministry about the types of digital divide in the country, it is obvious from the goals of Digital 
Tunisia 2018 that the government has identified two main types of divides: regional divide and 
generational divide. This may be due to the general social and political post-revolution context, 
which began to focus more attention on deep social disparities between Tunisian social groups, 
and dedicate more efforts to reduce the gaps between them.  
In the following section, I discuss a few of the problems most pertinent to my study. First 
on the list is the regional divide. Following its independence from French colonization, Tunisia’s 
development programs allocated most focus and resources to the coastal regions, which led to 
great regional inequalities (Ben Hassine, 2014). Today, there is a significant divide between 
coastal cities and the rural Western and Southern parts of the country (Breuer and Groshek, 
2014). According to Saidani (2012), the poor interior parts of Tunisia have been isolated 
                                                
8 ClusMED is a European Union funded project which goal is the “reinforcement of ICT regulations and ICT for 
tackling societal challenges links in Europe and in the Mediterranean countries.”  
Report retrieved on October, 2015 from: http://www.clusmed.eu/?wpdmact=process&did=38  
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socially, economically, and politically from the rest of the country. This led to waves of 
migration from the interior region to the more prosperous coastal cities. In fact, it was not a 
surprise that the first sparks of the revolution came from those underdeveloped and marginalized 
areas.  
Second, is the generational divide or the differences between the connected youth and the 
less technologically engaged older generations? The older generations continue to fall even 
further behind technologically, while the younger generations become more technologically and 
digitally literate. Part of the problem is due to the modern education landscape which includes 
technologies as part of its teaching strategies and goals. The generational difference is no 
surprise as many theorists have identified “age” as one of the main factors in the gap between 
those who use technologies and the Internet and those who don’t (Negroponte, 1995), and 
between those who have the skills to use technologies and those who don’t (Van Dijk, 2004).   
Also left out of the Digital Tunisia 2018 initiative is the state of women in the 
technological sphere. I am concerned with the existence of a gender divide in Tunisia stemming 
from a line of research that finds men to be more avid users of ICT and from the patriarchal 
nature of the Tunisian society. According to Van Dijk (2005) “[ICT] use is very much gendered” 
(p. 182). Through his series of digital divide studies, Van Dijk found that men in developed 
countries use the Internet twice as long as women, even though the access divide between the 
two genders has been closing. While Tunisian women are known to have one of the highest 
literacy rates and progressive women rights in the area (Sinha, 2011), gender inequality is still a 
significant problem in the Tunisian society and women have less opportunities for employment 
and power positions than their male counterparts (Ben Hassine, 2014; Sinha, 2011).This 
assertion is confirmed by Ben Hassine’s study (2014), which was conducted to assess Tunisian 
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female students, staff, and faculty use of ICT. The study revealed that although both gender are 
guaranteed equal access to ICT on campus and at home, women are less likely to spend time 
using ICT and thus less likely to acquire ICT skills compared to male respondents. The female 
respondents explained that fulfilling domestic responsibilities is the main factor preventing them 
from allocating more time to ICT usage. In other words, cultural gender roles foster a gender 
divide and digital competencies gap between men and women.  
1.3.3 The Revolution and a New Techno-Political Context 
On the flipside of the modern nation that he helped create, Bourguiba is also known for 
instigating a political atmosphere that suppressed plurality and legitimate opposition. In 1987, his 
prime minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali took over the presidency after a “soft coup-d’état”, 
establishing that Bourguiba was unable to continue in his position for medical reasons. Although 
Ben Ali continued on Bourguiba’s economic and social strategies, he further suffocated the 
country with political oppression, media censorship, and a mafia-like system9 of nepotism 
(Bouhaffa, 2011). He also changed the constitution multiple times to meet his political 
ambitions, allowing himself to be reelected as president for 4 times, thus staying in power for 23 
years. This means that the new generation of Tunisians (those under the age of 25, about half 
Tunisia’s 11 million people) have only known one president, one regime, and one dictatorship 
(Marshall, 2001). According to Angrist (2013), “the fact that the Tunisian population was 
relatively prosperous with a high Internet usage rate likely indicated that the country had rising 
expectations of its regime with regard to both economic prosperity and political participation 
                                                
9 The term Mafia System was widely used by the Tunisians but it was seen for the first time in an official document 
in a WikiLeaks letter from the American ambassador.  
http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_tunisia_protests 
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which were not being met” (p. 549). To the contrary, the Tunisian government was becoming 
more and more authoritarian and oppressive, while the country was going through difficult 
economic times with rising prices. As a conclusion, Tunisia had a complex and contradictory 
ICT dynamic that is not strange to other Arab world ICT landscape (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria). On the one hand the country strived to develop its ICT infrastructure and 
systems in order to generalize access for the population; on the other, the regime maintained a 
tight control and censorship system over their citizens’ use of ICT (El Gody, 2006). 
The events of the uprising came as a product of this political, social, and technological 
struggle. On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26 years old modest street vegetable 
vendor from Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, immolated himself to protest constant maltreatment by 
municipality agents. His actions sparked a widespread uprising in Tunisia that resulted in the 
overthrow of the Ben Ali regime and continued on to shake long-established regimes in several 
Arab countries, including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain (Bouhafa, 2011; Kuebler, 
2011; Cavatorta and Haugbolle, 2012; Dupuis, 2014).  
SNS, particularly Facebook, have been used by the connected Tunisians during the events of the 
uprising as a means of communication, mobilization, and support (Zayani, 2015). During the 
years that followed, Facebook is still continuously used to discuss the new political scene, actors, 
and parties, and the future of the country in general. Facebook and other media were also used to 
spread the news and updates about the several sit-ins that took place in the government square 
“Al-Qasbah”. Tunisians continued to put pressure on those leading the country at the time to 
change both the government and the constitution, which led to elections to form an interim 
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government and a Constituent Assembly (Nouri, 2013)10. Within a few years, the freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press indexes raised significantly to position Tunisian as a leading 
Arabic country on those two democracy indicators. In this study, I allocate a section to 
investigate the effects of the newly acquired freedom on political participation, particularly on 
the digital sphere through information technologies.   
                                                
10 On March, 3rd, 2011, the Prime Minister at the time, Mohamed Ghannouchi stepped down and the interim 
President Fouad Mbazaa announced the formation of a new government and nominated Beji Caid Essebsi as the 
Prime Minister. He also announced the scheduling of a legislative elections to take place in summer 2011 (it was 
postponed and took place in October 2011). 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As a conclusion to the above discussed literature, it has become apparent that the digital 
divide has become more of an umbrella to several underlying issues, factors, and causes of 
digital and technological disparities (Van Dijk, 2012; Warschauer, 2012). It is true that ICTs 
have become an integral part of everyday life but their adoption and consumption differ from one 
social group to the other. Their benefits and advantages also vary depending on several social 
factors, including the depth of the digital gaps between different social and demographic groups. 
The digital divide is closely tied to different levels of social inequalities, as those can hinder 
economic, social, and technological development efforts. Therefore, an examination of the 
digital divide must be situated within the specific social and political context of the technologies 
under focus. My dissertation focuses on the Tunisian digital technology landscape in the context 
of the post-revolution. The setting of my in-depth interview study, Tunisia, is a small country 
with 11 million inhabitants11, half of which are under the age of 25 and highly educated. It is one 
of the leading African countries in terms of ICT, with multiple government initiatives and 
programs implemented to provide affordable technology and access to all Tunisians. Although 
the stated purpose of these initiatives was to generalize access to Tunisians all over the country, 
regardless of geographic location, age, gender, or socioeconomic status, disparities are apparent 
suggesting a digital divide. My overarching theoretical goal is to investigate the dimensions of 
the digital divide in Tunisia. My immediate research goal is to explore the intersection of 
different demographic and social factors with technology access and use. I am mainly concerned 
                                                
11Statistics based on the latest CIA facts about Tunisia. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html 
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with the gender, age, class forces, and their implications for ICT access, attitudes, and usage in 
daily life and for political participation.  
The following research questions will help in guiding this project:  
RQ1: What are the implications of gender, age, and class on ICT access and usage? 
RQ2: What are the implications of gender, age, and class on attitudes towards ICT?  
RQ3: What are the implications of gender, age, and class on ICT usage for political 
participation?  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
As a result of several consecutive digital and technology initiatives, Tunisia has become 
highly connected with one of the most developed telecommunications infrastructures in North 
Africa. However, it is rather risky to take the government numbers for granted. Indeed, most of 
these statistics are derived from official reports published by the pre-revolution government 
agencies, which had to maintain a good technological image in order to meet the requirements 
necessary to obtain trade treaties and financial aid, especially from the European Union. Besides, 
the data remain descriptive with no in-depth analyses about each communication technology, its 
penetration in Tunisian households and the extents/nature of its usage. That is why, it is 
important to conduct academic, non-governmental studies to more closely examine ICT 
ownership and usage in the post-revolution Tunisia (Zayani, 2015).  
I conducted this study aimed at providing much needed in-depth qualitative data about 
ICT access and use in Tunisia. Second, I aim at making a small contribution to the digital divide 
literature, especially in the context of Tunisia, a country that belongs to an under-studied region 
in the field of the digital divide, the Middle East and North Africa. Conducting ethnographic 
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research studies in Tunisia at this particular moment, is important because most scholars, as well 
as media and political specialists, argue that ICT will continue to play an essential role in the 
democracy process in the post-revolution (Castells, 2015; Zayani, 2015). Researchers argue that 
the governments of many developed countries are not taking advantage of SNS in particular and 
ICT in general to nurture citizens’ political engagement and participation. However, without 
ensuring ICT access and usage by the whole populations, these recommendations are not only 
not feasible but will also result in a digitally exclusive sphere. That is why, ethnographic 
research is necessary to understand the social layers of the digital divide and to identify Tunisian 
social strengths and weaknesses that could be addressed to reduce the digital gap.  
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
While there is an ample amount of statistical data that describes ICT ownership and use 
in Tunisia, I opted for an ethnographic approach for several reasons. The first reason is the 
capability of ethnographic research to situate the technology within a specific place, and to 
provide the appropriate tools to analyze the interaction between the technology and the users 
without assuming the agency of one over the other. Miller and Slater (2000) argued that for a 
long time, research about the Internet has investigated the technology as a “placeless” (p. 1) 
device and invoked the need for ethnographic research to understand how the Internet, along 
with other technologies are assimilated into the everyday life of individuals and communities. In 
other words, ethnographic research contextualize the technology and respects the particularities 
of specific cultural, social, economic, and political contexts.  
The second reason is related to the existing literature about ICT usage for political 
participation in Tunisia. The Tunisian Revolution engendered a series of studies about the 
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Internet and SNS that focus on the Tunisian digital sphere (Zayani, 2015). However, most of 
these studies are entrenched within a political participation area of research and are more 
concerned with the participation and effectiveness of the already connected, than with the extent 
and scope of connection and usage among all Tunisians.  In other words, the research about 
digital media use following the revolution attempts to paint a diagram of the information flow 
within the online sphere and from the online to the offline sphere. In this work, I am more 
concerned with the access and usage itself, as well as with the interaction and attitudes of 
ordinary Tunisians vis-à-vis digital technologies. The focus of my research is on the vulnerable 
demographic groups including women, the elderly, and people from the lower middle class. I 
was mainly looking for Tunisians from popular neighborhoods whose socio-economic status can 
be described as middle to lower middle class. I also focused on middle to elderly age group, as 
research from all over the world demonstrates a persistent age divide between the elderly and the 
highly connected youth (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Correa, 2013). Nevertheless, I interviewed a few 
respondents from younger generations after observing the family dynamics and the involvement 
of the youth in their grandparents and parents’ technology usage.  
My point of departure was Sousse, one of the biggest coastal governorates in Tunisia 
with a population of 676,500 in 2014 according to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics12. I 
selected Sousse as the point of departure for a series of project, this dissertation being the first. 
The overarching aim of these projects is to map the digital divide in Tunisia with respect to the 
socioeconomic differences in the different regions of the country. The post-independence 
governments focused their development efforts and strategies on the coastal areas of the country, 
leaving the interior to suffer from significantly high unemployment and poverty rates (Bouhaffa, 
                                                
12 http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexen.php 
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2011; Kuebler, 2011; Breuer and Groshek, 2014). The divides are also obvious within the more 
developed coastal Tunisian cities. In Sousse, for example, different neighborhoods consist of 
different socioeconomic classes with different income levels, occupations, and social status. That 
is why I opted for investigating the divide within one city before the examination of the divides 
between the cities and regions. I chose the city of Sousse as the location for my ethnographic 
research for several reasons; (1) because of the diversity of its neighborhoods and the possibility 
to explore different socioeconomic status communities within the same city; (2) because Sousse 
is my hometown, which allowed me to easily find gatekeepers and have access to different 
neighborhoods.  
Furthermore, being from Sousse meant that I conducted this research assuming the role of 
the native ethnographer, which gave me several advantages. On the one hand, my strong 
familiarity with the linguistic cultural traits allowed for an easier communication with the 
informants. They were free to express themselves and articulate their opinions and patterns as 
they do on a daily basis. Second, my familiarity with the cultural and social traits as well as the 
history of the city allowed for a quick understanding and interpretations of their discourses, 
which gave way to several instant questions and more fruitful discussions. Kraidy (1999) argues 
that native ethnography is an appropriate epistemological approach for understanding cultures 
from within as the ethnographer observes daily life patterns that pass unnoticed and uses 
ethnographic research to explore and theoretically make sense of those cultural traits. I have 
personally visited Sousse often during my 13 years of stay in the US. I used my familiarity with 
both cultures to identify patterns of behaviors and attitudes that are specific to the Tunisian 
culture. The last phase of this project was the intensive field work during which I used an in-
depth interview study to take my observations to the next level and give a space to the Tunisians 
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in the city of Sousse to articulate, on their own words, those behaviors and attitudes in relation to 
ICT.   
In Sousse, I selected three municipalities: Zouhour (14,786 families), Kalaa (50815 
families), and Khezama (42,705 families)13. Khezama reflects the complexity of the issue of 
class in Tunisia more than the other two communities. It has a combination of very rich, middle 
class, and lower middle class families within the same densely populated geographic area. 
Zouhour and Kalaa could be described as suburban, mostly middle class and lower middle class 
neighborhoods also within the same geographic area. Thus, geographic stratification of the 
classes in Tunisian cities is quite complicated for reasons that will be discussed with further 
details below. To be more precise, I will state that I have selected “popular” neighborhoods14 in 
Kalaa and Zouhour.  
As previously discussed in the literature, research studies or even government data that 
describe class stratification in Tunisia are almost nonexistent15. I will attempt to describe the 
class division in Sousse based on my observation during my ethnographic study and based on my 
knowledge of the region given that Sousse is my hometown. The concept of class is clear in the 
mind of Tunisians although formal classifications are unclear. According to multiple sources 
(Brown and Spilling, 2009; Hasnaoui and Belhadj, 2015), the Tunisian society could roughly be 
divided into a high social class composed of approximately 20% of the population, and a middle 
social class that includes the rest of the population (80%). The boundary is very blurry 
                                                
13 National Institute of Statistics, Tunisia, 2015 Report.  
14 Popular neighborhoods is a term Tunisians use to call a collection of streets that house low-middle class families.  
15 A request was made to the Governorate of Sousse to obtain information about family incomes or class 
stratification within or across the neighborhoods or the whole region in Sousse were met by the response that no 
such data or statistics are available.  
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geographically. For instance a neighborhood like Khezama has houses where rich families live in 
close vicinity of houses where middle-class and even poor families live.  
Nevertheless, I would argue that the lines between the two classes is clear mainly in 
terms of housing, car ownership, and employment. The upper class usually own their own 
businesses and are composed of families that are well known in their regions as the communities 
within one city usually know each other very well. The middle class is much more diverse, it 
combines people from different professional domains, a wide range of income sizes and family 
trajectories. I argue that the class lines become even clearer with two main assets that are 
significant indicators of one’s belonging to the middle or the upper class. First is car ownership. 
It is rare for the low middle class to own a car. The middle class cars are usually European 
(mainly French or Italian) of a small size and made especially for the North African market to be 
accessible and affordable by the middle class. As a matter of fact, in my sample of respondents 
only 3 families owned a car in the popular neighborhoods; all of them were European, small-
sized cars. On the other hand, the rich families usually own German luxury cars. That is why the 
car in Tunisia is a significant indicator of one’s social class.  
The second asset is the type of house a family owns. People from the rich class usually 
own a house that is independent on all 4 sides and is surrounded by a private garden. Only the 
gates of the garden are shared with the adjacent neighbors as shown in picture 1 below. On the 
other hand, the middle and low-middle class usually share three walls of their immediate house 
with the neighbors and have no separate garden. This is due to two main factors: the first is that 
most middle class neighborhoods were built during the 70s and 80s as part of the government 
housing projects, which resulted in the creation of neighborhoods composed of  apartment 
complexes or neighborhoods with streets of attached townhouses (as in the case of Zouhour). 
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The second factor is that historically some families owned small lands in the rural areas of 
Sousse. As the urban development reached these areas, they divided their lands among family 
members to build small houses for their nuclear families (as in the case of Kalaa). The 
similarities between the housing project neighborhoods and the new urbanized neighborhoods is 
that in both cases, the houses are attached with the neighboring families. The process typically 
continues with the next generation with children (mostly sons) building on top of their parents’ 
houses. In fact, another characteristic of the middle class neighborhoods, is that the number of 
homes often surpasses the number of families (17,941 houses in Zouhour for 14,786 families 
according to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics). This is due to the fact that people build 
houses for their sons (sometimes even before they marry and found a family) on top of their 
houses (independent apartments), resulting in streets of two or three story houses as shown in 
Figure 2 from Zouhour and Figure 3 from Kalaa.  
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Figure 1: An example of a row of houses in a rich street in Khezama. The photograph shows the 
independence of each house from the neighboring houses and the surrounding garden. The picture also 
shows examples of the cars owned by the Tunisian middle class. 
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Figure 2: An example of row of houses in a popular neighborhood in Zouhour. The houses are attached 
to neighboring houses on three sides. The picture also shows the extra stories built by the families for 
their offspring. 
 
Figure 3: An example of row of houses in Kalaa. While the streets are wider than those of Zouhour, we 
can still see the similarities between the two neighborhoods in terms of the housing characteristics. 
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I had access through family members who live in both Kalaa and Zouhour. They served 
as my study gatekeepers and assisted me throughout my work. I used convenient and snowball 
sampling strategies to recruit my respondents. My gatekeepers contacted respondents of their 
own acquaintances who in turn forwarded us to members of their families and people they know. 
My focus was on adults and older generations of Tunisians, which is why I asked that the 
respondents would be more than 30 years old and would be currently living in one of those 
neighborhoods. I interviewed a total number of 33 Tunisian nationals, mostly, in their own 
family houses in the governorate of Sousse in Tunisia. Using family members as “gatekeepers” 
facilitated the access to the households of the respondents where the interviews were conducted. 
This was important to allow for the observation of usage and interaction with the technology 
available at the household and within family members. The interviews were a social encounter in 
the full meaning of the term. Family members of the respondents gathered around us and often 
participated in the discussion. I was offered sweets and food and traditional tea in each house I 
entered and the conversation took place around the cup of tea while technology devices were 
scattered around us (laptops, tablets, and smartphones), creating a crossover between the 
traditional and the modern without any apparent conflict between the two.  
A few of these interviews were conducted outside the houses, at the neighborhood’s 
hairdresser or in the middle of the neighborhood streets16. Regardless of the place, quite often the 
interviews prompted group discussions among family members and neighbors who were 
gathered around me and my interviewees. These discussions proved to be beneficial as they 
                                                
16 Whenever the weather allows it, the often-narrow streets of the popular Tunisian neighborhoods become a place 
for socialization. People in Zouhour’s neighborhoods, for instance, are accustomed to sit casually outside in the form 
of circles by the walls of their houses. They place rugs, stools and chairs in a circle during the late afternoon hours 
and until late in the evening in summer time. Each family sits in front of its house and sometimes neighbors join 
each other and spend the evening drinking tea and discussing different issues while watching the neighborhood kids 
play and people walking by.  
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revealed group attitudes, agreements and sometimes disagreements about the same issue within 
the same family and social class.  
I intentionally targeted women and people 30 years and older as well as the elderly (65 
years and older). I interviewed different people that belonged to the same family in order to 
examine the generational divide and to understand family dynamic and techno-dispositions. All 
respondents were at least 18 years old Tunisian nationals currently living in Tunisia. The 
interviews were conducted in the national Tunisian dialect and were later transcribed and 
translated to English. While I had laid out the theoretical basis for an analysis and had specific 
theoretical inquiries in mind, I am also proposing a grounded theory analysis based on an 
inductive method approach to examine unexpected patterns of discourse, thoughts, attitudes, and 
technological behavior. I am committed to report my interviewees’ voices and articulations of 
their own technological access and use. Their negotiations of the technologies’ values and 
influence on their lives and their society stretched beyond the theoretical framework that guided 
the questions of my interviews. Therefore, I left my analysis open for possible theoretical and 
conceptual analyses grounded in the ICT experiences and narratives of my respondents.  
During the interviews I started from overarching questions on technology ownership and 
usage. I then explored questions of attitudes towards the technology, its role in their daily and 
social life, and their tendencies to participate in the new Tunisian political atmosphere with or 
without the use of ICTs. Some of the questions were borrowed from the respondents’ question 
guideline used in the in-depth study conducted by RTF researchers for the City of Austin during 
spring 2011, which aimed at measuring ICT use and the digital divide within the Latino 
community of Austin (Straubhaar et al, 2012). Other questions were specifically designed for the 
purpose of this study. The interview guideline included questions related to (1) demographics 
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(age, gender, work, place of living…); (2) ICT and SNS access and usage (ownership of 
technologies, time spent on the Internet, types of websites and Internet services used on a daily 
basis…); (3) attitudes towards ICTs in general; and (4) political participation attitude and 
behavior (memberships in political parties, participations in political conventions and events, 
voting in past elections and intention to vote in the upcoming elections…).  
I piloted my interview questions with 6 respondents who matched the criteria of selection 
for this project (older women and men from suburban areas of Sousse) in order to test the 
reception and effectiveness of the questions in generating discussions. A few initial questions 
were eliminated, such as the income question17, and other questions were added to the list as they 
provided a basis to ask other key questions and generate fruitful discussions. For example, I 
added questions about Skype use as many families from the suburban areas of Sousse have 
relatives and children living abroad, mainly in Europe. When asked about their ICT and Internet 
use, the respondents immediately started talking about Skype and how it facilitated 
communication with their relatives who live abroad. This provided me with the opportunity to 
ask questions about their digital and technological proficiencies and the help they get from 
family members to either have regular Skype video or audio calls or to learn how to make these 
calls and hold a Skype conversation on their own.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17  Income is a taboo concept in the Tunisian society and all 6 respondents were puzzled that I would ask such a 
question for a formal interview. 
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Chapter 2: Social Capital or the AliBaba18 Cavern 
of Techno-Capital 
Cultural and social capitals are two of the terms I encountered often in my examination of 
the literature regarding political participation and the digital divide. Several digital media 
scholars argue that the concepts of social capital and political participation have a mutual 
relationship. On the one hand, using the Internet and other information technologies for political 
participation is related to the reproduction of social and cultural capital. On the other, greater 
social and cultural capitals can themselves translate into political action and participation 
(Livingstone and Lievrouw, 2002; Ellison et al; 2007; Skoric, et al, 2009). The two concepts 
emerged immediately as a suitable theoretical framework to decipher the complexity of my 
respondents’ patterns of access and usage that could not be explained with the simple 
examination and analysis of demographic and structural factors. Thus, this section analyzes the 
influence of social and cultural factors on ICT usage based on the respondents’ narratives of their 
techno-related behavior and modes of usage.  I start by laying the theoretical ground through a 
discussion of the major capital related social and technological concepts that guide my analysis.  
2.1 PIERRE BOURDIEU AND THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF “CAPITAL” 
Through his research on society’s modes of reproduction, Pierre Bourdieu, an influential 
French sociologist came to the conclusion that in addition to economic capital, there are other 
forms of capital that situate individuals hierarchically in a specific social order. First on the list is 
                                                
18 Ali Baba is a story from the “Arabian Nights” folk tales. He is a poor woodcutter who finds by coincidence the 
cavern of the 40 thieves with immeasurable treasures. I am using it as a reference to what I believe is an uncovered 
and under-used wealth of techno-resources, as the analysis will demonstrate.  
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the “social capital”, which refers to the durable network of relationships and acquaintances 
acquired by individuals (1985, p. 248). According to Portes (1998), “Bourdieu’s definition 
makes clear that social capital is decomposable into two elements: first, the social relationship 
itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and 
second, the amount and quality of those resources” (p. 2).  
Bourdieu developed this concept while analyzing the tendency of the social elite to 
maintain their social status and the exclusiveness of their circles. However, many sociology and 
media scholars found in “social capital” a guiding conceptual theme to understand the transfer of 
resources and power from one individual or one group to another not only in privileged 
communities, but also within the underprivileged and the least powerful of social groups 
(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995). This transfer results in the accumulation of other forms of 
capital such as the cultural capital, another concept developed by Bourdieu to describe non-
economic factors that influence people’s hierarchical status within a given society. These factors 
are culturally symbolic, and include taste, skills, credentials, styles of clothing and speaking, and 
so on. Each set of these symbolic elements determines the collective identity of a social group 
and signifies belonging and membership to a social class rather than another. Straubhaar et al. 
(2012) contend that cultural capital is acquired over time through long-term investment in time 
and education, which result in social mobility through generations. Bourdieu distinguishes 
between three forms of cultural capital: embodied (speech or skills), objectified (material 
belongings) which value is set by cultural norms, and institutionalized (education, credentials 
and qualifications), which is the cultural capital most pertinent to this research study.  
While cultural capital involves the set of skills and material belongings individuals 
acquire over time, the attitudes and perceptions that drive their behavior is described by 
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Bourdieu as “dispositions.” A set of dispositions that individuals develop through the course of 
their time is called habitus. The habitus explains diverse groups’ modes of unconscious 
navigation of daily life, and the attitudes individuals develop towards certain objects not because 
of conscious reasoning but because of their class habitus. Overtime, a group habitus determines 
what the individuals belonging to that group can or cannot do (Rojas et al, 2012). Bourdieu 
pointed out that with time, people (of a certain social group) tend to perceive their attitudes about 
certain objects as “natural” rather than cultural. The value of habitus as a concept stems from its 
theoretical ability to explain the reproduction of social structures. For example, studies 
conducted on certain racial groups demonstrated that when a specific group sets an educational 
achievement limit to itself, it tends to hold itself and the next generations within that limit. For 
example, studies conducted on Latino communities in Texas demonstrated that Latinos 
developed a class habitus that views high school graduation as a life accomplishment in itself. 
Thus, newer generations of Latinos continue the reproduction of the previous generations’ social 
structure- by remaining a working class group (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Rojas et al, 2001). The 
orientation towards reproducing social structures may take place even with more cultural capital, 
or resources, available to the newer generations.  
Therefore, while cultural capital may function as an agent of social mobility, class 
habitus may function as a barrier that hinders the effectiveness of the resources available to 
achieve upward mobility. That is why Dumais (2002) stresses on the importance of combining 
the analysis of an individual or a group’s capital (the resources available to them) with a careful 
examination of the habitus or the individual or group’s tendency to use those resources. She 
criticizes educational studies that consider cultural capital without habitus explaining that 
“habitus, or one’s view of the world and one’s place in it, is an important consideration in trying 
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to understand how students navigate their way through the educational system. Studying cultural 
capital while ignoring habitus leaves Bourdieu’s theoretical framework incomplete in its 
practical application” (p. 45).  
According to Bourdieu (1984), practice (social action) is the product of the interactions 
between the dynamic triad of capital, habitus, and field. The latter refers to the space where each 
social group strives to acquire and maintain resources. Each field is tied to a specific type of 
capital, for example, there is a strong correlation between cultural capital and the field of 
education (Bourdieu, 1985; Dumais, 2002; Rojas et al, 2012). Bourdieu’s concepts provided 
digital divide scholars with a theoretical framework to explore underlying social factors that 
hinder effective use of the Internet and other digital technologies. The growing complexity of 
technological access, usage and social factors that affect the two, prompted these scholars to 
develop another concept - techno-capital, a form of cultural capital that depicts the collection of 
resources and strategies used by individuals for meaningful Internet usage (Rojas et al, 2004; 
Robinson, 2009; Straubhaar et al, 2012; Lu and Straubhaar, 2014).  
Rojas et al (2012) examined how habitus affects Austinite communities’ investment in 
the field of education and ICT access and skills, i.e. techno-field, which they describe as a 
structured space that hosts the interplay between human agency and other social factors 
(political, economic, social, cultural, historical…). Rojas and her colleagues concluded that 
communities’ investment in the techno-field depends greatly on their dispositions to technologies 
or “techno-dispositions.” For example, an individual will be less likely to use the Internet or the 
computer when there is a prevalent group attitude that ICT usage is irrelevant to their lives. On 
the other hand, positive attitude towards the technology and its relevance will lead to time and 
resource investment in learning and mastering its usage (Rojas et al, 2012). Techno-capital and 
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techno-disposition provide an analytical nexus through which to examine my respondents’ 
modes of interaction, involvement, and usage of the technologies available to them. The concept 
of techno-disposition is especially constructive for understanding the lack of usage despite the 
techno-capital available to the respondents. Figure 4 summarizes the interactions between the 
different types of capital. It demonstrates how individuals accumulate cultural capital, which in 
turn leads to the development of techno-capital whether directly (as in the case of education) or 
through the intermediaries of class habitus and techno-dispositions.  
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Figure 4. The interactions between the different types of capitals based on Bourdieu (1985), Rojas et al, 
(2001), and Straubhaar et al, (2012). 
My aim was to combine the respondents’ narratives with a theoretical analysis to describe 
the culture of digital media use in the popular neighborhoods of Sousse. I played the role of 
participant observer and used: (1) a laptop to record the interviews for a verbatim documentation 
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of the informants’ discourses (and the background noise); and (2) written field notes for a 
personal documentation of the cultural aspects of the setting and the interactions taking place 
around me that the audio record could not capture. The home itself was one of the most 
important layers of the informants’ ICT usage. I took notes of where and how the technology 
was placed, and how the informants interacted with it. The second layer, which emerged as I was 
conducting the first interviews, is the interaction within the family and between the informants 
and members of their community/neighborhood. I conducted my first interview in the home of 
an elderly lady who, I was told, lives by herself. When I arrived to the house, her daughters and 
grandchildren were all there spending the afternoon together. The lady insisted on doing the 
interview in her living room with all of them around us.  
While, I initially felt uncomfortable with the crowded setting, I soon realized that this 
was a valuable opportunity to gather a wider range of cultural data regarding technology use. 
Spradley (1979) argued that in ethnographic research, observations and informal, friendly 
conversations produce an ample amount of data. Spradley’s argument turned particularly true 
with the productive (from an analytical standpoint) conversations that took place between the 
family members and my key informant. This setting took place in almost all my subsequent 
interviews; some inside the house and others sitting outside by the walls of the houses of my 
interviewees, in the middle of a busy neighborhood street. Both the family and the community 
dynamic play a significant and influential role in the informants’ technological actions and 
interactions as shown in this analysis.  
During the parts of the interviews that relate to this section, I used umbrella questions 
about ownership and usage and moved on to more focused questions about usage and learning 
choices, attitudes, and resources, which produced three main domains of analysis; (1) the 
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relevance of the technology in my respondents’ lives; (2) the degree of investment in learning 
and acquiring techno-competencies; (3) the resources available to them to acquire techno-
competencies and techno-capital.  
2.2 ACCESS AND OWNERSHIP  
Despite the fact that digital divide research has moved beyond the question of access as 
the determinant of digital gaps (Warschauer; 2002; Van Dijk, 2005; Straubhaar et al, 2012), the 
issue of access is still one of the key dimensions of the divide. Usage is dependent on access; 
indeed it is often analyzed as “the first divide” (Vehovar et al, 2006). Therefore, my first issue of 
investigation was ownership and access. I asked my respondents whether they own any kind of 
technology. I used technology19 in its broadest term intentionally as I was curious what the term 
means to the respondents. It was not a surprise that for almost all my respondents, regardless of 
their age, gender, or education level, the term generated a list of digital and information 
technology devices: “I have a PC and a smartphone” said Molka a 32 years old lady from Kalaa. 
The list was more extensive for Naima, a 52 years old lady from Zouhour: “I have my own tablet 
and smartphone and we have a computer too.” Similar to Naima, many of my respondents had 
almost all the essential ICTs and many included Internet connection as one of the technologies 
listed: “I have a tablet, a laptop, and phone. I also have a desktop computer and Internet 
connection at home.” Said Yasmine, a 35 years old high school teacher.  
The lack of an access gap within my respondents does not strike me as surprising. I have 
come to witness first-hand the widespread abundance of technology devices and Internet 
connection in the Tunisian society. In fact, the respondents themselves are aware of the 
                                                
19 The term I used was “Technologie” in French, or its close Tunisian translation  “Technoloogia”  
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widespread penetration of ICTs; “We have everything” was a phrase I heard from many 
respondents. This observation is best explained by the process of diffusion, which is defined as 
“the acceptance over time of some specific item- an idea or practice, by individuals, groups or 
other adopting units, linked to specific channels of communication, to a social structure, and to a 
given system of values, or culture” (Katz et al, 1963, p. 237). Technological devices have indeed 
become part of the daily life in Tunisia. Following the first ICT initiative launched by the Ben 
Ali government in the late 1990s, “The Family Computer”, the computer slowly integrated 
Tunisian houses and the Internet soon followed path without a particular end-goal or immediate 
application. As the technology became more and more affordable to all ranges of the Tunisian 
middle class20, the computer became a common household technology device bought because 
“everybody has it.” Aya, a 58 years old high school teacher from Kalaa sums up the 
technological diffusion in the Tunisian household as: “We have everything that is part of the 
daily life” she told me when I asked her whether they have any technologies at home; “Nothing 
that is extraordinary” she added. 
The above is especially true when part of the household consists of young and teenage 
children. Katz et al.’s (1963) definition of the process of diffusion acknowledges the social 
influence in the process of adoption of a new technology by the members of a certain group. In 
the case of the Tunisian families, children play an important role in the computer and Internet 
diffusion process. With the affordable “Family Computer” act, many families from middle class 
neighborhoods acquired the computer. Emulating peer behavior pushed children of other families 
to put pressure on their parents to acquire the computer as well. Rogers (1995) divides this 
                                                
20 Recently a few Tunisian scholars adjusted the poverty line measures to more realistic standards as the government 
had set the bar very low to determine poverty. These scholars found that the poverty rate was still significantly low 
compared to rest of the MENA region.  
 52 
process of adoption to three stages: the knowledge stage, the persuasion stage, and the decision 
stage. Communities in the Tunisian society are grounded in strong family and neighbor ties. 
Thus, the late adopters of the computer had quickly become accustomed to seeing and hearing 
about it within their communities. Children accelerated the decision-making through persuading 
their parents to purchase the computer, which is a recurrent pattern in the Internet and computer 
diffusion research, regardless of the cultural context (Kiesler et al., 2000). Digital divide research 
showed that families with children are more likely to be engaged with technologies than 
households without children (Helsper, 2008; Correa, 2013). In her examination of the bottom-up 
flow of techno-competencies within Chilean families, Correa found that children played a key 
role in their parents’ adoption of technologies. They used different persuasion strategies to 
convince them to acquire the technologies. She described her sample of young people as opinion 
leaders who promoted the diffusion of ICTs in their families.  
As a matter of fact, out of all the families I interviewed, the only two houses that did not 
own computers were an old lady living by herself and an elderly couple also living by 
themselves without children at home. The case of Habib and Ahlam is particularly interesting 
because they belong to the only household that could easily be classified as upper class and rich. 
Yet, they did not own technology or have access to the Internet at home.  Habib, a 74 year old 
man, is a very well off owner of many businesses across the city. Habib did not have computers 
or Internet access at home. “It’s only me and my wife, all my children are married now.” He 
explained, while implicitly stating that computers are for younger people. His wife, Ahlam (71 
years old) further elaborated: “we used to have a computer that we used to see my daughter in 
Germany. We don’t have it anymore… now my youngest daughter comes with her computer and 
“connects” us with her sister.” In addition to confirming the fact that children are an important 
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factor in owning ICTs, Ahlam’s statement also prompted me to rethink my definition of “home 
access.”  
The second observation is that while Habib and Ahlam do not, themselves, have 
computers or Internet access, their daughter provides them access, at their home, whenever they 
need it with her portable computer and mobile Internet device (USB drive)21. Similarly, another 
respondent, Yosra, an elderly lady living by herself in Zouhour, told me that she doesn’t “have 
anything”. However, as I was interviewing her, there was a tablet lying right next to her. It 
belonged to her granddaughter who was there spending the afternoon with her along with her 
mother and her aunt (Yosra’s two daughters).  
Another respondent, Hamed, a 55 year old electrician from Zouhour, owned a computer 
at home but did not have Internet access. Yet his sister’s house was open to him whenever he 
needed to use the Internet. “I don’t have Internet connection yet. Wahbi (his 11 years old son) is 
too young to have Internet connection now. When he needs something for school we go to my 
sister’s house, she has Internet connection at home.” When I asked him if he ever uses the 
publinet (the Tunisian cybercafé), he thought for a second then responded: “No. I never needed 
to, my sister has a printer22.” His response shows that he understood my question as being 
concerned with where he prints his son’s research rather than concerned with access to the 
Internet. It was a natural behavior for him to use his sister’s house for Internet connection.  
It is obvious that the close family dynamic in Tunisia greatly shapes my informants’ 
technology and Internet access. It is a cultural trait that is deeply rooted in the historical 
                                                
21 In Tunisia, Internet providers offer yearly Wi-Fi Internet plans that require a landline phone, as well as mobile 
Internet connection plans via USB sticks. Yearly Internet plans cost about $175. I bought a mobile Internet plan in 
the summer of 2015 and both the contract and the USB drive cost me 20 TND (about $10). The offer also came with 
unlimited free access from 9:00 pm until 8:00 am. The costs of both plans are affordable to most Tunisians. 
22 Publinets in Tunisia are widely used for printing out, scanning, and copying documents from the Internet as not all 
households with Internet access own printers and scanners and similar devices.   
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trajectory of the Tunisian society. Family life in Tunisia used to be organized based on kinship 
and tribal structures. The family used to include extended family members who live in a big 
house or a collection of small houses that share a big courtyard in the middle of the family 
housing. The Bourguiba regime strongly opposed the kinship and tribal structures and invested 
social and political efforts to dismantle these forms of family organization. Bourguiba’s 
government efforts coupled with the social and economic development during the period 
following the independence (1956) until the 1980s succeeded in reducing tribal and kinship. 
Today very few remnants of the tribal structures remain in Tunisia, primarily in the north and 
south west regions of the country, albeit, with much less power over the family relationships 
compared to the first half of the 20th century (Nelson, 1988; Charrad, 2011). These social 
changes along with foreign influences transformed the country into a cosmopolitan society. The 
extended family ties slowly began to diminish, especially in the urban areas to become consistent 
of the nuclear family with parents and their children only (Nelson, 1988).   
That being said, other forms of extended family solidarity are still present in the urban 
areas of the country. Many lower middle class neighborhoods have a concentration of extended 
family members living in houses that they rent or buy near each other, and sometimes in 
apartments on top of each other. This was the pattern in the three neighborhoods where I 
conducted my interviews. My Kalaa neighborhood interviewees had mostly cousins and second 
cousins with second and third generations living within the same area. The same applies to 
Zouhour, which was built by the Tunisian government as an affordable housing project23. 
Consequently, poor migrants who moved to Sousse from the interior regions of Tunisia found in 
neighborhoods like Zouhour a place to start a new life with the modest means they had. 
                                                
23 Discussion of the cheap housing neighborhoods in big cities 
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According to Nelson (1988), Tunisian migrants settling in urban working-class neighborhoods 
all over Tunisia preserved kinship-like structure of living. They chose to settle next to each other 
and their children choose to remain close to their families as they form families of their own. 
These migrants found in each other’s proximity a source of social capital and much needed 
social support to survive their transition from the rural to the urban life.  
 To better illustrate this Tunisian social phenomenon, I am going to describe one of the 
families I interviewed. The family consisted of 3 generations living in houses facing each other. 
Yosra said: “I used to live in Bir Chobbek (another popular neighborhood in Sousse) and I 
switched houses with my son. I gave him my house and took his house because it is “by” my 
daughters.” Yosra’s younger daughter, Naima, lives a few blocks away from her while her older 
daughter, Wafa, lives right across a narrow street from her. Wafa’s house consists of two 
separate independent stories. One of her brothers (one of Yosra’s sons) rents the upper story 
from her to be close to his mother and sisters. On the same street, there is another house with 
three independent stories, owned by Wafa’s daughter who is renting the two upper stories to her 
two brothers, each living in his own apartment with his own family. It is simply a cluster of 3 
generations of nuclear families from the same family. These clusters are becoming the norm in 
popular and middle class neighborhoods in Tunisia, not only because it is cheaper to build an 
apartment on top of the parents’ house than to buy a separate house, but also because family  ties 
and solidarity are rooted in the essence of the Tunisian social structure.  
These family clusters add another layer to the complexity of the issue of ownership and 
access, and proved to be essential to the understanding of both concepts. For instance, they make 
it difficult to affirm  that Habib, Ahlam or Yosra do not own or do not have access at home when 
their children and grandchildren are always with them in their house, with their technologies and 
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mobile Internet devices. The same is true for Hamed who does not have access at home but can 
walk to his sister’s house whenever he needs to use the Internet. In all these cases, we can detect 
a form of home access allowed by the social capital that these family members represent to each 
other. Thus access extends beyond the walls of one nuclear family house to include all the 
households of the same family. In other words, each family cluster becomes a vehicle for ICT 
access in a dynamic that could be called the family diffusion of digital technologies. It is a form 
of techno-disposition that boosts and increases the cultural capital of middle class families who 
can rely on their family ties whenever the resources are limited whether for financial or for 
relevance reasons.  
2.3 PURCHASE DECISIONS  
The relevance construct was crucial in understanding the purchase and ownership 
decisions, which proved to be more complex than I envisioned. Some of my informants acquired 
technology because it was cheap and they could afford it; others can afford it but made the 
choice not to have it, as in the case of Habib the multiple-business owner; while others acquired 
the latest technologies through members of their families. Yahya, 36, a self-described technology 
savvy, reported that he always owns the newest technology for no particular reason: “We have a 
computer, TV, a tablet, and telephones of course, smartphones. We have everything. Even the 
Dish (TV satellite) is in the latest technology.” Yahya is the only informant who reported 
acquisition of the technology for his interest in it. Most of the houses I entered had the latest 
technologies, whether information technologies (computers, tablets, smartphones) or TV and 
satellite dish, for specific purposes and to accomplish specific tasks.  
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A few of the informants bought a computer to provide their children with Internet access 
for school use, as in the case of Hajir (58 years old) who explained: “My sons have this (pointing 
to my laptop)24. We got it for them for school. My son uses it when he’s in school (she uses a 
word that refers to school semesters), he works on it and prints out papers and everything. We 
don’t have Internet connection but their “new phones” are all connected to the Internet.”  For one 
of the ladies, the computer and the Internet was her way of keeping her teenager away from the 
street. Basma, 55 from Kalaa, explained: “I have “the one you carry” (referring to the laptop) and 
a computer (referring to the desktop) for my sons. My sons use it the most. And my daughter too. 
They’re always on it. As soon as one is done, the other one takes his place. To tell you the truth, 
I like it that way… it’s better than hanging out in the streets all day long. At least, I know where 
they are and what they’re doing. They listen to songs, talk to their friends and that’s it” . She then 
explained why they have a newer laptop in addition to the desktop: “My son had one like this 
(pointing to my laptop), he used it to study. When he moved to Qatar, my husband bought me 
another one so I can talk to my son with it. So now my other two sons use it all the time and I use 
it to talk to my son in Qatar from time to time.”  
In this last comment, Basma introduced one of the most often reported factors for 
computer ownership and Internet access at home, which is to keep in touch with family members 
who live abroad. In 2015, the Migration Policy Institute25 reported that an estimate number of 
1,223,000 Tunisians live abroad, with a little more than one million of them settling in European 
countries. This is a significant fraction of the total population estimated at about 11 million in 
                                                
24 Hajir did not know what the laptop is called and she continued to refer to it as “this” while pointing to my laptop 
throughout the conversation.  
25 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/revolution-and-political-transition-tunisia-migration-game-changer 
 58 
2015, according to the CIA World Factbook)26. This means that most families in Tunisia have at 
least one immigrant member living abroad. They come from all ranges of social classes and 
regularly send remittances to their families in Tunisia. As of 2013, an estimated 2 billion US 
dollar were sent to Tunisia from Western countries in the form of immigrant remittances 
(Migration Policy Institute). In addition to the money remittances, Tunisians living abroad often 
bring a diversity of home products and devices to their families27. 
Often times, it is the immigrant children who provide their families with computers (or 
tablets) so they can talk to them when they go back to their host countries. Several of my 
respondents who had modest jobs and lived in modest homes but had the latest technologies, 
acquired them through their migrating children. The latter either bought new devices specifically 
for their families in Tunisia, or left their personal technologies before they went back to the 
countries they live in after a vacation stay in Tunisia. Hadir (59 year old stay at home mom) 
revealed that their household ICT devices were a mix of items they bought and items that her son 
who lives in Austria gave her: “We have a tablet and a computer. I have the old phone, I don’t 
want the new one because I like the old ones because when I get mad, I throw it on the wall and 
buy a new one (she bursts in laughter). Sometimes my son leaves whatever he has for us when he 
goes back to Vienna. He leaves the phone for his sister or the tablet. I bought the computer.” In 
line with Hadir’s report of technology acquisition, Kahina (57 year old a stay at home mom from 
Zouhour) expressed proudly her constant adoption of the latest technologies through her three 
children who live in different countries in Europe. She stated: “My daughter brings me 
                                                
26 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
27 This is especially true for those who travel back to Tunisia by ferries since they can bring their cars along and can 
bring as many gifts and belongings as their cars can carry. 
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everything, everything that came out, she brought it for me as soon as it came out. We always 
had everything that just came out. My kids bring me everything.” 
The remittances and the technology device “gifts” from the children living abroad add a 
few other dimensions to the complexity of the relationship between access, social class, and 
income in Tunisia. First, the findings discussed above are in agreement with literature from 
Western studies in regard to the factors informing home computer purchase and usage. Several 
studies revealed that the computer is mostly introduced to the home for specific reasons, whether 
it’s merely entertainment or for schoolwork, especially in homes with school-age children 
(Fairlie and Robinson, 2013). At this point, I have to note the absence of income related purchase 
motivations in my informants. For instance, none cited the need to perform activities that 
increase the family’s income or to simply work from home, which are factors that often drove 
technology purchases in low income households in other cultures (Bakardjieva, 2005). Second, 
my informants’ home computer acquisition counter the Western-based research findings that 
technology ownership is positively correlated to income (Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013). In fact, 
while the respondents who live in the low-income neighborhoods owned the latest technologies, 
the ones who lived in the more privileged neighborhood (Khezama) reported limited ownership 
or none at all. These findings support the new wave of digital divide research, which has driven 
attention away from the dichotomy between the haves vs. the have-nots, to  other forms of divide 
relevant to Internet usage and digital literacy (Warschauer, 2003; Van Dijk, 2005; Jenkins et al, 
2006; Straubhaar et al, 2012; Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013). The following section addresses 
these two main points: usage and the acquisition of digital literacies from a techno-capital 
standpoint.  
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2.4 TECHNO-CAPITAL 
White-collar jobs and formal education emerged immediately as a source of techno-
capital. A few of my respondents worked as educators, which required them to use computers 
and the Internet. Baraa (56 year old secondary school administrative staff) described his learning 
experience at length: 
At first, I learned… it was 2000-2001.. yeah... at that time, there was an idea that 
computer is going to be introduced to schools, so then I learned. When I tell you I 
learned, this is how I learned... that period in the school where I was working, the 
director brought a computer. So I went to a private computer science school. I registered 
for 20 hours. I used to go study in that school, then go to my office and apply what I 
learned… I practice on that computer (the one the director brought.) I used to go even 
outside of work hours to practice more. That’s how I learned. Then they organized a lot 
of training workshops for us. I went also to one-day workshops with professors, and then 
I started to train and teach my colleagues. I started to... I led workshops for school 
directors (principals).  
Baraa meant to report his own techno-capital experience, however, he unintentionally 
described the introduction of the computer and the Internet at the educational institutions in 
Tunisia during the late 1990s.  
The government implemented several initiatives to equip schools in urban areas with 
Internet connection, and provide those in rural and remote areas with mobile computer 
laboratories (mobile customized computer vans). Official numbers suggest that by the year 2000 
all secondary schools were equipped with Internet connection. However, training the teachers to 
use the medium was slower than the rate at which the equipment became available. This was 
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done by training small groups of teacher and then snowballing the skills from the trained 
teachers (called teacher-trainer) to colleagues in their school districts (Hamdy, 2007). Baraa 
described this process from a personal experience. He learned through a combination of formal 
courses that he took on his own, workshops provided by his work, and then he invested his free 
time to master the technology. As his competencies became advanced, Baraa became what is 
called “training trainer” (Hamdy, 2007). His techno-capital was a direct product of his cultural 
capital as his work and his occupation gave him an immediate purpose and resources to develop 
techno-competencies.  
The case was somewhat different for my younger informants. School provided them with 
basic techno-competencies but they developed or maintained those competencies at home, alone 
through self-experimentation, or through the assistance of family members. Abir, a 36 year old 
stay at home mom with an assistant pharmacist diploma explained: “I learned by myself. I 
learned how to use the computer during my college years... but the Internet... I learned the 
Internet... I learned how to use the Internet at home.” In line with Abir’s experience, Yasmine, a 
35 year old high-school teacher, took computer courses in college then expanded her techno-
competencies at home. She said: “I learned the Internet during my college years. It was part of 
my education... you know my university is called: “Math-Physics-Computer28” so I learned to 
use the computer and the Internet. That’s how I learned the basics... and then I learned a lot more 
by myself.” (She emphasizes the word “a lot” with her tone). Later on, she explained the role of 
her husband in developing her techno-capital: “There is always something new I don’t know how 
                                                
28 This is a program offered on many campuses in the country. Students learn all three subjects (math, physics, and 
computer-science) for the first two years then major in one of them for their junior and senior years. This program is 
designed for high school teachers. In other words, graduate of this program typically apply to become high school 
teachers unless they go into graduate education.  
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to do. I ask my husband to help me with technical or Internet problems, you see? Sometimes he 
would help me and sometimes he pushes me to do it, he tells me: you’re a teacher, you should try 
to figure it out on your own. I would try and then beg him (she laughs) to just do it for me and he 
would give up and just fix the problem for me. But then, I know how.”  
Ayat (32), also a college graduate currently unemployed stay at home mom, reported a 
very similar experience to that of Yasmine’s: “I am fine navigating. I can search anything, I use 
keywords to search... and search just fine. I studied “computer” at school, you know? Just one 
year, one hour per week. I learned by myself to use the Internet by searching... and my husband 
would help me sometimes... he would tell me to do this or that and next time I know how to do 
it. Even my 5 year old and my 2 year old know how to use it. They see us using it... and their 
father has “accustomed them” to the phone.” It is worth pointing out how the two young children 
are also acquiring techno-capital at a very young age in their home through their father and 
through watching their parents use the technologies. Ayat also mentioned that her husband 
signed her up for job qualification exam/competitions29 online as she is looking for a job in her 
field: “I signed up online for a “concours” (French for job exam/competition), but it was my 
husband who did it for me. He signed me up for a “concours” to recruit primary school teachers. 
He told me there was a “concours” and I gave him my information and he signed me up.”  
The similarities between the two households are striking. In both cases, it is the male of 
the family who is always ahead in his techno-competencies. The wives, while competent to a 
certain extent, turn to their husbands’ assistance. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to 
interview Ayat’s husband. However, Yasmine referred me to her husband who is Yahya, the 
only technology-savvy person in my group of informants. While I was interviewing Yahya at 
                                                
29 Public sector jobs often require qualifying competitions organized by the government and state entities or 
companies. Most Tunisians use the French term “concours” to refer to these competions. 
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their neighbor’s home (that’s where he was when I asked Yasmine if I can interview her 
husband), his children were there too. The son was playing with another kid, while the daughter 
(5 year old) was given her dad’s tablet in order to stop her from perturbing him during the 
interview. However, she kept coming back to him during the interview asking him to help her 
out with different tasks. Although we were in the middle of the interview, Yahya always took the 
time to address her technology problem and his assistance was always rather instructional, in 
other words, he was giving his daughter instructions on how to fix the problem rather than fix it 
for her. For example, on one occasion he told his daughter: “I just showed you this, look, here, 
you click on this and then click on this before you get to the front (referring to the main screen).”  
It was an important observation because Ayat also reported that her husband 
“accustomed” her children to using the phone. I am using the word accustomed as the word that 
comes closest the Tunisian word Ayat used, which means both letting them use the phone and 
teaching them how to use it at the same time. Thus, in both households, the husband is the main 
source of techno-competencies for the whole family, and is the one who domesticated the 
technology in the home setting. This finding is in line with several digital divide studies, which 
revealed that there is always a gap (varying in depth) between males and females (Rojas et al, 
2001; Stanley, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005). Van Dijk (2005) explained that the household chores are 
still primarily a female task even in some of the most advanced countries of the world. 
Therefore, the women of the households have less time to practice their Internet and computer 
skills, and consequently, they develop their skills at slower rates than their male counterparts. 
More recent studies are still reporting gender-role constraints as one of the causes of gender 
digital use gaps (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Lu and Straubhaar, 2014; Ben Hassine, 2014). This is 
appears to be the case in Tunisia as well. Although Tunisia is recognized as the leading Middle 
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Eastern country in terms of gender equity and women’s rights, it is still a patriarchal society with 
well-defined gender roles. Chores and children caretaking are the women’s job, which leaves 
much more time for the husbands to develop his techno-competencies compared to their wives. 
In fact, the findings of this research reflect Ben Hassine’s study (2014), which found that gender 
roles in Tunisia significantly slowed women’s acquisition of techno-competencies. It is 
important to mention that Ben Hassine’s sample was limited to university students, faculty, and 
staff.  
When the relationship between males and females is not spousal, as in the case of siblings 
or child and parents, those who have more schooling or are of younger age are the main 
technology resource regardless of their gender. Farouk a 30 years old high school dropout, found 
in his siblings, including his younger sister, a reliable source of techno-capital as he explained: 
“Nothing is difficult and you can research everything that you want to find. If I get stuck I ask 
my little sister, she’s in high school, she shows me things. My brother taught me to use the 
computer and then I learned the Internet by myself.” Farouk’s brother provided him with 
computer-competencies that he used to acquire even more techno-capital on his own. His little 
sister functions as a tech-support system and thus she is unconsciously helping him expand his 
capital.  
Nourane (a 74 year old retired lady) described how she acquired techno-competencies 
from her niece: “I actually wanted to take courses in computer and the Internet and then I found 
it to be easy to use, easy to understand... so my niece took courses, she gave me her lessons, I 
copied them down and I started to follow them, and I found it really easy. So I didn’t take 
courses.” Aya, the 58 year old high school teacher from Kalaa, had a similar experience as she 
learned from a relative whom she hosted for a while: “A guest came to live with us for a while 
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and she taught me how to use the computer. I like to use computers. I used to use it for hours. 
Now not as much. I don’t use the Internet as much. My niece graduated from college with a 
Master’s degree in computer science and she lived with us when she was studying and she taught 
me a lot about the computer and the Internet and how to use them. I’m very grateful to her.”  
What is most interesting about the case of Aya is that she is the wife of Baraa the 
“training-trainer.” Both are high school teachers, yet she learned at home not at work. She 
explained that she took Internet workshops but it was a few years ago (not as soon as the Internet 
was introduced to schools) and she reported that the workshop was for specific Internet usage 
such as accessing the recently transformed educators’ website, or how to create social 
networking sites accounts. The couple illustrate the slow pace in which training teachers in 
Tunisia took place, which prompted them to use their own resources to learn, such as paid 
computer classes as in the case of Baraa or family members as in the case of Aya.  
Whether it’s Aya and Nourane, or the respondents who were taught by their kids or 
siblings, most informants acquired their techno-competencies through their relatives who 
themselves acquired techno-competencies through formal education. It is an interesting example 
of the intersections of techno-capital, cultural-capital, and social-capital. As new generations 
acquire cultural capital through education, their relationships with my respondents prompt them 
to transfer one of the forms of their capital- their techno-competencies- to my respondents, and 
thus the latter became techno-competent through their relatives. Consequently, my informants’ 
social capital becomes embodied in the techno-competencies they acquired through their 
relationships with somebody who has acquired techno-capital.  
One of the cases that perfectly illustrate the intersection of techno-capital, cultural capital, 
and social capital was Hamed’s, the 55 year old electrician from Zouhour who uses his sister’s 
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house for Internet access. He has a computer at home that he bought for his son but does not 
want to have Internet connection until his son, who is 11, is older. He noted: “Wahbi (his son) is 
too young now. When he grows up I will get him Internet connection.” However, his son 
currently has to perform homework tasks that require him to use the Internet. Thus, Hamed 
found in his sister’s house all the resources he needs to help his son with his homework as he 
described: “Sometimes, Wahbi needs to do something for school, so he needs to find information 
or create a research project… so we go to my sister’s house. She has Internet connection. I don’t 
know much on how to use the computer or the Internet so my nephew shows me everything. He 
shows my son too. He always teaches him how to use the computer and the Internet. Even when 
there is a problem or something we don’t know with our computer, we go to Taha (his nephew). 
He helps us with the research and we put it together and print it out then I take my son and go 
home when we’re done.” To Hamed his sister’s house is a complete bundle of techno-resources 
and consequently a bundle of techno-capital, from access to the skills needed to teach and assist, 
to the technology support and help services. His sister’s house is an important vehicle not only of 
techno-capital but also of cultural-capital as it is providing the means and assistance for Hamed’s 
son to do his homework and thus perform better in school.   
2.5 FAMILIARITY WITH THE DEVICES 
The statements made by a subgroup of the older respondents about the technologies they 
own, gave hints about a level of familiarity and degree of interaction with the technology 
different from the rest of the informants. For instance, they revealed that while all the 
respondents have access one way or another, some exhibit limited familiarity and no immediate 
usage of the technologies. Qassem, a 72 year old college graduate who used to work for the 
 67 
government, had difficulties naming some of the technologies they have at home, despite his 
ample education and rich work history. He said: “I don’t use the one that moves like this one 
(referring to my laptop), I use the table one. My son brought it for me. I didn’t buy it. I still want 
to buy one that moves. My vision is bothering me... I have to use one that has big letters. The 
tablets are difficult for me.” Other informants had the same problem, though they did not have 
Qassem’s educational background. For instance, a few ladies knew the devices but did not know 
their names, as in the case of Hajir, a 58 year old lady from Kalaa who said: “My kids have the 
one like this” while pointing to my laptop, “laptop, you mean?” I said, “Yes, laptop and they 
have a tablet too” she responded. To me, it was fascinating that she knew what a tablet is called 
but did not know what the laptop is called. However, in my later discussion with her she 
explained that her young grandchild- whom she watches during the day- uses the tablet all the 
time and thus she knows the name, while she does not come in contact with the laptop that often 
as it remains in her children’s room. Interestingly, examining the placement of the technology 
within the house is a feature of the domestication theory as and digital divide research. . 
Livingstone and Bovill (2001) argued that the technologies are often placed in the children’s 
bedrooms or play area, preventing other family members from developing familiarity and 
experimenting with the devices. This observation was echoed in the informants’ discourse about 
their device ownership. 
Ilham, a 68 year old from Kalaa, did not know what a tablet is called. She described it to 
me: “My son has that thing that’s small and you touch it and it works.” “A tablet?” I said, “yeah, 
I think that’s what it’s called” she answered. Another elderly lady, Layla (72 year old from 
Zouhour) recognized the tablet and laptop but did not know the name of the Internet USB stick: 
“We have a tablet and a laptop. We have phones, the old ones, and we have Internet connection 
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with that thing we hook to the laptop” and she made a gesture with her hand to describe the USB 
stick. The lack of terminology to describe the technologies they own and use to access the 
Internet, suggests two major points. The first, is that the Internet has indeed become well 
integrated in the Tunisian households that even those who are not fluent in the technological 
language are able to have a degree of familiarity with the devices and what they-the 
technologies- do. They can easily describe the devices and the tasks accomplished with them. 
They also find ways to list them as part of the technologies they or their kids own.  
It has become part of their life and part of doing “what everybody does” to upgrade to the 
latest technologies despite the lack of means and income, a behavior that will be discussed at 
length in the next chapter. According to Carrington (2007), the digital technologies have become 
embedded in the structure of our daily life that sometimes we fail to notice it. Others went as far 
as describing the technologies as taking an almost natural place in the communal attitudes (Gere, 
2002). Children played an essential role in domesticating the technologies to the level where it 
became familiar to the parents even without immediate usage. Silverstone (2014) argued that 
technologies are localized through the users, however, the social context of the house often limit 
the familiarization with the technology to a few members of the household (Haddon, 2006). 
Silverstone’s statement is true in the case of the informants who developed familiarity with the 
technologies as part of the household devices but have not come to contextualize their usage as 
part of their overall media and technology ecology. Furthermore, for the current group of 
informants, age proved to be the main indicator of the usage divide as the common point among 
all the respondents who lacked the terminology about the technology is the age factor. All of 
them are older people who have only use the technology to Skype, a task facilitated by their 
children. Nevertheless, in the case of my sample of Tunisian informants, the invisibility of the 
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technology devices has not given it any privileges. They have determined and well-articulated 
arguments about its positive and negative dimensions as will be shown in chapter 3.  
2.6 THE COMMUNITY RESOURCES  
The publinet, the Tunisian cybercafé, is an example of the communal life in these 
neighborhoods. It is the equivalent of the cybercafé in its worldwide meaning and basic function 
(to access the Internet) but with more functions given to it by the Tunisian users and culture. 
First, the publinet staff or managers are willing to help, assist, and teach the users how to 
accomplish tasks. A simple question of how to do something can become a digital literacy 
lesson. It is not strange to see the staff pulling a chair and sitting next to the user and showing 
him or her step by step with voiced instructions how to do something30. The publinets in small 
neighborhood become part of the community landscape and resources as in the case of the 
neighborhoods under focus in this study. The respondents talked about publinets and the people 
who work in them casually. They constitute an integral part of their community and of the 
resources they can use at any time. In addition to allowing her to talk to her expatriate son, the 
publinet provides Refka (age, profession) with a sense of freedom as she explained: “My sons all 
have smartphones. We use it sometimes to talk to my son abroad... and sometimes, I go by 
myself to the publinet. “Free”. Just by myself. Whenever I want to. I don’t wait for anybody to 
‘connect31’ for me. I call him (her son) on the phone sometimes but someone responds in a 
foreign language. It takes all my money and I don’t get to talk to my son. So I go to “Radhia” 
                                                
30 In fact, I personally learned and developed my computer, Internet, and digital skills at the publinet. I used to pay 
for an hour to access the Internet and get free lessons on how to perform a wide array of tasks.  
31 Tunisians use the word “connect” to refer to different situations such as to access the Internet, to operate a video-
conference, and to spend time on Facebook. A lengthy discussion of the terminology used by my informants will be 
included in the second chapter.  
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(the lady who works at the publinet) and talk to my son. When I go there, it’s Radhia who puts 
everything for me. There, I talk to my son in Sweden” soon she remembers something and adds 
proudly: “I know how to close Skype. The only thing I know how to do is to turn it off. I would 
look at him and say: Aziz my son, good bye! And he asks me: Mom do you know how to ‘close’ 
the conversation? And I say yes, the green thing is here (referring to the Call button on Skype)... 
and I send him a kiss and then close it. And then I’m sad. I say: Oh god, my son is gone.” This 
last statement demonstrates that for Refka, the virtual presence and communication with her son 
is equivalent to or compensates for real presence. Only when the video call is over, does she feel 
sad that he is gone.  
Ayat, a 32 year old stay at home mom from Kalaa, reported that she does go often to the 
Internet café for her daughters’ research. She noted: “When they have to do research for school, 
we go to the publinet. I go to the publinet to prepare their lessons. I don’t do anything by myself. 
I ask the guy who works there and he finds me everything. I can learn if I want to but I just want 
to stay away from it.32”   
In her 2005 study of Tunisian high school students, Abassi found that the publinet was a 
source of competencies of one third of the sample while half learned from their siblings and their 
friends, and only about 15% reported learning in their educational institutions. Abassi’s 
informants reported that they took free lessons and instruction from the person managing the 
publinet where they learned. In addition to the publinet, neighbors are also part of the resources 
available to the users. Nacira, a travel agency associate in her 30s reported: “I feel comfortable 
searching and researching. Technical problems are hard. If it breaks, I have to find someone who 
knows how to fix it. A neighbor helps us whenever something happens. Like if it “catches” a 
                                                
32 Amal had strong views about Internet and Internet usage mainly based on her fear as a parent about the dangers 
the Internet poses to her young daughters, an issue that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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virus.” While Nacira’s neighbor provides technical support, Kahina, one of my informants, plays 
the role of an Internet provider to her neighbors. She said: “Not everybody has connection at 
home. There are people who go to the publinet to see their kids. I have people from the 
neighborhood come under the walls of my house to use my Internet connection so they can talk 
to their kids. The young people from the neighborhood too. During the summer evenings they 
would stay until very late at night under the walls of my house to use my connection. And I don’t 
care. It doesn’t bother me. I’m paying for it with or without them using it... so I let them use it. I 
even leave the outside lights on for them so they can see.” Kahina described how she is playing 
the role of a Wi-Fi hotspot for the neighborhood. She actually gives her Internet password to 
whoever wants to use her Wi-Fi signal, be it elder neighbors connecting to talk with their 
children abroad, or neighborhood youth connecting using their mobile devices for diverse 
reasons (as shown in Figure 5.) 
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Figure 5. Neighborhood youth, late in the evening, using Kahina's house Wi-Fi signal. 
 
The sense of community is especially strong in the popular neighborhoods. It is a product 
of the structure of the Tunisian society and a consequence of the layout of the houses that make it 
impossible to avoid the interactions with the neighbors. In fact, Kahina’s street was particularly 
busy (given the warm weather that day) when I interviewed one of the respondents under the 
walls of her house. As we were sitting, neighbors joined in, in a casual fashion, including 
Kahina. Others walked by and, recognizing the stranger with the laptop in the neighborhood, 
stopped to ask: “Are the ‘census people’ touring the neighborhood again?” They were told that I 
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wasn’t one of the ‘census people’, but that I was doing an interview for my studies, and they 
were invited to join the circle and have a cup of tea.  
Coleman (1988) argues that these close community relationships represent another source 
of social capital, consisting of people willing to assist each other with different problems in 
different contexts without expecting anything in return. He suggests that members of such a 
social circle engage in mutual assistance acts mostly because they value their community as an 
integral part of their social life. In line with Coleman, Rojas et al (2012) maintain that social 
relations and interactions are an essential component of the residents’ techno-dispositions as they 
become a resource that promotes ICT use.  
Nevertheless many of my respondents reported limited to no ICT use at all despite the 
resources they have in their communities and their households as described above. In the 
following section, I focus on those non-users and explore the factors that work as barriers to 
usage.  
2.7 USAGE FACTORS AND BARRIERS 
Most of my non-user informants had the same social capital at their disposition to teach 
them Internet and computer skills, but did not acquire the techno-competency for different 
reasons. The respondents discussed several factors such as gender role, lack of language 
competencies, and finally age and health related issues. The gender-role narrative was reported 
only by women who blamed the lack of time and the chores workload for not learning to use the 
technologies they have at home. Ilham (68 year old from Kalaa) stated: “I just don’t have time, I 
have to weave rags and do chores, I don’t have time. I think I can learn it if I want to. I didn’t 
learn to write at the time because I didn’t finish... that’s it (in reference to the literacy courses she 
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took years ago)”. Amira (54 year old) from the same neighborhood as Ilham said: “I don’t want 
to access. If I need someone I have my phone. I don’t use it. Besides, I don’t have free time to 
use it. My mother in law lives with me and it takes a lot of time to care for her... and the house... 
and the kids. After dinner I just watch TV for a little while and that’s it.” Their similar attitude is 
not surprising given their close relationship within the same extended family and community. As 
a matter of fact, I interviewed both ladies in Amira’s home in her kitchen, where they both were 
helping each other to make a Tunisian dish that requires a lot of work and preparation. They 
often intervened while I was interviewing one of them, finishing each other’s sentences and 
asserting each other’s points and giving me examples of what the other lady means by her 
statement. To both of them, chores and caring for the family is more important than investing 
time in learning to use the computer and the Internet. Gender-roles, coupled with women’s 
tendency to be less tech-savvy than males, are recurrent barriers to access and usage in the 
research about the digital divide (Van Dijk and Hacker, 2003; Straubhaar et al, 2012; Ben 
Hassine, 2014).  
A few of my respondents saw their lack of literacy as a barrier to their usage. Ahlam, the 
71 year old lady, immediately stated that she can’t use digital technologies because she is 
illiterate: “I never went to school. I went to those literacy classes for old people... I went a couple 
of days and then stopped... My husband told me it’s not time for school now.” she said. Dhiaa 
(53 year old) also stated his lack of education as the reason for his lack of usage: “I think if I 
were really educated, I would be able to learn it, but I can’t really read and write. I had 3 years in 
school, so I think it would be difficult for me.” For other informants, it was a mix of lack of 
education and lack of confidence in their abilities to learn that prevented them from learning. 
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Refka, the 54 year old lady from Zouhour, expressed a lack of self-efficacy: “I want to learn but 
I’m not sure my mind still accepts learning” she said.  
On the other hand, one of the interesting observations was that not many people reported 
age as a barrier to learning (3 respondents only) and it was mostly brought up by respondents 
who barely went to school and lacked general literacy skills. Habib, the 73 year old business 
owner, barely knows how to write and read. He never went to school and taught himself to read 
and write enough to be able to manage his businesses (coffee shops, factory spaces, and houses 
that he rents to other people). He initially reported age as a barrier; he perceived himself to be 
too old to learn as he said: “Listen to me, now I’m 75 years old. I’m too old to go and learn. Now 
my children and grand-children learn and study. I help them and stand by them so they learn to 
make something of themselves.” However, when I asked him if he would take digital literacy 
classes offered by the government- similar to the literacy classes the government offered- he 
stated that the lack of language skills may prevent him from fully learning how to use the 
Internet. He explained: “The problem is, it is ‘created’ in French not in Arabic. It is created in a 
language that is not ours. If it was created in our language I can learn it. Even writing on the 
Internet, everything comes in French. Maybe if something is ‘organized’ and made by the 
government, then maybe. But we’re old and I can’t really learn. If they make things in Arabic 
then maybe we can learn and it would be good for our finances and business”. Habib’s concern 
about the language has some validity to it, as there are very few popular websites and services 
available in Arabic. Viard and Economides (2014) argued that the lack of content in the native 
tongue is a significant barrier to Internet use and Internet diffusion within a particular cultural 
group. The authors stress on the language barriers as a significant reason for the global digital 
divide. This leads to some cultures where there is ample content in the native language, to have a 
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significant digital advantage over other cultures where there is very limited content in the native 
language.  
This is particularly true in the case of Arab countries where the number of domains 
offered in Arabic language is not only relatively limited- compared to the domains offered in 
English or French- but also invisible and unknown to the Arab Internet users and non-users (El 
Gody, 2006). In Tunisia, language is not an issue for the educated population since education is 
bilingual (courses are offered in Arabic and French since elementary school). Tunisians who 
finish middle school usually master enough of the French language to navigate the Internet. 
Given that French is one of the popular languages on the Internet, connected Tunisians face no 
problems using popular websites and finding relevant content. Besides, whether in schools, at 
work, or at the publinet, the Internet as well as the computer are learned and taught in French; the 
terminology is in the French language and most websites are accessed in French (Facebook.fr, 
Google.fr, and so on.). Tunisians often code-switch on the net and a Romanized version of the 
Tunisian dialect is widely used33.  
In my sample respondents, very few reported using the Internet in Arabic and when they 
did, they put it in a second place after French. Those who reported using Arabic on the net also 
reported searching for religious information, as in the case of Baraa, the high school teacher 
whose Arabic language content use is driven by his second professional position as an Imam at 
the local mosque. He researches religious topics often, which is a content mostly offered in 
Arabic. He explains his language usage as so: “French, and Arabic. I use both equally. I 
                                                
33 Tunisians speak a colloquial form of Arabic called the Tunisian dialect. The standard Arabic is used in written 
forms and formal settings, especially in the media (newscast). On emails, SNS, and instant messaging, Tunisians 
speak the Tunisian dialect using Latin letters and replace the sounds that don’t exist in the Latin alphabet with 
numbers. This form is widely used in other Arab countries, especially in Egypt as demonstrated by Warschauer et al 
(2002).  
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manipulate both equally. Sometimes, English but since I’m not fluent in English, I don’t access 
much the Internet in English. For religion, Arabic, but sometimes in French too.” Yasmine 
reported that she speaks Arabic when talking to other people, however, she uses the Romanized 
Tunisian dialect when writing: “I use French and Arabic... I use both languages equally 
depending on the friend I’m talking to or the page I’m visiting. I always type in French letters 
though and I only do research in French.” Even those who did not finish primary school but 
learned to use the Internet at home reported using the Internet in French. Thus, given the 
prevalence of French illustrated by the users’ habits on the Internet, we can understand how, for 
the non-users, the fear of the language plays role in the perceived-ease of use factor, which is a 
motivational factor that can become one of the psychological barrier to learning ICT use in 
addition to lack of perceived relevance and usage motives (Van Dijk, 2006; Correa, 2013).  
Some informants reported the lack of relevance as the main reason for not using the 
Internet. One of the ladies, Hajir (58 year old lady from Kalaa) said: “My son asks me to let him 
teach me. He says: come mom let me show you how to use this. I say no. Something that I don’t 
use or need! Why learn it if I don’t need it?” Others explicitly reported the lack of interest as the 
main reason for not using the opportunity that their kids offer them to acquire techno-
competencies. Monji, a 61 year old from Kalaa, used to work at a high school which provided a 
computer and Internet connection for the staff members. His daughter offered to teach him but he 
refused to learn for an unconventional and rather facetious reason: “The administration provided 
us with a computer and Internet connection but I was at the end of my career, I didn’t care much 
for it, so I didn’t learn. I don’t use it at all. My daughter studied computer science years ago 
before I retired, and she wanted to teach me, I told her no! Because if you know, it’s a problem at 
work. If they ever need something, you would be the one they call. I didn’t learn so when I tell 
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them ‘I don’t know’ I wouldn’t be lying.” Other than the fact that it’s humorous, Monji’s reason 
for not learning demonstrates a careless attitude towards the acquisition of techno-competencies 
that he was willing to give up, for fear that the new competency would burden him with more 
tasks at his work place.  
Similar to Monji, Dhiaa’s daughter desired to teach her father but was faced with his lack 
of interest: “My youngest daughter uses the Internet the most. She shows me things. Mainly 
pictures. She really wants to teach me how to use the computer and the Internet but I don’t want 
to. I’m not into it. I just don’t care.” The same discourse, with almost the same words was 
brought up again in another informant’s interview. Adam, a 53 year old from Zouhour, expressed 
no interest in learning because he finds the programs that he likes on TV. He said: “My daughter 
uses it the most. She didn’t try to teach me and I’m not interested. I like news and animals and I 
find those programs on TV, so I don’t care about the Internet.” Fatma, the 58 years old lady from 
Kalaa also reported her satisfaction with TV as the medium where she find the information she 
needs: “There is TV to teach me everything I want, cooking and everything else.” For all these 
respondents their satisfaction with their traditional media experience seems to be another factor 
preventing them from connecting to the Internet. TV is a powerful competitor to the Internet in 
these communities. It emerged as the main source of information for my informants, and will be 
discussed at length in the last chapter. That being said, it is not only their satisfaction with TV 
that is standing between them and learning. The main problem is that these respondents are not 
seeing any benefit to the Internet other than giving them entertaining programs about subjects 
that interest them (cooking, animals, news, etc…). Therefore, they do not see the benefits and the 
relevance of going online as long as the television is providing those services. In other words, 
there is a lack of perceived relevance in their attitude towards the Internet.  
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For many, the only relevance to the Internet is chatting with their kids via Skype. To do 
so, they had their children do everything for them, from turning the computer on to video-
conferencing. This trend was particularly prevalent among the elderly regardless of the gender. 
Yosra, the 76 year old lady who lives in her own house but surrounded with her children and 
grandchildren houses reports: “I don’t know why they use it. I don’t ask and they don’t tell me. I 
have my daughter in Sweden... she talks with her sister and I go there (to her daughter’s house) 
and talk to her too. That’s it.” The grandchildren of Layla (the 72 year old lady from Zouhour) 
are always in her house, along with their parents as they all live in the independent stories above 
her house. She reports their assistance to help her talk to her daughter who lives abroad: “I call 
my daughter in Italy and talk to her via Internet. They open it for me, and I put that thing on my 
head and I just talk. I don’t even know how to open the computer… I don’t want to learn. As 
long as they call my daughter for me, I’m fine.”  
Similar to Layla, Basma’s sons handle the whole process of video conferencing for her: 
“We talk to my daughter abroad. She calls them on the phone and tells them to open Skype 
because she wants to talk to me so they open Skype and they call me and I talk to her… I would 
like to learn. I just don’t have the opportunity to learn. Whenever my daughter or my son is 
going to talk to me, my younger kids open it for me... it’s ready for me to use. My daughter is 
very young and she opens it for me too.” Basma actually articulates the reasons for her and the 
other ladies’ lack of learning. There is nothing compelling them to learn as the kids do 
everything for them. The issue of younger family members “connecting” for their elders further 
complicates the issue of ICT usage which usually holds the assumption that people are either 
users or non-users, either in or out (Van Dijk, 2006).  In the case of many of my respondents, 
they are neither in nor out. They are a separate category of users who go online through a 
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mediator, a person connecting on their behalf. That is why it is difficult to argue that they are not 
benefiting from the technologies available to them. They have a specific digital needs – mainly 
keeping in touch with their children abroad- and they satisfy their needs with other people 
connecting on their behalf. If they have other needs, for example searching for health-related 
information or administrative documents, they will satisfy their needs through their mediators in 
the same way. In other words, their social capital is at their disposition as a bridge to technology 
use and benefits. On the other hand, their social capital is playing against their techno-capital as I 
can’t help but wonder if these people, especially those who can write and read, would invest time 
and effort in acquiring techno-skills had they been compelled to do so on their own.  
Many researchers found similar results while investigating reasons for not using the 
Internet by those who have access. They found assisted or facilitated Internet use as an important 
factor, especially in marginalized populations (Van Dijk and Hacker, 2003; Straubhaar et al, 
2012; Rideout and Katz, 2016). Furthermore, this line of research usually finds the lack of 
relevance as a key determinant of the usage divide. Relevance is an integral part of ICT usage; 
without a perceived degree of relevance, people do not see a compelling reason for learning to 
use ICT. Rojas et al (2001) provided a list of techno-dispositions that includes the awareness and 
perception of the potential value of the technology to the individual and the community as one of 
the most significant elements. The authors argue that people must have a positive attitude 
towards ICT. In other words, they have to perceive the information provided on the net as 
relevant to their lives, in order for them to acquire competencies and apply them. In line with 
Rojas et al, Lu and Straubhaar (2014) argue that the lack of perceived relevance and desirability 
will drive a person away from computer and Internet use. Van Dijk (2006) argues that motivation 
comes second in line after access in terms of the digital divide scale. He asserts that only after 
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one establishes access and finds a motivation for using the technologies, can he or she invest in 
skill acquisition, and only then can we discuss the absence of techno-competencies as a reason 
for lack of usage.  
In terms of motivation, all informants who reported daily to limited usage of the Internet 
also reported a specific motive for their skill acquisition and ICT usage. Yahya, the techno-
savvy, was driven by his interest in TV satellites and Dishes to both learn how to use information 
technologies and to expand his knowledge. He said proudly “I learned by myself. Yes, I swear! 
By myself! I learned mainly by… I’m very interested in satellite cards, so that’s how I learned. 
And through forums... I learned through forums such as TunisiaSat. I access a lot of groups and 
pages related to satellites. So I learn about new generations of TV sets. How to “patchi”34 (patch) 
a satellite receiver… and so on.” Yahya, also uses the Internet for work, he reported that he uses 
it as a medium of communication as his work is based on receiving and sending emails. A few 
like Yahya, especially those who work as high school teachers reported that they use it to 
download the lesson plans and the exams: “My work does not necessitate that I use the Internet 
so I rarely use it. Actually, I use it during the finals because they created this website where we 
can download the exams and we can also use it to get the syllabus. That’s it. I download what I 
need for 2 or 3 months so I can have the lesson plans ahead, so I don’t use the Internet that 
much.” (Aya, 58 year old from Kalaa).  
Helping children with school work was the main motive for parental use. It influenced 
the parents purchase decision or their usage of the publinet as in the case of Abir, the 36 year old 
stay at home mom who graduated as an assistant pharmacist but uses the Internet mainly for her 
son’s schooling. “Sometimes there are things I don’t understand. But I’m really not that curious, 
                                                
34 “Patchi” is the term Tunisians use as a synonym to ‘patch’, to refer to the practice of downloading hacking codes 
to access restricted satellite packages. The practice is illegal but some tech-savvies have made a business out of it. 
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I don’t search in websites I don’t know or try to find things I don’t know. I search things mainly 
for my son’s studies. Otherwise, I’m not really interested in anything. I don’t search that many 
things...I search for things regarding Labib’s (her son) studies or read about alternative medicine 
or religion. But mostly Labib’s studies. In fact, I learned to use the Internet just to help my son 
with his school work. Otherwise, I never touch the computer or care for it.” In the case of 
Yasmine, the high school teacher and Yahya’s wife, being a mom is the main driver of her 
Internet use: “I search a lot about raising kids... I go a lot when I do something bad like yell at 
them, so I would go and search how I change that, and then take notes and write down what I 
read. I always want to improve myself as a mom and search for ways to make myself better. I 
also search for things to help my daughter with her homework.”  
For the few who don’t have Internet access at home, they use the publinet or their family 
members’ houses to help their kids with their homework. Hamed, the 48 year old electrician 
explained that his son’s homework is the only reason why he uses his sister’s Internet 
connection. He reported: “We don’t have Internet... we have a computer but no Internet... when I 
need something for Wahbi’s school we go to my sister’s house... but when he’s older I will “get” 
him the Internet.” Molka, the 34 year old stay at home mom from Kalaa also uses the publinet 
for her daughter’s school: “I go to the publinet to prepare their lessons. Every time they’re taking 
something new, I go to the publinet, I research it and learn about so I can help them with their 
homework. Sometimes, I go about two times I week. I go only for research. I never use 
Facebook or anything else.”  
For the majority of my respondents, using Skype to keep in touch with their children who 
live abroad was the only activity they do online. It was a form of usage that surfaced 
independently of age, income, education, or gender of the user. Wafa, who didn’t finish primary 
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school learned to use it only to chat with her daughter: “I don’t use the laptop that much because 
my daughter calls me (on the phone) often. I only use it [the computer] to call Shada (her 
daughter). I learned how to turn it on. My sons taught me. But that’s the only thing they taught 
me because I only use it ‘for Shada’.” The same usage was reported by Adam, the 64 year old 
from Zouhour, who used the computer exclusively to chat with his son. He said: “We have a 
laptop. My son is in Holland and that’s how we keep in touch together. I have a yearly Internet 
connection plan so we can talk together. Otherwise, it’s my daughter who uses it [the computer] 
the most.” All these respondents use the Internet only to preserve family ties as a transnational 
space that compensates for the geographical distance separating them from their children and 
preventing them from sharing face to face time, something that is characteristic of the Tunisian 
family. In other words, ICT become an extension to what they usually do without the assistance 
of the technologies. This observation is in agreement with Internet scholars who argued that the 
medium “tends to complement rather than displace existing media and patterns of behavior” 
(DiMaggio et al, 2001, p. 307)35 
My users’ narratives indicate that the Internet has been integrated in their daily lives as 
part of the household instruments that satisfies specific tasks without much interest or emotional 
involvement with it, beyond the task they need it to accomplish. In other words, these 
respondents have appropriated a specific function of the technology and manipulated it to their 
specific needs. In more simplistic terms, their lives are not overwhelmed by the technology; it is 
the technology that is manipulated to fit into their lifestyles, habits, and relationships. Although it 
integrated their homes, the technology did not integrate their modes of life more than they 
allowed it to do. 
                                                
35 Skype will be discussed with more details in the next chapter as an example of how ICT are being used to assert 
pre-existing behavior of the Tunisian families.  
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Bakardjieva (2005) refers to this behavior as “indifferently instrumental” (p. 107), which 
signifies the instrumental use of the technology with limited emotional involvement. In other 
words, to these users, the Internet and the devices they used to access it serve a particular 
purpose, and it is them (the users) who manipulate the technologies as instruments to accomplish 
those specific tasks. In a way, the Internet became similar to the other one-task-only household 
devices such as the vacuum, the laundry machine, or the washer and drier, even if the potential of 
the technology, as well as the purpose and nature of the task are fundamentally different.  
The indifferently instrumental usage was not tied to a specific demographic group. 
However, those whose use was limited to Skype have age as a common characteristic, as all were 
older adults. Some only learned enough to be able to perform a video-call through Skype, others 
had their children connect to Skype on their behalf. In my discussion with all of them, none 
reported a motive for usage besides Skype. This takes us back to the discussion of the relevance 
and motivational factors, which obstruct the acquisition of techno-competencies. As a matter of 
fact, the case of my next informant, Mohamed perfectly illustrates this point. Mohamed is an 82 
year old retired judge, a high-paid job in Tunisia with a good retirement plan. He has several 
college degrees (from Zeituna University and from Law School) and lives in an upper-class 
neighborhood in Khezama. Yet, Mohamed’s Internet usage is limited to chatting with his 
daughter who lives in Italy.  
One particularity about Mohamed is that he learned how to access the Internet for other 
purposes when he had a motive and relevant information he was seeking, but his motive was 
short-lived: “I wanted to learn. My daughter taught me when I went to visit her in Rome. I was 
there for a month, she taught me how to use it. I had an account in something and started reading 
newspapers. When we returned to Tunisia, I didn’t use it.” When I asked him about what made 
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him learn and what made him stop using, he misunderstood my question: “It wasn’t difficult to 
learn and when I tried to search for something it wasn’t hard. The first thing I searched was news 
about Tunisia since I was abroad. When I returned I stopped using it.” This is when his wife, 
Nourane (74), intervened and explained that he wanted to learn in December 2010 because they 
were in Rome visiting their daughter, and it was then that the uprising events started. Since there 
was no immediate television coverage, he wanted to learn to use the Internet so he could follow 
the news about the events of the revolution. She also explained that they returned home in 
January and they followed the events on the ground and from Al-Jazeera which, at that point, 
was broadcasting news about the events. Nourane on the other hand, displayed more usage 
patterns than her husband, despite the education differences between the two. She is the lady 
who copied her niece’s computer lessons and instructions to teach herself how to use the 
computer and the Internet.  
Thus, Mohamed’s nostalgia for his country and desire to follow the events shaking its 
political and social scene motivated him to acquire techno-competencies and to use the Internet, 
beyond Skype, for as long as the motive lasted. Similar to Mohamed’s behavior, Ayat, the 32 
year old lady from Kalaa reported intermittent user behavior (Van Dijk, 2006) in reference to 
those who give up the Internet for a period of time then connect again for one reason or the other. 
She explains the reasons of her discontinuous usage: “I used to go when I was in high school, 
about 2 or 3 times when publinets were first created. There was no connection at home, so when 
professors gave me something to research, I would go to do my research. Just to do my research, 
I don’t use it to talk to friends or other people. After that, I went for my Senior year thesis... In 
college... After I got married, I stopped using the Internet. It’s something for people who don’t 
have anything to do. For my thesis, I used it a lot. It can be good. A lot of things, I learned them 
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from the Internet. During my pregnancy, also, I used it a lot. I learned a lot about pregnancy 
through the Internet.” Ayat and Haroun and a few other respondents’ modes of techno-usage 
reflect Van Dijk (2006) sequencing of digital divide barriers, which consist of (1) access; (2) a 
motive for usage; and (3) the skills. Here we should add to Van Dijk’s sequence the importance 
of maintaining a motive, as some appear temporary, allowing the users fall back into the non-
users group.  
Helsper (2008) explains that continuity is an important factor to ensure digital inclusion. 
She pointed out that “people tend to dip in and out of technologies such as the Internet, 
depending on their everyday circumstances. This means that at certain point in their lives they 
are digitally included and at others are excluded” (p. 23). For those who are on the verge of 
digital exclusion, especially those who have digital access but choose not to use, the Internet and 
other ICT are only part of their everyday life as hardware devices. Helsper adds that it is 
necessary that they become aware of some of the ICT benefits and relevance to their lives in 
order for these information media to become part of their daily life habits as well. This could be 
applied to my group of respondents and other similar non-users, especially that all the other 
techno-capital factors are available to them: access, resources, and a techno-positive class 
habitus.  
2.8 AN ICT-FRIENDLY GROUP HABITUS 
At this point, I would like to tie the respondents’ lack of a relevant motive with a 
discussion of the younger generation’s desire to teach their parents and grandparents to use the 
Internet. Most of my informants had members in their families willing to teach them how to use 
digital technologies. The discourse about children willing and wanting to play the role of techno-
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brokers continuously emerged to the point where it became central to the narratives about the 
techno-field. I interviewed Layla (the 72 year old from Zouhour) with her daughters, 
grandchildren and some neighbors gathered around us. As soon as I asked her about her Internet 
skills her granddaughter intervened and the following discussion took place:  
Layla: I don’t want to learn. If they leave it on, I unplug it and that’s it. I just don’t know 
how to use it. Even the phone, I don’t really know how to use it. I fight with my 
granddaughter all the time! 
Granddaughter: she won’t let me teach her. I begged her: please let me teach you. I 
asked her over and over “please let me teach you” but she always says no.  
Layla: She keeps asking me to learn, she says: come let me show you this, let me teach 
you how to do this and I say: leave me alone. I just don’t want to. I can’t do it. As long as 
they call my daughter for me, I’m fine.”  
What is even more fascinating in this conversation is that Layla had an annoyed look on 
her face as she tells me how her granddaughter insists on teaching her and won’t “leave her 
alone”, while the granddaughter had a regretful, almost sad tone to her voice and her facial 
expression as she told me how Layla wouldn’t let her teach her. The attitude of the 
granddaughter is foremost intriguing; she acquired techno-capital in school and at home with 
constant access to the Internet since she was a kid and she sees it as her duty to pass her 
knowledge to her grandmother. Even much younger children were willing to teach their 
grandparents as illustrated in Amira’s comment: “My grandson, aged 6 years old, was showing 
me how to open it (the tablet). He told me let me show you so you can take pictures of me (she 
laughs). He was telling me: this is how you open it, this is what you do next, you touch this, then 
the camera comes on, then this is what you touch… and so on.” Amira proudly explained to me 
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that her grandson had acquired his techno-competencies at home from seeing his mother and his 
uncles (Amira’s sons) use the Internet, and that he had the common sense to show his 
grandmother step by step instructions to operate the tablet to take pictures.  
In line with their youngsters, the relatively older generation of adults reflected a positive 
and encouraging attitude towards their parents and grandparents acquiring techno-competencies 
regardless of their age. During my interview with Yosra, her two daughters were pushing for her 
to learn Internet and computer usage:  
Yosra: I never went to school. That is the problem. If I had gone to school I would be 
able to do everything. I never went to those literacy courses. My grandchildren wanted to 
teach me but I never put my mind into it. I regret it. I regret it a lot.”  
This is when one of her daughters intervened: “You can still learn. Anybody can teach 
you and they (referring to the government) still offer those literacy courses.” 
- “I don’t know.” She responded as if thinking.  
- “You know Mabrouka (a lady that they must know) is 82 years old and she’s taking 
courses.” said her other daughter.  
- Of course! Education is good, it’s always good. Said Yosra.  
Similar to Yosra, Refka’s daughter was encouraging her to use the neighborhood 
resources, the “Youth Center36.” When I asked Refka if she ever learned to use the computer she 
responded: “I never learned. There are [computer] clubs at the youth center but they don’t teach 
you.” Her daughter interrupts: “Yes they do!” Refka explained to her that they let people use but 
                                                
36 They are called “Houses for Youth and Culture” in reference to their communal aspect, and Tunisians refer to 
them as Youth Houses. These centers were created in the early 1980s in popular and lower middle class 
neighborhoods in order to provide entertainment for the neighborhood kids and youth. They offer free sports club 
(martial arts mainly) and culture clubs (theater, photography, painting, plastic arts). In the mid-1990s, the computer 
clubs were introduced to these activity centers. They were meant to teach the youth how to use the computer and, 
subsequently, the Internet when connection became available. However, many of these clubs are used only for 
gaming with youth coming in and out as they wish to play games whenever a computer is available.  
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do not teach how to use, to which her daughter responded: “No, they do teach. If you want to 
learn you can ask whoever is there and they will teach you. Just go there. You can go any time.” 
It is noteworthy from Refka and Yosra’s case that even when the children are not interested, 
willing, or simply are not able to offer to teach their parents, they still encourage them to seek 
courses and to learn using public resources available to them.  
Researchers contended that social resources stemming from social capital can be in the 
form of instrumental support (teaching competencies) or emotional support to learn and use ICT 
(Helsper, 2008). Thus, the younger generations’ encouraging attitudes towards their parents and 
grandparents learning is in itself a resource that represents a valuable techno-disposition to those 
who see age and other age-related factors (health, self-efficacy, or technophobia) as a barrier to 
their learning. The children and grandchildren have the power to change their elders’ attitudes by 
instilling in them the conviction that they can learn. In many cases, the children succeed in 
teaching their parents or relatives how to use the Internet as in the cases discussed earlier in this 
chapter. The Tunisian characteristic of strong family relationship and solidarity informs much of 
these young Tunisians’ attitudes. They value their elders, and passing the techno-capital they 
acquired to them comes naturally to them. It is a reverse trend from what we usually see in 
Western cultural-capital literature where the capital is passed from older generations to the 
younger ones. However, given the circumstances and the nature of the Tunisian society, this 
form of cultural-capital- techno-capital, is being passed in a reverse mode from the younger 
generations to older ones. This illustrates Rojas et al (2012) point that techno-field is a product of 
the interaction of specific cultural, social, economic, political, and historical forces with human 
agency. Rojas et al, found patterns of bottom-up transfer of techno-competencies in their sample 
of Latino-families in Austin, Texas. The same patterns were also reported by Correa (2013) in 
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her study of families from low socioeconomic status in Chile. Her results revealed that offspring 
often served as brokers of techno-competencies and taught their parents how to use both the 
computer and the Internet. Thus, it is a tendency of the children from low socioeconomic status, 
regardless of the culture to transfer or attempt to transfer their techno-competencies to their older 
ones.  
In my group of respondents, while some succeeded at convincing their parents and 
grandparents to learn to use information technologies, others were less successful as in the case 
of Layla, Monji, Habib, Adam, etc... This could be explained by the lack of a perceived motive 
factor in these respondents’ discourse as discussed above. The younger family members, while 
extremely motivated to pass their techno-capital to their elders lack the response to the question: 
why should the latter learn to use digital technology? The lack of interest narrative is not 
addressed in the effort of the younger to transfer their competencies within the family. As a 
matter of fact, their attempts at teaching, insisting and sometimes begging their elders, become 
exhausting to the latter when not accompanied by a reason that clarifies a motive. This was the 
case in Layla’s situation who seemed tired of her granddaughter’s constant begging to let her 
teach her how to access the Internet. It is worth mentioning that the only youngster who 
accompanied his desire to teach his grandmother how to use the tablet with a relevant reason, 
was Amira’s 6 year old grandson. He provided a concrete and relevant reason to his 
grandmother, which is to be able to take pictures of him. This motive, as childish as it may seem, 
was significant enough to grab the grandmother's attention. The fact that she was able to recite 
the steps he showed her (to take pictures with the tablet) demonstrates that she did, indeed, pay 
attention to his directions. Thus finding motives and providing relevant reasons for learning 
maybe the key to the acquisition of techno-competencies by the older generations.  
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2.9 THE CASE OF KAHINA: THE TECHNO-EMPOWERMENT 
While I consider every single one of my interviews as a valuable insight into Tunisians’ 
negotiation of the meaning of ICTs for their society, one of my informants had a particularly 
memorable impact on me. Kahina (the 57 year old stay at home mom) added a unique 
perspective to the way I view my research and the importance of understanding the issue of the 
digital divide. In addition to the role she assumed to serve as access provider, a hotspot for the 
neighborhood, Kahina exemplifies the sense of empowerment felt by “the simple user” 
(Bakardjieva, 2005) through the Internet and technology devices. This section is dedicated to 
shedding the light on the experience of a woman with limited financial and educational capital 
who found in the information technologies a door to the world and an opportunity to acquire 
literacy and digital competencies. Wheeler (2007) argues that the Internet’s ability to empower 
the less privileged and marginalized social groups is difficult to prove and is dependent on many 
other factors. The case of Kahina highlights some of these factors, particularly the role of the 
social capital in building techno-capital. Thus, I discuss in this section the role of children as 
technology resources to achieve the sense of empowerment that Kahina reported. 
2.9.1 Children as Techno-Competency Brokers  
Kahina is a 57 year old stay at home mom. She went to school through 6th grade but quit 
before she finished that year. She speaks Arabic and some French and can write and read in both 
languages. She has never worked and saw “raising her 6 kids” as the only job she ever had. 
Three of her kids live abroad, two in Italy and one in Germany. The other three aged 23, 21, and 
15 live with her. Wheeler (2007) contended that “for women in the Arab world, several obstacles 
stand in the way of their empowerment through ICT, including illiteracy, lack of access, 
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prohibitive costs, IT knowledge, and lack of technical training.” (p. 90). However, social capital 
can sometimes represent a solution to all these problems. Kahina’s children constitute a full 
network of techno-resources. Those who live abroad, provide her with the latest technology 
devices and send remittances that help in paying for the Internet fees. She has at one point owned 
all major information technology devices at home, although the tablet is her favorite. In response 
to my question about the technologies she owns she said: “I have a tablet and a smartphone, 
they’re my life. I used to have a PC but now we don’t anymore. We all have tablets. Who’s going 
to sit on the table and type on a PC anymore? We all have tablets. I navigate and chat and watch 
the whole world.”  
Kahina is an avid user of the Internet. Her daughter who lives with her transferred the 
techno-competencies she acquired through education to her mother. Kahina maintained and 
expanded her skills as she continued using the technologies. She reported: “Before, I didn’t know 
anything. My daughter Iman taught me. She taught me how to sign in, how to navigate, how to 
chat and so on. She taught me how to use the phone too. And now sometimes she would say: My 
mom knows more than I do! (She laughs)”. One of the two sons living with her plays the role of 
tech-support, although she uses his assistance to acquire more skills. She said: “What I don’t 
know at all is technical problems... like if it ‘gets virus-ized37’. I don’t know what to do at all. I 
would call my son Mohamed. But the things I have problems with and Mohamed fixes it in front 
of me, I can fix it by myself the next time. Like sometimes there are boxes that appear on the 
screen. I would ask him why that appeared. He tells me and he shows me what to do. Next time 
it happens I fix it by myself”.  
                                                
37 Tunisian Internet users use a variant of the word virus as a verb when referring to computers being infected with a 
virus.  
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To purposefully engage in learning, Kahina had to be interested in the devices and had to 
have knowledge of the advantages and benefits the Internet and the computer offer her as a stay 
at home mom. Her daughter was the one who revealed the benefits of the Internet to her and 
influenced her initial interest in information technologies, which led to her adoption and usage as 
she disclosed: “My daughter used to call me and show me things on the Internet and that’s how I 
got hooked: wow, it’s a whole world and you can see everything in there, you can see the deep 
sea, how to give birth.”  
In her study of the bottom-up transfer of techno-competencies in Chilean families, Correa 
(2013) demonstrated that the transfer occurred more frequently and efficiently when the parents 
foresaw the relevance and benefits of the technology. Kahina is fascinated with the world and is 
yearning to learn. When she realized that she can “access” the world through the Internet, it was 
not difficult for her to acquire techno-competencies through her daughter and expand her skills 
through her son. Developing techno-capital is a complex process, the transmission of techno-
competencies is only part of the process (Correa, 2013; Straubhaar et al, 2012). The desire to 
learn and willingness to invest time and effort are as important as the transfer of competencies 
(Rojas et al, 2001).  
Kahina’s strong drive to learn combined with her children’s investment in teaching her 
moved the process forward to the point where she surpassed her daughter’s skills as she reported. 
Correa (2013) argued that parents may develop feelings of technological empowerment after 
interactions intended to influence adoption and usage. Once they learn, they develop confidence 
in their learning abilities and further expand their skills (Correa, 2013). Furthermore, Tufekci 
(2003) argues that learning how to use information technologies engender feelings of 
empowerment and inclusion in the digital sphere. She also stated that learners feel confident in 
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their digital skills and in their ability to perform more and more tasks on their own. Hence, 
learners’ confidence in the acquired skills lead to further practice and additional opportunities to 
strengthen their skills.  
Kahina, continued using the Internet after her initial learning phase to the point where she 
became comfortable navigating the medium. Besides, accessing the Internet through the tablet 
has become part of her media ecology. She combines her viewing experiences with her 
technological practices for several reasons. First because traditional media no longer “feed” her 
curiosity to satisfaction. She said: “I learned [how to use the Internet] and now I can’t sleep 
without the tablet next to me. I don’t like TV anymore, TV programs “شينيّذغيام” “May-
ghadhinich”! “May-ghadhinich”! Seriously... “May-ghadhinich”! (they don’t feed/nourish me 
anymore).  
Before, I used to not know anything. I used to complain that my daughter doesn’t help me 
(with house chores). I would tell her: you’re sitting on your bed all day long, you don’t help me. 
She would respond: Mom, I’m in another world! Now sometimes she calls for me: mom where 
are you? And I say: I’m in another world!” Kahina’s choice of words hints at her strong drive 
toward learning. She is hungry for knowledge and only the myriad choices and opportunities that 
the Internet offer to “feed” or satisfy her curiosity. “I like to learn. If I have free time, I really 
want to learn. Because I can’t type on a PC for example, the tablet is easier. And I want to learn 
more, I don’t like to miss anything. My mind is open and I really like to learn.” In fact, 
throughout the whole interview, I only sensed traits of regret and sadness on her voice when she 
talked about her missed opportunity for literacy as a child. She said: “[Ya ritni] I wish I had gone 
to school. I wish... I really want to learn... The Internet teaches you. I thank whoever invented the 
Internet. Whether it’s a foreigner or an Arab... I thank whoever invented the Internet and 
 95 
whoever invented the AC38 (she laughs).”  
Besides, Kahina developed familiarity with the Internet devices to the point where it has 
become part of her daily routine and is akin to a companion. She noted: “At night, I can’t bring a 
CD player next to me, so I put the tablet next to me and let the music play all night long.” 
Moreover, her hunger for knowledge spills over to her viewing experiences. She merges media 
and ties her traditional media viewing experiences with new media forms. She watches TV on 
her tablet as she reported when I asked her about following political news: “I follow politics of 
course. Who doesn’t follow politics now? I follow Tunisian politics and the world politics too. I 
like to watch the 8:00 pm national newscast and when I miss it, I watch it the next day on my 
tablet… I watch everything on my tablet... I like to watch reality shows from our national TV 
like “AL Musamah Kareem” (a popular Tunisian reality show). I watch it on my tablet too.”  
Kahina’s TV and Internet practices demonstrate her control over the traditional media she 
consumes. She uses the Internet to complement, transform and control what she watches on 
“TV”. Indeed, Kahina explained that she controls when she watches something, for example, she 
does not wait for the reruns of the Ramadan TV series. She said: “I watch Tunisian sitcoms on 
my IPad. I watch them sometimes on TV. But most of the time I watch them on IPad. There is 
that program I like... and there are a lot of TV series they have on Ramadan, I watch them later 
on my own one by one. I would be laughing by myself. No more boredom anymore. If I didn’t 
have this tablet, I don’t know what I would have done. They only repeat the things they have 
during the summer in winter time, I can’t wait until winter to have a laugh, so I use my tablet to 
watch whatever I want whenever I want.” She has moved to a next generation of “TV” viewing, 
                                                
38 Air Conditioning has just recently (since the early 2000s) become a basic home appliance in 
popular neighborhoods, and is highly appreciated as summer temperatures consistently exceed 
35°C (upper nineties in F). 
 96 
ahead of most people of her age, gender and education. 
Mehra et al (2004) studied how marginalized groups are integrating information 
technologies into their daily lives and routines. The authors argued that people from less 
privileged social groups contextualize the Internet use in their daily life experiences to enrich 
their practices and widen their opportunities. In fact, not only does Kahina take control over what 
and when she watches, but she also ties her TV viewing with the Internet in a way that creates 
further learning experiences. The following discussion explains how her international drama 
viewing coupled with the Internet has become a learning experience:  
Kahina: My daughter went to Turkey, she called me from there and told me she went to 
this great shopping place, a street full of stores... She said: “Mama, I wish you were here 
to see it, “لامرون شيم” [mish normal] (it’s unbelievable).” I told her: I know that street!... 
Listen... I told her... If you go down the road from that street, you turn this way, then turn 
this way, then you will find that big palace where they filmed that drama series. She 
laughed at me... she said: even Turkey, you know it? (She laughed)... I actually know it 
very well... even though I never travelled to Turkey.  
Interviewer: you saw it on the Internet?  
Kahina: yes! I saw it on “that Google” with the maps and places (Google Earth). When 
they had that Turkish drama39, I looked up the places on it. One by one... I looked them 
up. All the places they showed... I found them all... One by one... “لكلا مهتّعلط” [talla’t-hom 
elkol] (I found them all)... So when she told me about that shopping place, I said: tell me 
something I don’t know.” (She is clearly proud of what she had learned by watching TV 
on the Internet) 
                                                
39 Since 2007, Turkish drama series dubbed in Syrian dialect (a dialect very well understood by the Arab audiences) 
has become very popular in Tunisia.  
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At this point, it is clear that a transnational TV product such as a Turkish drama series 
can become the motive for a new learning experience for Kahina. Straubhaar (2007) argues that 
consumers of global TV situate global cultural products within their specific cultural context. In 
the case of Kahina, she single handedly contextualized and refashioned the way transnational TV 
products are consumed. She maintains agency over the flow of the globalized product and 
personalizes it in a way that is meaningful to her. The usual trajectory of a transnational drama 
series flow is altered by an audience member, who is not content to be a passive receiver of the 
media product. Her simple act of watching a transnational TV drama is enhanced by an Internet 
search generating a knowledge experience. Kahina developed her own complex media practices 
that start with viewing places on TV, identifying them then locating them on Google Earth, and 
ends with challenging the daughter to come up with something that she doesn’t know.  
Furthermore, Kahina uses websites such as YouTube or Facebook as a learning platform. 
She remarked: “I only like to see things. I don’t comment or share or do anything else. I like to 
discover things and that’s it. I like YouTube too. I watch everything. But I’m really into 
dangerous and exciting things like natural disasters. I like African traditions, I like to watch 
traditions from different African countries. I like to see scientific things too... I like to learn about 
scientific things...  like how humans and animals give birth. I don’t like people telling me how it 
happened. I like to see for myself.” Wheeler (2007) refers to this behavior as “knowledge 
gathering,” which is when less privileged members of the society, specifically women with less 
education and professional opportunities, use the Internet for learning purposes.  
Mehra et al, (2004) stated that the Internet empowers the less privileged and change their 
daily life into a more opportunity filled space. Wheeler (2007) defined Internet empowerment as 
a process that engenders independence, self-confidence, and self-worth. He argues that the 
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Internet empowers simple users into taking control over the structure of their daily lives and 
improves their overall quality of living.  Although Kahina does not comment or share anything 
yet, Wheeler (2007) argues that as they feel more empowered, women who are constantly 
exposed to the Internet accumulate knowledge and over time develop more and more social and 
political awareness, thus slowly becoming more active and confident to share their points of 
view.  
Throughout our interview/discussion, Kahina was very excited and animated as she 
talked about her Internet experience. Wheeler (2007) argued that the theoretical claim of the 
Internet’s ability to empower and provide opportunities for women in marginalized and low 
socioeconomic status can be hard to demonstrate. Hence, I left Kahina with a sense of 
fascination as I have witnessed the theoretical claims being exemplified in a real life example. 
Kahina comes from a modest family, had little education, and migrated from the regional 
impoverished interior of Tunisia, settling in a popular suburb of a big city to look for better life 
opportunities. With only her husband working low-wage jobs and 6 children, things have not 
always been easy economically. However, with a tablet and the Internet, she achieved a sense of 
empowerment and overall feeling of wellbeing.  
At that point, I couldn’t help but think of Ahlam, the millionaire’s wife who despite her 
husband’s economic wealth, the big house, and her frequent travels to Europe (mainly Germany 
to visit her daughter), is in the opposite position in the empowerment scale.  She said when I 
asked her if she would attend digital literacy courses if offered by the government: “I would love 
to go and learn. ‘You know, now that you mentioned it, I feel like I’m going to cry (she does 
actually cry). I want to learn, I feel like I am missing everything because I can’t write and read.” 
Ahlam cried during the interview and cried again when I finished recording.  
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I naively thought I should mention to her that the adult literacy courses are still offered by 
the government and that she could go and learn. However, Ahlam burst in tears again and told 
me that she went for a couple of courses but her husband thought that she had enough “learning” 
and that she should stop learning. Ahlam’s unfortunate situation demonstrates two main 
observations; first, it highlights how sometimes economic means are not enough to empower and 
provide an overall feelings of well-being. Ahlam’s lack of education is troubling her and 
significantly hindering her ability to feel content and included in the social life around her. 
Second, her situation sheds the light on the social barriers that stand against Arab women’s 
educational empowerment, and the impact of the family and social gender roles in limiting vs. 
fostering women’s learning opportunities (El Gody, 2006; Wheeler, 2007). Ahlam’s case shows 
that access to technologies and economic means are not always enough to develop techno-
competencies and to have access to the benefits of the Internet.  
The combination of a supporting social capital and access to the technologies, however, 
can be enough to access the benefits of the Internet even in the case of lack of financial 
resources. Kahina’s family, mainly children, play an essential role in her sense of empowerment. 
Her curiosity, willingness to learn, and self-confidence did the rest. All those elements converged 
together to structure a space for human agency to negotiate and organize. Kahina is developing 
her own literacy curriculum, she is in control of what she does and does not learn.  Kahina does 
this while maintaining an active social life. She is very close to her family members as she 
reported using Skype to keep in touch with her migrating children (as will be seen in the next 
chapter).  
She is also very well integrated in her community life; she reported that she supplies the 
neighborhood youth with her Wi-Fi password to enable them to use her Internet signal and 
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leaves the lights on at nights so they can use the signal late at night under the walls of her house. 
Kahina was also present in a few of the interviews I conducted with her neighbors as part of the 
crowd attending the ‘event’ of the interview. That is why I believe Kahina can be a strong 
influence on her community; she can spread awareness of the Internet’s role in her learning 
process and her feelings of empowerment. She can easily spread positive attitudes about the 
Internet to motivate others into taking advantage of their children’s willingness to teach them and 
thus empower them through the expansion of their everyday opportunities. Identifying the 
change agents like Kahina in each small community in Tunisia may offer one of the keys to 
addressing the complexities of the digital divide in Tunisia. 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
Since the early 2000s, digital divide scholars argued that the issue is no longer 
determined solely by physical access; other social and demographic factors, mainly poor 
education, age, and lack of motives affect digital engagement (Warschauer, 2001; Van Dijk, 
2006; Helsper, 2008). This chapter channels these claims. First, access was not a problem in any 
of the households I visited or to any of the informants I interviewed. On the contrary, most of my 
respondents had the latest technologies and had Internet access through yearly plans or through 
USB drives. Those who did not have access at home had their relatives’ houses or the publinet at 
their dispositions.  
Nevertheless, access did not necessarily translate into usage as already established in the 
literature (Van Dijk, 2006). Many of my respondents had limited to no usage. Age especially was 
a key factor, which is a well-known determinant of the digital divide (Helsper, 2008; Correa, 
2013; Straubhaar, 2014). Education appeared as a second determinant factors for many 
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informants. However, it was not the case in all the families as some had a reversed tendency as in 
the household of the retired judge (Mohamed, 82 years old) who has not used the Internet at all 
ever since his return from his visit to Italy (January, 2011), expect for Skype chats operated by 
his wife. This is despite his rich educational background and the several degrees from prestigious 
Tunisian universities he acquired. In contrast to his complete lack of usage, his wife Nourane, 
who did not finish middle school, uses the Internet from time to time for medical doctor reviews. 
Mohamed learned from his daughter while he was visiting her in Italy, only to be able to follow 
the events of the Tunisian revolution. His wife, was much more interested in learning. She 
wanted to take courses but then her niece took the courses and she copied them from her and 
acquired techno-competencies by herself through her niece’s courses.  
It is important to note that Nourane’s 9th grade level provides enough literacy to read and 
write in both Arabic and French, the language mostly used for the Internet in Tunisia. This was 
not the case of those who did not finish elementary school. Their poor education, coupled with 
their older age was a significant barrier to their ICT usage. This confirms digital divide scholars’ 
assertion that while the access gap is closing among different socioeconomic groups, the digital 
gap is becoming more about usage and competencies (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Van Dijk, 2005; 
Warschauer, 2002; Compaine, 2001). Compaine (2001) places illiteracy at the center of the 
digital divide narrative. Illiteracy causes those with limited education to perceive many 
motivational psychological hurdles associated with lack of usage, such as confidence and self-
efficacy (Van Dijk, 2006; Helsper, 2008). In other words, they view themselves as too old to 
learn or simply not interested because they do not see the relevance of learning.  
In the case of my informants, their lack of competencies and digital usage emerged 
despite the abundance of the techno-dispositions necessary to acquire techno-capital. Their 
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family and community members were a significant social capital and techno-resource. They were 
willing to help, assist, teach, and encourage the elderly’s learning and usage. They also provided 
access whenever the relative did not have the technology at his or her house. Not having younger 
children living at the house, as in the case of Habib and his wife Ahlam the upper class Khezama 
residents or in the case of Layla from Zouhour, was the main reason for not having the 
technology at home. In both cases, however, their children and grandchildren come to their 
houses often bringing their technologies and their USB drives with them to help them connect 
and chat with their immigrant offspring.  
The absence of a motive was the main factor behind usage disparities. Many reported a 
complete lack of interest in using the Internet. There was no perceived benefits from the 
information technologies other than chatting with children abroad, which is performed for them 
by their children, thus, they had no reason compelling them to learn. For those who use, 
parenting education and children schooling were big motivational factors, echoing a recurrent 
finding in digital divide research from different cultures (Helsper, 2008; Correa, 2013; 
Straubhaar et al, 2012). Others acquired techno-competencies because they were motivated by 
keeping in touch with their immigrant children. Many learned enough to be able to use Skype 
and operate video-calls. Some learned to play games and conduct small searches.  
A few respondents were intermittent users, meaning, they take part in the digital sphere 
as long as they have a motive then quit as soon as their motive expires. Some of the intermittent 
users go back to use with the emergence of a new motive, others don’t. Thus, the techno-field in 
the communities I observed revealed to be unique in some ways, yet similar in many aspects to 
techno-fields from other cultures.  On the one hand, my sample of respondents complicated the 
relationship between demographics and usage. It was a mixed sample of educated younger 
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respondents making an informed choice not to use digital technologies, while other, older and 
less educated trying to become more engaged digitally. Also, in terms of access, while 
informants with limited income had the latest technologies, those with much comfortable 
financial situations renounced digital usage and digital devices.  
On the other hand, as other research suggested, my respondents’ digital narratives also 
demonstrate that access is followed by motives not skills on the scale of barriers to digital use. 
While most research shows that older adults have similar usage and attitudinal patterns, my 
informants show that non-users have similar attitudinal and barrier patterns regardless of age. 
They have similar attitude, discourse, and reasons for their lack of usage, which is mainly the 
lack of a motive. Helsper (2008) argues that those pushing for techno-competencies must first 
establish motives and provide relevance factors in order for the potential user to invest time and 
effort to learn and become fully engaged in the digital sphere. 
The recurrence of the of absence of a motive as usage barrier may be understood as an 
age group habitus; a shared and widespread attitude that views the technology as important for 
the younger generations as an educational and entertainment medium, but not beneficial or useful 
to their age group beyond keeping in touch with their children abroad. In a way this could be 
attributed to the lack of a government campaign, which is often crucial to instill in the population 
the relevance of ICT to their lives (Warschauer, 2003; Lu and Straubhaar, 2014). The Tunisian 
government's’ initiative to domesticate the computer (in the late 1990s) and then the Internet 
(mid-2000s) produced a tech-savvy new generation of young Tunisians  (Ayeb, 2011) but was 
not combined with a campaign to explain the benefits of using ICTs or their relevance to the 
Tunisian population regardless of their age or educational levels. As a matter of fact, for a long 
time, the home computer remained a medium of entertainment for the younger generations until 
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teachers started asking students to use the Internet for homework or for research. This may have 
affected the older generation's attitude towards the medium, especially that many of my 
respondents expressed that they don’t need to learn the Internet because the television satisfies 
their need for entertainment and information.  
Once a motive is established, my informants had ample techno-resources at their 
dispositions. Their social entourage (family and community) formed a social capital that fosters 
the acquisition of techno-competencies and encourages the usage of digital technologies. Correa 
(2013) argued that offspring from marginalized social groups often socialize their older 
generations into acquiring techno-competencies. The effect of the social capital was embodied in 
the unique case of Kahina who leveraged the techno-resources at her dispositions to empower 
herself and improve her overall quality of life and sense of wellbeing. Kahina’s insight 
demonstrates the capability of the Internet to empower the underprivileged and the ability of 
social capital to compensate for educational and economic handicaps.  
Rogers (1995) argued that social capital is an integral factor in the diffusion of new 
technologies. While I agree with these arguments and find evidence in their support in some of 
my respondents’ discourses, I would like to lay a counter argument that social capital can in 
some cases obstruct the acquisition of techno-capital. This argument is grounded on the 
discourse of the informants who reported their reluctance to learn because there is always 
someone who can connect on their behalf. In other words, these informants’ social capital is 
actually a barrier to their learning. As a few of them articulated, their social capital is causing 
them to feel content with their assisted-digital technologies usage, instead of trying to learn 
technological and digital skills so they can enter the digital world by themselves. 
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Chapter 3: Attitudes towards ICT – Skype and Facebook.  
Van Deursen and Van Dijk (2014) argued that an examination of the attitudes towards 
ICT is fundamental to the understanding of the digital divide. This section is designed to the 
analysis of the informants’ attitudes towards the technologies and the overall technological 
habitus that shapes the techno-field of the three neighborhoods from a cultural point of view. I 
examine factors that determine positive versus negative attitudes and trace how these factors 
affect the usage of certain applications and the rejection of others. The digital divide remains the 
guiding conceptual theme and thus this section is concerned with how attitudes and values affect 
the existence of usage gaps; in other words what cultural beliefs drive the formation of usage 
gaps and what beliefs foster the shrinkage of these gaps. I begin by an overview of the scholarly 
work on the concept of attitudes and the effect of the cultural and social traits on ICT adoption 
and usage. I discuss the impact of attitudes towards ICT in the context of the Tunisian and the 
Arab societies in general, which remains a theoretically unexamined area except for a few 
studies (Yasseen and Al Omoush, 2012).  
This chapter is in line with an increasing impetus towards recognizing the role of culture 
based attitudes on the adoption or the rejection of ICT.  Several researchers argued that 
technology is not a neutral social artifact; rather, it derives its meaning from the cultural values 
and social structure in which it operates. Several researchers stressed on the importance of 
situating the technology within the cultural values and belief system of the technology they 
inhabit (Straub et al., 2002; Loch et al, 2003). Loch et al (2003) defined culture as the set of 
unconscious beliefs, values, and behaviors within a defined group or a community. Cultural 
values constitute a measure through which good and bad are distinguished and applied (Bagchi, 
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2015). In their examination of the culture’s impact on ICT adoption, Bagchi et al (2015) defined 
values as “the basis individuals use to evaluate people, events, and explain their actions and 
evaluations.” Van Dijk and Hacker (2000) contend that a positive attitude towards ICT is 
indispensable for the adoption of the technologies. The lack of awareness of the benefits of ICTs 
and/or a negative attitude towards them obstruct usage even in the case of accessibility to the 
technologies. Rojas et al (2001) situate attitudes and technology awareness among the members 
of a family and a community within the matrix of techno-dispositions fostering or hindering 
technology use. A group attitude towards the use of the technology constitutes a habitus that 
most often deepens or reduces the digital divide without a conscious awareness of what 
engendered the gap or helped in shrinking it.  
As Straubhaar et al (2012) stated: “members of the same group are the product of the 
same objective conditions and share habitus without realizing that their practices are harmonized 
beyond what they as individual agents know or wish” (p.7). Thus, a habitus could be described 
as a discursive construction of the attitudes and behaviors resulting from years of social and 
cultural experiences and perceptions of the information technologies. For instance, a habitus that 
discredits the accessibility and benefits of ICT for one reason or another, poses serious 
challenges to the adoption of the technology within that group’s members.  These latter reject the 
technology without consciously knowing that it is a direct product of their cultural habitus. This 
takes place regardless of the prevalence or scarcity of technology resources (techno-capital); a 
negative group attitude towards the resources will prevent its members from taking advantage of 
them even if they are available. Group habitus and its impact on technology adoption is 
particularly stronger in cultures with close-knit relationships between its members who tend to 
 107 
gravitate towards the community for behavior references (Loch et al, 2003; El Gody, 2006; 
Straubhaar et al, 2012; Bagchi et al, 2015).  
To map the habitus of a certain group, Straubhaar and his colleagues (2012) state that it is 
important to start from an understanding of what the technology means to the group members. In 
other words, do they view it in a positive or negative light and to which degree do they view its 
benefits and relevance to their lives? Loch et al (2003) used cultural influence modeling to 
examine Arab people’s adoption of information technologies. The model was adopted from 
previous cultural and social studies literature and included culture-specific beliefs, technological 
culturation, and national policy and infrastructure. The authors found that these three cultural 
indicators significantly affect the acceptance of the technologies. Views on modernizations and 
foreign cultural influence had a particularly strong influence on the adoption process. In their 
examination of the cultural value orientations that influence the way Arab societies function, Al-
Kandari and Gaither (2011) identified five primary cultural values: “commitment to religion, 
devotion to group, recognition of hierarchical order, resistance to change/attachment to history, 
and sense of pride” (p. 268). The authors contended that each of these values can create a barrier 
to changes; all together, they make for a strong change-resistance model.  
Previous research studies revealed similar findings. El Gody’s (2006) discussion of the 
digital divide implies that there is a rupture between the Arab society and ICT technologies due 
to attitudinal and diffusion issues. He argues that the rapid domestication of ICT in the Arab 
world was not coupled with a parallel human development in the region. He explains that the 
marginalization of women and the persisting high levels of illiteracy and poverty have created a 
significant access and usage gap in the region.  
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Several researchers (Dewachi, 2002; Loch et al, 2003; Straub et al, 2002; Albirini, 2006; 
El Gody, 2006; Askool, 2013) found that attitudes were the other significant reason for the slow 
diffusion of ICT in the Arab world. This line of research demonstrated that Arab people were 
cautious about information technologies when it was first introduced to their societies. Several 
Arab societies saw it as an extension of the Western colonization while others perceived it as a 
threat to their moral and cultural values. El Gody (2006) argued that the attitudes of some Arab 
regimes did not foster a quick adoption of the technologies. For example, in the case of Tunisia, 
the oppressing regimes feared the liberating power of the Internet (El Gody, 2006), which may 
explain the lack of a campaign accompanying the introduction of the computer and the Internet 
in the late 90s and early 2000s. The Tunisian regime may have preferred that the information 
technologies be viewed as merely entertaining media. In this study, not only did many of the 
informants see information technologies as a youth entertainment media, but also many 
perceived it as a threat to their social and cultural values.  
This section proceeds from the premise that Arab society values and morals have a strong 
effect on usage patterns of Arab people and thus has an effect on the Tunisian society as well 
(Mills, 2005; Akour et al, 2006; Yasseen and Al Omoush, 2012). Tunisia could be described as a 
collectivist culture. The family is the center of all discourses, behaviors, and attitudes. However, 
I remained cautious in my analysis of the informants’ discourses and left my theoretical 
framework open for a grounded theoretical outcome that respects the social and cultural 
differences and disparities within the Arab world. Indeed, despite the similarities in the cultural 
and social values of the Arab societies, the influence of these elements on ICT adoption is far 
from being homogeneous. El Gody, (2006) argues that there are deep educational, financial and 
social differences within the Arab world. In the case of Tunisia, while the country scores higher 
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than other Arab societies in terms of gender equity and literacy indexes, its technological 
infrastructure is less developed than other countries. Thus, it is necessary to situate the 
technologies within the Tunisian cultural and social context in order to examine the lens through 
which Tunisians view different technologies and their usage. I consider how the sense of family 
and attachment to the community form the basis of group habitus that significantly affect the 
acceptance of a technology usage and the rejection of another. I also use the informants’ 
discourses to identify the different cultural values and attitudes that serve as barriers or boosters 
to ICT usage.   
3.1 SKYPE: THE PLATFORM FOR A VIRTUAL RAMADAN 
According to Straub et al (2002), Technology derives its meaning from the culture in 
which it operates. User assigned ICT values stem directly from the cultural and moral values of 
the society. This was clear in my group of informants’ attitudes towards ICTs. They saw 
technologies through their cultural filter and thus Skype passed the cultural test with honors, 
while Facebook relatively failed it (or at least received mixed results). In fact, Skype has a 
privileged position in the informants’ lives, families, and discourses. It has imposed itself in all 
my interviews. I added a Skype related-question to my key-informant questions after it emerged 
in all 6 pilot interviews. However, almost all my respondents discussed it before I asked them 
about it, showing how salient it was to them. For most of them, ICT was directly associated and, 
for many, synonymous to Skype use, whether because that is the only way they use the Internet 
or because most of the people around them use Skype.  
Samia (a 61 year old stay at home mom), was very excited to talk about Skype even 
though she did not know what it is called. When I asked her if she ever uses Skype, her answer 
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was ‘no’ until her son intervened: “yes, you do, it’s that thing you use to talk to me and see me 
when I’m not here.” Samia’s tone changed, she now sounded happy talking about the medium: 
“Oh! That’s what it is! Yes, yes, I do, I use that. My other son ‘opens’ it and we use it. I asked 
him to show me how to use it and he’s teaching me right now. I’m still learning. I asked him, I 
told him: I want to be able to ‘open’ it by myself and use it by myself.” Similar to many 
respondents discussed in the previous chapter, Samia’s excitement about Skype is motivating her 
to learn how to manipulate the medium and the computer by herself.  For those who have family 
members living abroad, Skype facilitated and reduced the costs of communication with their 
relatives. Nourane explained: “We connect and talk to my daughter (in Italy). We see her and she 
sees us at any time. It’s something completely different. My siblings used to study in Syria, 
Lebanon, and France, back in the day, I used to write so many letters, all the time. Even the 
phone. There was no phone that you could use to call them. After that the phone became 
available and now Skype. Skype is different because there is a ‘picture’. And also, it doesn’t cost 
money. The phone is really expensive. Even my family here all over Tunisia, I call them and see 
them with Skype. If I want to see my nephews and nieces I use Skype”. Kahina as well uses 
Skype to talk to her family in other parts of Tunisia, she said: “My family from ElKef40 here in 
Tunisia, even my family in ElKef and sometimes even people here, we talk via Skype. I don’t 
waste any money that way. We send each other photos and so on.”  
Skype was integrated in Kahina, Nourane and other respondents’ life as a space that 
allows them to maintain their close family ties. Almost all the houses I visited had a relative, 
mainly an offspring, who lives abroad. Thus Skype took a central position in their lives. Skype is 
their means to virtually unite what geographical distance separates, not only in terms of 
                                                
40 El Kef is a region in the North West of Tunisia, about 300 Km away from Sousse. 
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communication, but also in terms of the social practices that they are used to perform as a family 
before their offspring migrated. For instance, Refka (54 years old) spends time with her grandson 
whom she never met but who’s used to her and knows her well because of their regular Skype 
calls: ““I see my son, his house, his kids, what he cooked and what he ate. The other day he even 
showed me the soup he was cooking! You know, he puts his son in his lap and asks me to talk to 
him and I start playing with my grandson through the screen... and kissing the camera and my 
grandson would be laughing and jumping like he’s going to come to me through the screen.” 
Two years prior to the time of the interview, Refka virtually attended her son’s wedding. She 
described the event in details: “For my son’s wedding, they put the cameras on... and they have 
this room they rent for weddings... and they cooked Couscous and Tajine and Slata Mechwiya41 
and the drinks! There were even alcoholic drinks! I told him, it’s like you are here at home!42 He 
showed me the whole reception table. I was cooking couscous here too... and then he showed me 
his wife... My daughter was crying and he was holding back his tears. And I was crying too but 
was trying not to show him and was clapping and the neighbors came and they started clapping 
and singing too... It was a wedding celebration through a piece of glass (referring to the screen) 
43.” A wedding through a piece of glass sums the situation. It was a typical Tunisian wedding 
with all the elements present: the community, the food, and the singing but through a virtual 
space. The geographical distance between Tunisia and Sweden was eliminated by the 
technologies which provided her a transnational space to be there for her son’s wedding, and 
attend a celebration similar in nature to those Tunisians organize for their weddings in Tunisia.  
                                                
41 All Tunisian dishes often cooked in festivities.  
42 The food Refka describes is typical in wedding celebrations in the region of Sousse, where all 
family and neighbors are invited. Alcoholic beverages are commonly consumed by men in those 
celebrations. 
43 Refka explained that she was not able to travel to Sweden to attend her son’s wedding due to 
financial reasons.  
 112 
The ‘piece of glass’ transformed the notions of place and time and created a space for 
instant interaction through transnational virtual spaces. For the Tunisian informants, social 
practices take place instantly despite the geographical distance as Adam (64 years old) reported: 
“We chat with my son on my daughter’s phone or on the laptop. We talk with him as if he is 
here... He would be in his house with his wife and kids and sometimes we watch him cooking...” 
For many, Skype was particularly important during Ramadan, which is a cultural moment that 
has a special place in Tunisians’ life. People fast all day long and get together at sunset around 
the family table to break the fast. They usually cook a wide variety of food with a few staple 
dishes that have to be on the table everyday (e.g., a Tunisian soup, Tunisian egg rolls, and 
Tunisian salad). Collectively breaking the fast in family is a revered tradition similar to the 
Thanksgiving dinner in the USA.  
For the families that have someone living abroad, Skype allows them to connect with 
their geographically distant relative and virtually complete their family gatherings. Basma said: 
“In Ramadan sometimes, I would be breaking the fast and talking to him, it’s as if he is here with 
me.” The talking takes place through the virtual space while the “here” refers to her 
geographically-bounded location, her house and precisely her Ramadan dinner table. Nahla (62) 
goes as far as reporting what could be described as a transnational kitchen: “Skype is great, my 
son has been there [in Canada] for two years and I don’t feel like I’m missing him that much. I 
see him every night. I see his house, I see his wife. Sometimes she asks me how to cook 
something, so she puts the camera in the kitchen and I tell her what to do. My son too, especially 
in Ramadan. I tell him now put this, now add that, now cut the onions... Now wait a little... And 
then when it’s done, he tastes it and says: Mom, it’s delicious! And I tell him: ‘of course! It’s 
like ‘I’ cooked it’ (she laughs).” Nahla, does not only give her son or daughter in law recipes of 
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Tunisian Ramadan dishes, she actually spends time guiding him while he cooks. When I asked 
Layla (the 72 year old from Zouhour) about her view of the Internet, her response was grounded 
on the time she spends talking to her daughter via Skype. She said: “I think it’s a great thing. It 
brought people who are far away closer. You know in Ramadan, my daughter in Italy she asks 
me, mom how do you cook this thing? So I have the computer next to me and I show her, I tell 
her do this, do that. I tell her: boil the water, add the flour, add this... Add that... and she does 
what I tell her. She tells me: it came out great. If there was no computer and no Internet, I 
wouldn’t even see her!”  
The stories about the virtual collective cooking was overwhelmingly present in the 
experience of the parents in my group. Kahina (57) also described moments of Ramadan cooking 
that she shares with her son who lives in Europe. She said: “In Ramadan, he (her son) would be 
cooking in the kitchen and I would be in the kitchen... and the IPad right next to me... I always 
have the IPad next to me... like a TV set. I would be cooking and showing him what I’m cooking 
and what I did or ‘put’. Then he shows me what he is cooking. We would be talking like he’s 
here. Even when he comes, I don’t feel like I missed him that much, ‘chab-anin beb-athna’44.” 
In fact, it is worth mentioning how the transnational kitchen is both supporting existing family 
ties and traditions but also challenging them. Given that the kitchen is not the typical place for 
men in the Tunisian society, these moments of shared cooking with the “sons” is a product of 
immigration and the Internet. Immigration compels the migrating sons to enter the kitchen and 
cook for themselves, especially in Ramadan. Their nostalgia for the Ramadan table and family 
time drives them to cook for themselves under their mothers’ supervision. The Internet allows 
them to instantly use their mothers’ knowledge and experience to make authentic Tunisian 
                                                
44 Translates to ‘our hunger of each other is satisfied’ 
 114 
dishes. Thus they spend quality time in their respective kitchens, which have been virtually 
connected despite being geographically separated. Thus, immigration and the Internet not only 
strengthened the preexisting family relationships, but also helped in overcoming years of 
predefined gender roles that kept the men out of the kitchen.   
It is not only in Ramadan that the migrating children spend virtual time together with the 
family through Skype, they also include their families back home in their overall transition 
experience. For example, Basma’s son gave her a tour of downtown Doha in Qatar. She said: 
“My son went in the traditional town where he lives in Qatar. He connected with me with his 
phone and he started showing me the town... he showed me the streets, the shops... everything! 
And then he said ‘good bye, I’m going to have dinner now’. He always does that, he shows me 
where he’s going what he’s doing... everything.” In her discourse about Skype, Kahina 
articulates its ability to delete the geographical distance. She said: “I think the Internet is the best 
thing that ever happened. It brings those who are far away really close. You need to drive 3 hours 
to go to Beja45 but via Internet, you can bring Beja to you... in front of you in one minute! In one 
minute, I can see my son (in Italy), I see him even when he is in his car. My daughter gave birth 
two days ago in Germany. A few minutes after she gave birth she showed me the baby and I saw 
her and saw that my daughter was ok. If it wasn’t for the Internet I would not have seen my 
daughter and looked at her face to know that she was ok.” The informants’ shared activities with 
their migrant children take place in a virtual space that creates a sense of proximity and relieves 
feelings of longing, despite the geographical disconnection. Wafa, literally articulated many 
informants’ view that technologies are a remedy for homesickness: “Society is better today. You 
know, we used to hear some saythat there will be a time when you get a phone that ‘looks at you 
                                                
45 Beja is a town in the north-west of Tunisia. It is about a 3 to 4 hour drive from Sousse.  
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and you look at it’ and we used to say: What? No way! It sounded... just weird. But now it’s a 
normal thing. And the Internet is great. It is great for homesickness and missing your kids.” 
These informants not only satisfy their yearning for their migrating family members but they also 
use technology to reinvent family practices and traditions in a transnational setting. Immigrants 
and their families in their home countries often sustain modes of communication that create a 
network of cross-border cultural, social, and economic relations, all taking place on a 
transnational space and setting (Basch et al, 1994; Guarnizo, 1997).  
Skype functions as the platform for this transnational space; it assumes a Tunisian 
identity and essence stemming from the social practices and experiences of the Tunisian users, 
and becomes shaped by their values and traditions. The users shaped its space and manipulated it 
according to their belief system and their daily life habits. Consequently a new cultural layer is 
added to the definition of space and time. These transnational communication habits also add a 
new culture-specific dimension to the space of flow, which refers to “the material arrangements 
that allow for simultaneity of social practices without territorial contiguity” (Castells, 2000, p. 
19). Nevertheless, within this space of flow, the migrants and their families’ position in the 
migration network is reconfigured and rearranged. Several research studies focus on the 
immigrants themselves as the ones living a dual and transnational life (Owusu, 2003; 
Christiansen, 2004).  
Glick-Schiller (2003) uses the term “transmigrants” to refer to immigrants whose lives 
are rooted in and connected to two different geographical territories through technology-
facilitated communication. Yet, based on this study’s informants, I argue that the families in the 
home country themselves are emblematically transmigrants. Their daily existence is embedded in 
two different territories not only emotionally but also in virtual practices and activities. They 
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accompany their children in virtual tours in the host cultures, attend weddings, visit the newly 
born grandchildren, and cook and eat on the transnational space of flow. Thus, the combination 
of ICT, immigration, and strong family ties, are adding another layer to our understanding of 
transnationalism and transmigration.  
However, the users’ social practices are also shaped by the technologies; driven by their 
family values, the informants who reported spending quality time with their offspring online are 
mostly elderly who appropriated a function of ICTs to maintain the family unit. In other words, 
they adopted information technologies to satisfy a specific emotional, social and cultural need. 
Thus, the way that the ‘piece of glass’ as Refka called it, functions as a transnational agent of 
family solidarity and unity generated a positive view of the Internet and its applications. On the 
other hand, other information technology applications did not fit within these moral values and 
traditions, as discussed below in the case of Facebook.   
3.2 FACEBOOK: “IT’S ALL FACEBOOK’S FAULT46” 
One of the younger informants, Nacira (in her 30s) stated that Facebook is the most used 
communication outlet by Tunisian Internet users. She said: “In Tunisia, we only use the Internet 
for Facebook (she laughs). I’m not kidding, it is becoming a sickness. Facebook is the number 
one in the family.” In fact, Nacira is not exaggerating. Facebook remains the number one most 
visited website by the connected Tunisians, followed by YouTube and Google.47 Some, mainly 
younger informants, use Facebook to maintain their social networks and for news information.  
                                                
46 “Kullu mel Facebook” (it’s all Facebook’s fault) was the phrase one of the informants used to blame 
Facebook for the degradation of cultural values.  
47 http://www.wamda.com/2013/04/12-key-statistics-on-how-tunisians-use-social-media-infographic 
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Naima (52 years old) learned to use the computer and the Internet through Facebook. She 
explained: “My children taught me how to connect. They taught me how to use Facebook and 
they taught me how to play games. They taught me how to use the computer too. They would be 
using it and I would sit next to them and they show me how to use it.” Walid, a 31 years old from 
Kalaa described what he does on FB: “I talk to my friends, I follow sports groups, I read the 
latest news on sports. I follow groups about electronics as well.” Others use it for personal 
interests and for work-related purposes as in the case of Yasmine, the high school teacher: “I 
follow a lot of groups for women... groups for fashion, accessories, clothes, kitchen and recipes. 
And there is a group for teachers, I use it a lot too, I participate in it too. Sometimes I’m not 
convinced with something so I ask a question and they answer me.”  
For many of the respondents, Facebook is used for communicating with friends, in 
addition to the other information, shopping, and general interest related activities. Farook (the 30 
year old) also uses Facebook for news in addition to other activities. He said: “On Facebook, I 
order clothes... I talk to my friends abroad and... and I follow the news.” Facebook links the 
offline world with the online sphere as Facebookers mostly use the platform as an extension to 
their offline community and social networks (Lampe et al, 2006). Thus, the maintenance of 
existing social ties is one of the main uses of Facebook regardless of the age of the user (Ellison 
et al., 2007). For instance, once she learned how to use it, Naima’s (the 52 year old from 
Zouhour) usage pattern was similar to the rest of the younger Facebook users: “I have a 
Facebook and I use it to talk to my friends, I look around. I share things... I like, I comment. I 
connect everyday whenever I have free time.”  
Several researchers argue that SNS enhance and generate social capital (Livingstone and 
Lievrouw, 2002; Ellison et al., 2007; Zhang et al, 2010). They also found that SNS disembeds 
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communication from the traditional physical locality and give it more spatial dimensions and 
more flexibility over time. In addition, it empowers its users through the maintenance and 
expansion of their social networks and thus enhances their social capital. That being said, my 
informants’ view did not correspond or match the scholarly found benefits of Facebook and SNS 
in general. Not only did they perceived them in a negative light but also their views affected their 
attitude towards the Internet in general. Those who had an account and reported being Facebook 
users had mixed feelings about the Internet and Facebook.  
Farook explained: “It’s good and bad. It’s a whole world, it shows you everything, but for 
the kids, it’s not good at all, parents must control their children’s use. Especially, especially on 
Facebook! They can waste a lot of time. They have to control the time.” Walid based his view on 
his own personal experience: “I think they could be used for good or for bad. The good thing, 
you can keep in touch with friends or read news. The bad things, it can be very distracting when 
one has to study. You can get into problems with the family too.” He laughed and his mother 
nodded in agreement and laughed too. He explained: “I said something in the family group, it has 
the whole family,48 and to this day, some of my family members don’t talk to me.” Molka (34 
years old) was very distrustful about Facebook to the point where she felt the need to watch over 
her daughter’s use of Facebook and used the assistance of other family member to ‘protect’ her. 
She reported: “When my daughter opened her Facebook account I didn’t have to open an 
account as well because there was somebody monitoring her. Her uncle was monitoring her. I 
still sit by them sometimes when they’re using it and watch what they do.” 
At this point, it is clear that the narrative about Facebook is family-based. Despite 
reporting being avid users of Facebook, both Farook and Walid’s discourses are grounded in the 
                                                
48 Walid refers to the extended family, his mother and father’s cousins and their offspring.  
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family dynamic and their cautious attitudes stem from the website’s impact on the family and the 
relationships within it. They both saw it as a threat to the family’s relationship, solidarity, and 
well-being. Another self-reported avid user of Facebook, Nacira, articulated most informants’ 
fear of the threat Facebook represents to the traditional definition of the family. Nacira 
explained: “I think it has a lot of inconvenience. The problem is the family. The unity of the 
family is completely gone. It’s a bad thing. Imagine we go out together49 for a drink thinking that 
you’re going to chat and talk together but you find everybody on their emails and Facebook.”  
It is interesting to note, through the above informants’ discourse, the emergence of the 
top-down parental cultural transmission as a source of influence about ICT within the family. 
This flow differs from what we observed in terms bottom-up transfer of techno-competencies. In 
other words, while ICT adoption research demonstrated that younger generations affect their 
parents’ adoption of technologies, it is the parents who influence the younger Tunisians view of 
technologies; their attitudes are the product of their social and cultural values. Bourdieu (1984) 
argued that parents transmit different forms of cultural capital, including attitudes to their 
children, which is why attitudes toward technology are also grounded on the parents’ view of the 
world (Rojas et al., 2012; Correa, 2013). 
Top-down transmission of attitudes also explains why the older informants had identical 
attitudes and a very similar discourse to the younger generations. Refka (the 54 year old) had a 
forthright negative attitude about Facebook, although she does not have an account and never 
used it Facebook. She noted: “I told my daughter it’s better not to have a Facebook. It creates a 
lot of problems… many spouses divorced because of Facebook. So I told my daughter it’s better 
if she stays away from it. Just use your phone to watch videos and talk to your friends and that’s 
                                                
49 Nacira was talking in the context of the family and “together” was referring to her and her family.  
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it.” For others, it is the problem of security and privacy that fed their distrust. Both Molka and 
Refka expressed a pattern often revealed in the domestication of the Internet studies. Parents, 
users and non-users, are often concerned about the effect of the Internet on their children’s 
physical and moral wellbeing and feel a responsibility to protect them against the negative effect 
of the technology (Ito et al, 2010). Hover et al (2004) stated that in order to protect the family 
values, parents often go as far as placing strong rules and restrictions to control the children’s 
ICT use.  
Morals and cultural values were a especially strong source of ambivalence towards 
Facebook in my group of informants. Baraa (56 years old) the highs school teacher and Mosque 
Imam expressed a strong, moral-based view against Facebook despite having an account and 
being a regular user himself:   
Interviewer: What do you do on Facebook when you access it?  
Baraa: I read news... There is our “branch” of elementary education domain, I access it 
to see what’s going on in education... News about education mainly…  Also, some 
communication for friendships but not that much.  Very rarely. 
Interviewer: Do you ever write a status or post pictures or… 
Baraa: No no no, pictures, never! ... Why? Because you know the Arab mentality... the 
problem is... we use Facebook and the Internet the wrong way. Other people use it for 
research and we use it to… first, when you enter the Tunisian Facebook, all you see is 
people with fake names. Why does one have a fake name? To flirt and ‘bleda’ (bad 
immoral behavior). The Tunisians who use Facebook, 80% of them have fake names50 
                                                
50 Baraa’s statement about Tunisians using fake names on Facebook is mostly true, however, it has been argued that 
the large number of fake names was due to a general distrust in the Internet and how personal information are being 
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and switch their genders. And that shows bad intentions, not good intentions. If they had 
good intentions, they would use their real names. 
Interviewer: Ok... so in general, how do you see Facebook being used? 
Baraa: In a negative way... negative... negative... Very negative. There are people who 
are geniuses in computer... but they use it for “scamming”... So they would take your 
picture and do things... things that you wouldn’t even think of! They would even use your 
account and use your name to talk with people that you respect about unspoken things! 
So I don’t put my pictures.  
In his way of describing the usage of Facebook, Baraa neutralizes the technology itself, 
instead he blames the users and considers the “negative” usage as ethnically-based problem, a 
direct result of the “Arab mentality,” which, according to him, leads to misuse of the technology 
and of personal information and renders Facebook a dangerous space and a threat to privacy, 
morals, and existing network ties51. Baraa perceived the technology itself to be free of 
transgression; rather, it is the user who chooses to apply or to renounce his or her moral values 
when using the technology. That being said, the prevalence of the mixed feelings and the 
negative attitudes towards Facebook masked the positive usage and social practices. Baraa and 
many of the connected informants reported using Facebook to keep up with the latest news in 
their professional domains and to keep in touch with existing social ties. However, when asked 
to discuss their attitudes toward the medium or how others are using it, their narrative was 
mostly focused on the perceived negative modes of usage and none of them explicitly noted the 
time they spend on Facebook as a positive aspect of the medium.  
                                                                                                                                                          
used online. Concealing real identities was also part of the general state of fear of authorities as one could find 
him/herself persecuted for any comment or action.  
51 This view was actually largely shared by other informants but in their discourses about the Internet in general, a 
point that will be discussed in greater details later on in this chapter.  
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Many informants reported engaging in family activities or spending time together with 
other family members because of Facebook, hence the non-users knowledge of this online 
platform. Several older informants reported that their children show them “things” from their 
accounts and their newsfeed. Dhiaa (53 year old from Zouhour) said: “I see news sometimes on 
Facebook. When something happens in Tunisia, my son would show us what is going on through 
videos on Facebook.” His wife proudly corroborated his comment. She said: “‘Montassar’ (their 
son) showed us everything and told us everything... Everything that happened... Whatever 
happened we know it from Facebook.” Their son - also present during the interview along with 
his siblings and a couple of neighbors- added: “Every time I see something I know would interest 
them I show it to them... And they know what is going on Facebook and Twitter from Al Jazeera. 
They always watch Al Jazeera and it has a program where it shows what is going on Facebook 
and Twitter so they know from that too.”  
Monji (61 years old) also explained how Facebook allows him to spend time with his 
sons. He said: “My sons search things on Facebook all the time and then they call for me: Dad 
come see this... dad, check this out. I take a look and that’s it. I didn’t want to have an account on 
my own (he laughs).” He also reported how his son screens his favorite soccer games on their 
computer: “My sons have the games of my favorite soccer team on videos… recorded on some 
kind of video... On the Internet (YouTube)..., they have its participation in the soccer Clubs 
World Cup and I always ask them to play the final game for me, and we watch it together... We 
watched it together so many times.”  
Wafa’s family often spends time around Facebook to the point where she feels satisfied 
about the platform and does not need to learn to use it or have her own account. She reported: “I 
know what they are. My sister especially follows Facebook a lot. She tells me and shows me 
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things. She shows me recipes and religious information. She shows me pictures of the family. 
My sons show me a lot of things too. I don’t need to learn. When my daughter posts something 
or sends something, my sons show it to me.” Several research studies demonstrated that families 
members tend to gather around the Internet as a casual family activity (Ito et al, 2009; Correa, 
2013). The few users accustomed the non-users to Facebook to the point where it became part of 
their technological ecology and media habits.  
For the few users, their usage does not take over the time spent as a family. On the 
contrary, it has become a means for the different generations living in the same household or in 
the same family cluster to spend time together and to gather around shared interests and hobbies, 
whether it’s soccer or food recipes. In fact, this observation is in line with Western-based 
research studies that demonstrated that technology use does not necessarily disturb the time spent 
offline with the family, or engaging in hobbies and personal interests and activities (Ito et al, 
2010). Researchers found that family members share time together around the information 
technologies whether to transmit new skills to each other (Straubhaar et al, 2012; Correa, 2013; 
Lu and Straubhaar, 2014) or to create web content together (Ito et al, 2010). In the case of these 
Tunisian informants, many gather around the technology to teach others new skills, to Skype 
together, to follow the latest news especially in relation to the political situation in the country, or 
to screen TV content through the computer or the tablet. Thus, in these situations, ICTs support 
the family tight-knit structure and create new opportunities for shared moments between 
different generations.   
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3.3 FACEBOOK AND BREAKING THE MORAL CODES 
One of the major concerns about Facebook is its threat to the social and cultural values 
and morals. In this section I use the language used by my informants as a baseline to 
conceptualize their fears and ambivalence towards Facebook. Spradley (1979) argued that 
cultural meanings are encoded in the language used by the informants. Ethnographic research is 
the process of collecting encoded cultural meanings and decoding them through the analysis of 
the symbolic systems of the informants’ language. Through the analysis of the terms often used 
in their discourses about Facebook usage, I identify indicators of negative attitudes towards 
Facebook and Facebook users.    
‘Exposure’ emerged as the first indicator of the rejection of Facebook use. Exposure was 
mainly attached to the concept of privacy. For the informants, exposing one’s life online is 
breaking the notion of privacy. In the literature, the alternative scholarly word to the informants’ 
notion of ‘exposure’ is the notion of “exhibitionism.” It is defined as the act of revealing one’s 
life and sharing personal thoughts on Facebook (Day, 2013). While this is usually a behavior 
attached to narcissism, Facebook popularized the notion and provides a platform for a broad 
audience to regularly exhibit large parts of their lives (Day, 2013).  The word ‘exposure’ was 
mostly used by the informants to pejoratively describe what people reveal and post on their 
Facebook pages. Hajir (58 from Kalaa) found the idea of exposing one’s life repulsive. Her 
choice of word against Facebook reflected her strong attitude: “I know Facebook... And I want to 
‘curse’ whoever made it (she was serious when she said it but she laughed when I laughed)... 
Because the West made it to advance ‘themselves’ and we use it to ‘expose’ ourselves.” Amira, a 
neighbor and a relative who was helping her prepare a Tunisian dish at the time of the interview, 
agreed with what Hajir said: “everybody is on it and they are all exposing themselves and their 
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whole lives!” Amira continued: “Us (talking about Tunisians)... we are using it to do things that I 
can’t even describe. It’s not a good thing. We should use it to do things that improve our lives 
and benefit us not hurt others.” For both ladies, life matters are private and sharing them with a 
large public is morally wrong. The idea of a whole network of people who are not necessarily 
part of the family is hard to digest for them.  
Ayat provided an example that defines to a large extent the problem of exposing one’s 
life in the Tunisian culture. She said: “I am saying that because it has created a lot of problems to 
people close to me. A lot of problems! For example, my sister who lives right next to me. 
Recently she posted her picture with her friends in a cafeteria. My brother in Germany saw it and 
a big problem rose because of that picture. If she didn’t have Facebook, she wouldn’t have 
posted that picture. My brother’s only problem is that she posted the picture, it wasn’t that she 
went out with her friends.” While I initially thought that the problem was patriarchal in nature, it 
turned out that it is specifically about the privacy of the family affairs. The sister was free to do 
as she wishes with her life, but exposing what she does on Facebook is a problem that upset the 
family. In fact, the issue of privacy was not related to a particular gender.  
The informants had a problem with discussing one’s life or posting pictures on Facebook 
regardless of the gender. Wafa described her disagreement with all her children (her sons and 
daughter) posting their pictures on Facebook. She said: “Sometimes I think it’s a bad thing. I 
personally think that it’s not appropriate. My husband too he told them one time: why post your 
pictures on FB? We just were not raised like that and I haven’t changed, my ideas did not 
progress with this time, so I still think that pictures are private and we shouldn’t post them for 
everybody to see.” It is important to mention that Wafa is the lady who felt satisfied with her 
facilitated Facebook usage because when her daughter posts pictures, her sons show them to her. 
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As a matter of fact, Wafa’s mother Yosra (a 76 year old), had the same appalled view 
about Facebook, which tainted her attitude towards the Internet as a whole. She said: “It’s bad, 
it’s bad in everything. I think people now live in prosperity unlike before, but I still think before 
is better on all levels. Life was better. They know everything now, but everything has good and 
bad in it. But people can control that, they can learn the good and they can learn the bad. Before 
we had values, and respect, and humility. Now they put pictures and they put everything on the 
Internet. They put everything on the plate.” Yosra perceives someone exposing their life, 
especially pictures on the Internet, as a lack of respect and a lack of “humility.” It is a strong 
value-centric view of other people’s behavior on the Internet. Besides, it is clear from the 
informants’ discourses that the issue is not posting the pictures online in itself, the issue is that a 
broad audience outside of the family is going to view them. In other words, the issue wouldn’t 
have arisen had the pictures been posted on a platform where only family members could access 
them. It is exposing one’s life to a broad audience that greatly bothers these informants.  
In her quote, Wafa mentioned that her ideas about exposure did not progress with the 
times. In fact, this is not an individual or personal trend, it is rather a character of the Arab 
culture where the cultural attitudes are so strongly embedded in the social structure that they are 
highly resistant to the influence of technological progress and influence on societies (Al-Kandari 
and Gaither, 2011). That is one of the reasons why cultural beliefs about technologies are more 
likely to be transferred in a top-down rather than a bottom-up fashion. As discussed earlier in this 
section, the younger generations are more prone to adopt their parents’ cultural beliefs towards 
technologies even when they are techno-savvy or occasional users themselves.  
For instance, Yasmine (35), the high school teacher had a very confused and almost 
appalled look and tone as she spoke about what people do on Facebook. She said: “I ‘go on it’ 
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just for chat and FB and to look at each other’s pictures more than doing research or using it for 
research. Everybody is using it for entertainment. I saw a lady posting pictures of herself giving 
birth to her son, she showed everything, right before she gave birth, her hospital room, and then 
the baby just came out and everything. I don’t understand why they do that! There are ladies who 
put statuses of every single thing of their daily life. Some post things like: I just had a fight with 
my mother in law, I just ate at this or that restaurant. And other people enjoying watching and 
reading all this!” Despite being a user herself, Yasmine clearly had the same negative view 
toward exposing one’s life on Facebook as the older generation in the group of informants.  
It is also difficult for Yasmine to accept the fact that people would enjoy ‘watching’ parts 
of someone else’s private life. In fact, watching others or the idea of “voyeurism” guided the 
choice of words to describe what Facebook users do on other people’s pages. Molka (34 years 
old) had the same attitude as Yasmine. She said: “I just don’t like the idea of talking to your 
friends online, sending messages and sharing things. I just don’t. You spend time and then what 
do you gain? If you use it for news or to learn things, that’s ok. But just to talk to friends and 
watch your friends’ pictures and birthday, no. I mean, people watch other people’s pictures! So 
no, when she (her daughter) really learns how to use it, it’s ok, I don’t mind.”  
“Voyeurism” is in the essence of SNS. Day (2013) explained that voyeurism is the act of 
observing others, which is a generally inadmissible social behavior. However, on Facebook the 
act of viewing other people’s lives (through their Facebook pages), whether with or without 
sharing information is generally acceptable52. Nevertheless, the voyeurism function of Facebook 
is not well accepted by the informants. Arab cultures value the privacy of others and religious 
                                                
52 On Facebook, someone who shares information and views other people’s information is simply a Facebooker. A 
person who views other people’s information and lives without sharing his or her personal information is called a 
lurker.  
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teachings stress on the notion of not “prying over” someone else’s household or family (Sobh 
and Belk, 2011). Both voyeurism and exhibitionism are deemed to be breaking the privacy 
barrier.  
Privacy in relation to the Internet is a broad and complex overarching concept often used 
to discuss issues related to identity, information, security, anonymity, and fraud to name a few. 
Bowie (2015) reported “a considerable consensus around the notion that we have privacy when 
we have at least some control over the information that others have about us.” When not attached 
to the Internet, the term itself is much simpler to define. According to the Oxford Dictionaries: 
“privacy is the state of being free from public attention.” The notion of privacy takes a culture-
bound meaning in the discourse of my informants who view exposing one's’ life as inviting the 
public attention, and view that public attention as an invasion of other people’s privacy.  
The third issue is “dishonesty.” For Tunisians dishonesty is both a religious and cultural. 
The Oxford Dictionaries define dishonesty as an act intended to mislead or cheat. Almost all the 
informants had difficulties accepting the fact that people have the space and freedom to talk bad 
about others, spread “lies” about others, or simply lie to each other on the Internet. Mohamed 
(the 82 year old retired judge) said: “There are people who talk about important issues, and 
others who only criticize people or say bad things about others. Facebook is the most important 
site for people but they don’t know how to use it.” Qassem had a very similar discourse to 
Mohamed’s: “There is only one good thing about FB, which is learning about people and 
learning about their ideas and their thinking. But I don’t like that you can use it as a fishing bite, 
they fish people with it. For example, if someone wants to say something about someone else, he 
has the space on Facebook to do that.” For Nacira, the issue of “lying” is ruining the benefits of 
Facebook. She said: “Even Facebook, it can be used for good things. It depends on the type of 
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groups you follow. You can get information about sports, fashion, or religion. It’s an electronic 
newspaper and always updated. You can read all the information. People don’t have time 
anymore to go buy and read the newspaper so they read Facebook. But unfortunately a lot of it is 
lies.”  
Several informants used the Arabic verb “Shawaha [هّوَش]”, which is best translated to 
‘misrepresentation to the point of distorting and deforming the matter being represented’. They 
expressed a feeling that Facebook users distort the notion of what it means to be part of a family 
and a Tunisian person.  “There is no privacy anymore. There are a lot of lies in there, a lot of 
lying and a lot of fake news. I used to trust Facebook and then I was disappointed. I have a lot of 
friends who closed their accounts.” Said Yasmine, the 35 year old high school teacher. Lying has 
surfaced in the Facebook narrative as one of the most negative and non-acceptable aspect of the 
platform.  Lying is intrinsically problematic; however the informants’ negative views may be 
exacerbated by the fact that the Tunisian culture is strongly influenced by the Islamic values and 
moral teachings (Jeffrey et al, 2003; Al-Kandari and Gaieth, 2011; Jandt, 2016). Lying in Islam 
is a sin and thus the informants found it appalling that there would be a communication space 
where users can freely spread lies or gossip about others. Thus, the combination of dishonesty, 
voyeurism, and exposure generated a strong negative attitude towards Facebook.  
3.4 SKYPE VS. FACEBOOK 
Cullen argues that cultures that value strong family ties and face to face communication 
will reject, to some extent, the use of technologies as a communication medium. In the case of 
my informants, I detected some fear of the information technology effect on face to face 
interactions, yet they all valued its ability to bring those abroad closer through transnational 
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communication. Studies from around the Arab world revealed similar patterns. Arabs fear the 
negative impact of the Internet on their social norms. The fear that it would challenge the essence 
of their social values is a reliable predictor of the use or rejection of digital technologies (Akour 
et al, 2006; Yasseen and Al Omoush, 2012). The dichotomy of Skype and Facebook served as a 
double lens through which attitudes about information technologies in general were built and 
established. The informants’ perceptions of technologies and their impact on societies were 
definitely grounded in their views of Facebook and Skype. I was stricken by the similar and 
almost identical responses to my question about attitudes towards ICT in general.  
One interview after another, the informants placed Facebook in juxtaposition to Skype. 
For instance, Refka noted: “The computer is great, before, I used to talk to my son without 
seeing him. I can’t see if he’s thin or if he gained weight... Now I can see him and even see his 
kitchen, his rooms, his living room; he even showed me the laundry room of the apartment 
complex where he lives... It’s way better now.” Studies found that Skype’s cultural advantage 
stems from its audio and video call features. Ito et al (2010) stated that “voice and vision are 
often viewed as the ideal modes of communication because they mitigate the distances in time 
and space that typically plague transnational families.” (p. 171). Thus Skype was easily 
domesticated and welcomed in the Tunisian households and represented the positive aspect of 
information technologies.  
In contrast, Facebook in my informants’ opinions presents a combination of privacy-
transgressing features that embody the negative side of the technological developments. When I 
asked Refka about how technologies changed societies, her response was grounded in her earlier 
discourse about Facebook: “I think technologies made society worse. It made it a lot worse. In 
fact, technologies have good and bad sides. The negatives is that it creates relationship problems 
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between spouses and people engaged to each other. And the good side, it’s like in my case, I can 
see my son. We would be spending the evening here and he would be spending his evening there 
and we would be chatting via Skype as if he is here spending the evening with us. Then, you can 
tell he feels better, he feels less homesick.”  
Ahlam’s view of technologies was also grounded in functions related immediately to her 
life and her family. She said: “I think society is better now. We see everything now on TV or on 
the Internet. We used to not hear about news and events. If someone dies we don’t know about 
him. Now we do. Even though I can’t read, my son and daughter tell me everything. They would 
tell me this happened or that happened. It used to be rare for someone to have a phone, now 
everybody has phones. Now we can talk to people abroad all the time and see them too. I see my 
daughter in Germany... My son and grandchildren in Switzerland. They call each other too and 
their cousin in Canada talks to them and to us all the time too.” Similar to Ahlam, Dhiaa’s 
narrative proceeds from his ability to watch soccer games on the Internet. He said: “I think today 
life is much better with technologies. There was no Internet or Facebook before. There was only 
phone, ‘the house phone’. Now societies have advanced... You can even watch a soccer game on 
the Internet. My son watches soccer on the Internet and I watch with him. I only like soccer and 
my son puts soccer for me on the Internet.” Nourane’s view was very specific. There were three 
dimensions to the Internet in her mind: Skype, Facebook, and the rest of the Internet. She noted: 
“I think it’s a useless thing [Facebook]. It is used to criticize people and it creates problems. It 
wastes time. The Internet is great. There are a lot of useful information. Technologies brought 
those who are far away closer. We didn’t think technologies like these were even possible. Now 
they became necessary, like Skype or the phone. We need them now.”   
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Even the younger generations’ views of the technologies (in my group of informants) 
were shaped by the cultural values of the Tunisian society. Several saw information technologies 
as distancing people from each other. Ayat explained nostalgically: “Before, we used to miss 
each other, we used to go visit or call each other and say “Aid Mabrouk” (happy Aid)... now 
either people don’t call at all or send a text message or send a group message on FB... for 
everybody! You don’t feel like it’s for you. In the Aid, we used to go visit each other and sit and 
eat the traditional pastries made for the occasion, now a message is all we do. I feel like the 
relationships between people has become very cold (nostalgically).”  
Yahya, the 36 years old technology savvy also expressed an ambivalent attitude; on the 
one hand he valued the global communication and information qualities of the Internet. On the 
other, he expressed a concern for the cultural values and the face-to-face communication. He 
said: “Look, I am a  ‘moukhadhram’ (translates to someone who lived through and experienced 
different epochs)... I was here before the Internet and at the end of the black and white TV era. I 
think it made society better and worst. A good thing for example is that you can see the whole 
world while sitting down. The bad thing is that it distanced people from each other. People now 
call each other and so on... So technologies made you have a bigger network, but within the 
family, a lot of things have changed. Instead of going physically to say hello, now people only 
send a text message. But at the same time, people who are really far, you can talk to them.”  
Molka, the 34 year old stay at home mom also expressed her dissatisfaction with how 
technologies have changed the Tunisian society: “technologies… I think it’s a good thing... But I 
think before was better. I think the relationships were better before... In Tunisia... Tunisia, in 
particular... is worse because of the technologies. We don’t know how to use it. People here only 
use it for negative things.” The social and political problems also fed the fear of Facebook as in 
 133 
the case of Naima (52 years old): “It’s good and bad. It’s a sword with double edges. It’s good 
because it reduces the distance and one can see her daughter. I feel as if she is “closer.” Bad 
because... more than 50% is bad. Some websites are bad and a lot of news are bad too, lies, a lot 
of lies. Negative things. There are things that, us Arabs, are not really knowledgeable about. 
Especially youth, they fall for brainwashing, like terrorism.” Nahla (62 years old) shares Naima’s 
fear over the threat of terrorism: “I don’t like the influence of the Internet on young people. 
Sometimes they use it to brainwash young people. You know those guys, they got recruited by 
terrorists through the Internet.” When I conducted these interviews, the terrorist attack in Sousse 
and later the bombing of a bus transporting presidential guards in the capital, Tunis, were still 
fresh in the collective Tunisian mind. The media discourse focused on terrorist recruitment 
through SNS, which fueled the older generations’ fear of the medium and its threat to their 
children and their society. Basma (55) explained her mixed views about technologies also 
inspired by her views on Facebook, she said: “knowledge is great. But there is ‘debauchery’. It 
shows you the good and the bad and it’s up to you to do what you want with it. It can take you to 
deep oceans. My youngest son showed me this famous guy that was on a famous TV show, he 
told me he’s friends with him on Facebook. So that’s a good thing. But at the same time there are 
others who use it to become friends with young guys to take them to Syria; that is bad and 
dangerous.”  
A large number of respondents, especially the female ones, viewed Facebook as 
dangerous to spousal relationships. Ayat stated that Facebook and the Internet are only for 
people who are not in a relationship: “Also, between the man and his wife, men are distanced 
from their wives. If it wasn’t for the Internet... The Internet and Facebook... he would be talking 
to her and they would be spending time together. My husband is like that and not just him, a lot 
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of my friends when I tell them, they tell me it’s not just you, it’s the same with our husbands. I 
personally see it useful for a particular age group, for those about to get engaged, it’s better to 
stay away from the Internet.” Yasmine had a similar view: “Sometimes I see my husband sitting 
for a long time on the Internet and I start doubting... Is he on Facebook? He tells me I’m on 
MediaSat and I’m doing research and I know it’s silly that I think he might be cheating on me 
but for a while I couldn’t help it. But he told me to do research too so I can learn more and 
improve as a teacher. He works as clothing dye expert and he is always searching for new 
formulas and new colors, he is doing great in his job and his boss loves him.” One of the younger 
respondents, Yasmine, the 35 year old high school teacher, refused to teach her mom how to use 
Facebook, but taught her how to use Skype. As with most of the interviews, the whole family 
was present when I was interviewing the mother, Nahla. The following discussion took place 
when I asked the mother about her techno-competencies:  
Nahla: I only learned when my son moved to Canada. I asked them (my daughters) to 
teach me. And I didn’t really learn to use the Internet. I only know how to “open” Skype 
and how to “close” it. I don’t know anything more than that. My daughter taught me, she 
only taught me how to use Skype. But she wouldn’t teach me more.  
Her daughter intervenes: Well, she wants to “learn” Facebook.  
Nahla responds: Whatever! My son said he’s gonna teach me everything when he comes 
home. I didn’t need to use it when I was working, I only needed it for my son.  
Similar to the rest of the informants, Adam (who is 64 years old) also had mixed feelings 
about the technologies. Skype is good for keeping the family values and Facebook is bad for 
threatening these values. However, he did not develop his attitude about Facebook on his own; 
rather, he built it based on his community’s attitude toward the medium as he explained: “The 
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good thing is they reduced the distance. We can talk to people who live really far from us. The 
negatives, I personally didn’t see for myself but I hear people talking and saying that there are 
bad things. I heard that people say lies about other people. They ruin their public image. The 
youth take that seriously, they believe those lies as if it’s truth. They are all on Facebook and 
they believe everything they see. They say: It’s on Facebook. But Facebook is not a prophet or a 
holy book. You shouldn’t trust everything in there.” Adam externalized what is implicitly 
obvious in the attitudes of my group of respondents. Hamida also had an opinion about Facebook 
inspired by what people say about it. She said: “I think Facebook is good but sometimes I hear 
it’s bad, it has bad things. I think it depends on the consciousness of the people, if you want to do 
something good with it, you can do something good with it.” The informants’ use of the same 
terminology is a strong indicator of this observation. Their discourse was almost identical, the 
good side is Skype while the ugly side is Facebook and/or anything else that touches on family, 
religious, and cultural values. Both were interpreted through the perspective of the group. It is a 
collective attitude based on the group modes of usage. Zakaria et al (2003) described Middle 
Eastern societies as high-context cultures where the individuals’ social groups such as the family 
or community, act as the source of all attitudes and perceptions of the world artifacts. In contrast, 
low-context cultures lean more towards individual autonomy and personal privacy. The Tunisian 
society fits within the high-context culture definition and hence the similarities in the language, 
attitudes, and consequently the collective rejection of one communication technology and the 
adoption of another.  
The sense of community also fed other forms of attitudes about the technology’s 
influence on societies. Some are negative and others positive, and each stem from a different 
reason and point of view. However, collectively, the respondents summed the positive and the 
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negative impacts on society from a Tunisian point of view. Layla (the 72 year old) sought her 
neighbor’s support about her opinion about technology. When I asked her about how 
technologies changed society, the following discussion took place between her and Kahina, the 
neighbor who had joined us during our interview. Kahina is also another informant.  
Layla: Before was better than now. We didn’t have the Internet like now and we lived just 
fine. Too many expenses now. She turns to her neighbor: just say the truth Kahina, 
wasn’t it better before? ‘ 
Kahina says: Life was better before, but technology-wise, it’s better now.  
Layla: I don’t care about technology, she’s asking about life now.  
Kahina: But it was a different life and now it’s a whole different life.  
Layla: yes, “we wake up at an exact time and sleep at an exact time” (a phrase that 
means now everything is controlled), now there are ACs, when we had the traditional 
fans before, we would use them until we fall asleep. The AC makes me sick, the fans never 
made me sick.”  
Monji (67) criticized the effect of technologies on youth and their education but valued 
the promptness of the Internet’s information. He said: “I think technologies only taught people 
how to be lazy. Now when you need an information, you can find it really fast, without any 
effort at all. Before, when we needed a very simple small information, we would go to the public 
library and we would spend time in there and the librarians gets fed up with us: give us this book, 
give us that magazine, where is this reference... Etc. However, I have to admit now the 
information is more precise. When you get an information it is still fresh. When we got an 
information [before the Internet] it used to be at least 5 years old, today it would be the same day 
information.” 
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Baraa echoed and articulated the point of views of these informants: “Every era has its 
negative and positive sides. Our problem is… ok... from a technological point of view, people 
now are more modernized and more than our era... From a “values” and “discipline” point of 
view, we are better than them. Way better. This is from a religious standpoint. But from the 
technological point of view, what did we learn from the technology? We have the computers, we 
have the Internet, but what did we learn from them?” Mouldi thinks that it’s people who have 
changed, he said: “We used to have only TV but our time was much better. Now they have more 
technologies but people have changed. People at our time were much better.”  
Others valued the technology’s modernizing effect. Nacira appreciated the globalizing 
effect of the Internet. She argued: “I think now is better, there is a general culture, a world 
culture; the world is all connected. A window to see the whole world without travelling. You can 
visit the whole world without visiting. Even places in our country that we never physically 
visited, we can see them on the Internet. A lot of people don’t have the means to go visit the 
South (south Tunisia), with the Internet, you can be there in a second.” Farook explained the 
positive side of technologies: “It’s something we didn’t think it was going to happen. One didn’t 
expect that one day, someone would be far away and you can talk to him and see him. It brings 
everything closer. You can see the whole world. Even if you want to go somewhere, let’s say, 
you want to go to Hammamet, you can enter online and check out the best places and best 
restaurants, you can see the road. There is a big difference and big time. It’s true that they say, it 
was a good life, but now is better.” Ilham (68 years old from Kalaa) said: “Now is better. 
Technology is alive and society is developed unlike before. We were ignorant back then. 
“Yahyal-elm!”53 Everything became better now with the technologies.”  
                                                
53 A cheer translating to “Long Live Knowledge!” or “Long Live Science!” 
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Hadir also touted all the modern functions and tasks facilitated by technologies.  “It’s 
extraordinary! It is great!” she exclaimed with excitement. “Even when you go to an 
administration because you need an old bill or something, it used to take them forever to get it 
for you. Now all you have to do is give them the number of your ID card and they would get you 
everything, everything you need right away. It advanced the country, our country and all 
countries. ‘El Elm Nour’54.” Habib the businessman appreciates how technologies facilitate 
businesses, he explained: “It made society better. It improved and facilitated things. So now, if 
you sell and buy things even from America, you can see it on the Internet, you can even buy it 
and pay your money and they would send it to you from there.” Yasmine, the high school teacher 
articulated the knowledge gap between the connected and the not connected. As a teacher and a 
mother, she also valued the technology’s organizational and computational abilities. She noted: 
“Technologies facilitated things a lot. It’s like having another brain with you. A second brain 
where you can store work, souvenirs, information, etc. People who don’t own technologies know 
things but their knowledge remains limited compared to those who have technologies.”  
The spectrum of the attitudes towards information technologies could be divided into 
two major categories; (1) a positive effect narrative entrenched in the transnational 
communication and the socioeconomic benefits of the technologies; and (2) a negative effect 
entrenched in a cultural morality and nostalgia to the old-times rhetoric. Sometimes, the two 
manifest within the discourse of the same informant. It is as if the informants are in the process 
of negotiating the technologies’ effect on society. The concept of cultural beliefs and values was 
central to the perceptions of the technological impact on societies in general and communities in 
particular. Whenever the impact of a technological platform was easily measured through the 
                                                
54 Another cheer meaning “Knowledge is light/enlightenment” 
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cultural-value balance, as in the case of Skype vs. Facebook, the informants provided clear 
articulations with an almost unanimous agreement about the attitude towards the platform. On 
the other hand, their varying perspectives towards the socioeconomic benefits of the technologies 
could be understood as a result of the relative novelty of the domestication of the technology and 
of people’s struggle to negotiate their meanings in Tunisia and the Arab society in general, a 
society known for being resistant to change and imposed development (Al-Kandari and Gaither, 
2011).  
3.5 THE TUNISIAN AND THE OTHER 
 Perceptions of how the cultural ‘other’ uses information technologies were not included in the 
key informant interview guide. The issue emerged spontaneously in the informants’ discourse 
about the misuses of technologies. It was prevalent in their discourses to the point where the 
trajectory of their articulations led to a separate domain of analysis. In a way, it complements the 
analyses of cultural impact on perceptions of ICT and their usage, and adds another layer to the 
understanding of the narrative of Tunisians’ attitude towards ICT.  
The ‘Arab mentality’ discourse brought up earlier in this chapter about the misuses of 
Facebook emerged often in the discourse. Hajir said: “I see... I think for Arabs... people didn’t 
use it to advance themselves, because they can do that if they want to. They can use it to improve 
their lives, but they don’t. I think before was better. Now even birthdays, they announce them 
and put them on Facebook.” Baraa sees the West as taking more advantage of the technology 
benefits: “They (the West) use it for the positive… very rarely do they use it in a negative way... 
mmm... Maybe a little. But they are more clear than us, ok? They created pornographic sites to 
make it clear… the (the user) knows… if that is what you want to do … go on do as you want, 
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you are free. Things are clear... Us? No. We only take the negative. If we used the Internet for 
good intentions... Just take a look at the Tunisian Facebook. If you ask them if they know 
something, like... A religious question, they would say, what is he talking about? If you get one 
or two comments you should be happy. But try to put a picture of a naked girl... then, you will 
see all the comments and discussion you will get. So really, we’re not using this technology for 
good reasons. It’s all about ‘our mentality’. Technologies, did not improve our society. It’s not 
the Internet that didn’t improve our society. It’s us who didn’t let it improve our society. It’s our 
mentality, the Tunisian mentality that didn’t let us improve. The Internet is a ‘manipulable’ tool. 
It’s like playdough, and you can do anything with it.”  
Monji (61 years old from Kalaa) had a similar view to Baraa’s, he said: “Everything in 
these new technologies has a good thing and a bad thing. From my point of view. It makes 
everything within reach, you can find everything. The negatives are only for us, the Arabs, 
because us, especially the youth, when we take the positives, we take only very little, but when 
we take the negatives we take everything. But as a communication medium, it is just 
extraordinary. Someone can be in America, and you can see him/her within seconds. A letter 
used to take two months to get to you. Phone is very expensive, especially to call Europe. Today, 
you can see someone anywhere in the world.” What is most intriguing in the discourse about the 
West, is the fact that the respondents were aware that ICT play a role in social progress and 
development. Almost all of those who brought up the topic, mentioned that Westerners use ICT 
to advance their societies.  
The comparison with the Arab society takes an almost regretful and nostalgic tone that 
the Tunisian or the Arab societies in general are not using ICT as productively as the West is. 
When this discourse is put in the context of their narrative about their usage and the relevance of 
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ICT to their lives, one cannot find an articulation of the benefits of ICT to personal and social 
development (except for youth educational benefits). This is significant in a number of ways. 
First from a digital divide perspective, it adds to the understanding of the global divide and the 
effect of the perceived benefits of ICT to cultural adoption or rejection of information 
technologies. From a techno-capital perspective, this further explains the lack of usage despite 
the prevalent ICT ownership as the respondents do not perceive it to be well used by their 
entourage, and thus do not have the group disposition to encourage acquisition of techno-capital 
to “do” what their peers are doing.  
In contrast with the view discussed above of the West vs. the Arab society, other 
respondents had a more conspiracy-theory inspired narrative. Qassem, the retired government 
employee, an avid reader and poetry writer, meticulously chose his words as he described the 
ICT in relationship between his culture and the West. He viewed technology as a means of 
economic control of the West over the Arab world and criticized the overwhelmingly quick 
adoption of technologies by Arab societies. He explained his point of view saying: “The 
technologies are great, today is way better, no doubt. But anything that goes too far is bad. In the 
Arab world, we consume technologies, we don’t produce them. Everything that comes out, we 
quickly get it, whether home technologies, or automobile technologies. This was the purpose of 
the West, to produce these technologies to keep us slave to it so they can always control us with 
those technologies. They give us what we need with very expensive prices. This creative 
revolution is in fact an anarchy revolution and is a result of technologies and advancement in 
weapons and the technology of destruction. Technology is an evil that we can’t do without. 
We’re a consumer society and we need the technology but we can’t produce it. We do not 
‘create’.” Habib had a lesser tendency to espouse the conspiracy theory in his discourse than 
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Qassem, but still expressed his concern over the knowledge gap between the Arab societies and 
the Europeans. He took the opportunity to stress on the need to follow the path of “the 
Europeans” to advance our societies as he reported: “I think it’s good for the new generations. 
They have to advance with science and technologies. Because if we don’t advance, like the 
Europeans, they advance and we go backward. We have to follow them, we have to advance like 
them or better.”  
In previous research studies about Arab cultures’ view of the West from an information 
technology perspective, the Arab respondents appeared to be concerned by the technological 
advantage and dominance. Albirini (2006) demonstrated that Syrian interviewees had a similar - 
to the Tunisian interviewees- ambivalent attitude towards the Western technological 
advancement. Some of his respondents appreciated ICT communicative and informational 
qualities while others complained about the Westernizing effect on the kinship-based and 
conservative Syrian Society. In general, people all over the Arab world fear the corrupting effect 
of ‘Westernization’, which fosters a negative discourse towards the West and the exported 
technology (Albirini, 2006; Jandt, 2016).  Several researchers (Hill et al, 1998; Albirini, 2006) 
attribute the skeptical and distrustful perception of the ICT to the religious-based cultural values 
of the Arab societies. This line of argument contends that the more conservative the society, the 
more resistant it proves to be to technological adoption. Albirini (2006) stated that “computer 
technologies, like most other tools, select, amplify, and reduce aspects of experience in various 
ways. This aspect of the new technology may pose a threat to conservative cultures that value 
their own experiences.” 
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3.6 GENERATIONAL CONFLICT  
Another cultural attitude-related perception of the Internet was also based on another “us 
vs. them” discourse, though this time, it is a generational conflict that was articulated. Some 
viewed ICT as more suitable for the younger generations and less relevant and appropriate to 
their age. Hadir considered Facebook as more appropriate for younger generations with parental 
control. She explained: “The Internet is necessary but mostly for the youth. I’m 59 years, it’s not 
appropriate to start chatting online and talking. But I gave my daughter her freedom to do 
whatever she wants on FB. She can talk to her friends and she actually shows me and asks my 
opinion. She would say: look this friend sent me an invitation, should I accept it? We talk and I 
tell her to be honest with me.” 
However, the majority of the respondents, even those who are not yet parents, indicated a 
concern towards the effect of ICT use and Internet in particular on younger generation. Hajir had 
a disagreement with her friend about how the younger generations are using technologies. Hajir 
remarked: “We are using it to do things that I can’t even describe. It’s not a good thing. We 
should use something to improve our lives and benefit us not to hurt others.” Amira disagreed 
with her: “But there are people who use it for good, some use it to study with it.” Hajir explained 
her point of view: “But most kids use it to play with it. And I think it’s very bad for kids, not all 
parents are always at home with their kids... and you have kids who come home and use the 
Internet as they wish, it’s absolutely negative for them and for the society.” Not only does Amira 
see the younger as susceptible to the harmful effects of the Internet, she also views them as less 
resourceful than the older generations as she noted: “We lived without the Internet and we raised 
good kids. They turned out very well our kids. Did you hear the minister the other day? He said I 
used to go to school with only a pen and a bag. Now you have everything but get nothing.”  
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Baraa the high school teacher shares her concern: “Most of the time, you would find all 
the youth addicted to the Internet... but they play games... they chat... they say profanities. We 
[they] do not use the technology in things that would benefit us. I’s just the opposite, it hurts us, 
the Internet. We have our neighbor, that house behind our house (showing me), his son failed his 
baccalaureate exam just because he is addicted to the Internet and he wouldn’t study. He stays up 
until dawn but he wouldn’t study. It’s an addiction! So, it’s a bad usage of the Internet. The 
Internet, is a science, an advancement, but we do not use it in the positive way, we only use it in 
negative way.”  
Concerns about youth addiction to the Internet is a common ICT research finding. Ito et 
al (2010) examined the interaction between youth and new media technologies and found that 
many parents are cautious about the effect of the Internet on their children’s physical wellbeing 
(mainly fear of addiction and sitting for a long time in front of the computer). Besides, the 
authors found that parents (Latin American) were concerned about the preservation of their 
cultural and moral values. The authors demonstrated that both parents who are avid users and 
those who barely used information technologies share the same uncertainty and fear towards the 
Internet. In line with the fears of the Latin American parents, most disconcerting to the Tunisian 
informants in my study was the corrupting effect the Internet has on the youth. They were mainly 
concerned about youth exposure to ‘immoral’ content and some yearned for the old times when 
parents strictly controlled media exposure. Yasmina argued: “The bad things, you must avoid the 
bad things that corrupt the values. Debauchery! Sometimes a young kid asks you a question that 
he is too young for! I remember when we first had the dish, my father blocked all the channels. 
He left us with 5 channels. I used to be very curious about these channels. But I think my dad 
saved us from those channels.”  
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At this point of the analysis, one begins to notice the emergence of a conflict between the 
technology generation and the generation of technology (born 1949-1963). Sackmann and 
Winkler (2013) argue that “the fast technological changes, especially a change of basic 
technologies, enlarges inter-cohort differences and raises the likelihood of a conscious perception 
and description of differences as generational differences.” In other words, different generations 
begin to isolate the social and technological practices that differ from their own. Older 
generations, in particular, perceived the practices of younger generations as deviating from the 
cultural and moral norms. Some of them blame the technology itself, while others neutralize the 
technology and view the youth modes of usage as the source of deviation.  
Ito et al (2010) argued that many parents feel a moral responsibility to monitor their 
children’s new media usage. The authors argued that parents who are themselves users of 
information technologies have fewer concerns about the technology’s role in their children's 
lives. However, in this study, no attitude disparities emerged among the users and the non-users. 
Concerns over information technologies’ influence on youth were reiterated by the informants 
regardless of their usage levels, their age, and gender. The only shared attribute that explains the 
disconcerting attitude is the fact that they belong to the Tunisian cultural values, which proved to 
be the strongest source of attitudes towards technologies. For example, SNS created a 
contentious space of conflict between their values and the characteristics of the networks. In 
other words, while Facebook allows for monitoring others’ lives and exposing one’s own life on 
the Internet, the informants viewed those characteristics as the most offensive to their cultural 
values which holds private life at a highly status. As a matter of fact, these culture-based 
concerns echo the findings of previous research studies. For instance, Albirini’s (2006) Syrian 
interviewees expressed the same concerns over the immorality on the Internet and its effect on 
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the younger Syrians. Others saw it as part of a cultural invasion agenda that aims at breaking the 
structure of the Syrian and Arab society in general.  
Ito et al (2010) reported a line of research that revealed a universal parental concern for 
the inability of the younger generation to resist the temptations of the Internet and to avoid 
falling into the negative effects of the medium. However, the younger generations are not as 
helpless as we tend to perceive them to be. For instance, while the older informants viewed the 
younger Tunisian generations as morally corrupt and “superficial,” the new wave of social 
movement research considers them to be a significant factor in the recent digitally supported 
social movements. Zayani (2015) coined the role of the young Tunisians in the Tunisian 
revolution with the term “the youth factor.” He argued that: “the new generation was marked by 
a growing consciousness about issues of civil liberty, social justice, human rights, and citizen 
participation” (p. 173).  
According to Zayani (2015) young Tunisians’ usage of Facebook reflected a growing 
discontent with the status quo. He stated: “It is from this perspective that one can understand the 
gradual transformation of Facebook from a favorite pastime to a space that gave rise to a culture 
of contestation” (p. 175). Allagui and Kuebler (2011) argued that the young Arab users were 
patriotic and concerned for their nations’ political state, and used technologies to shake the 
grounds of the dictatorships. They remarked that “the emerging force of Arab youth is articulated 
to the development of communication technologies in these countries and to the creation of 
content. Arab youth have triggered online activism and online participation for many years now, 
challenging all practices of censorship.” While I do not attempt to invalidate the older 
generation's concerns about the risk of addiction or the potential demoralizing effect of 
information technologies, I argue that the newer generations are more socially and politically 
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aware than their elders think, and when necessary, they know how to take advantage of 
information technologies to be powerful agents of positive social change.  
3.7 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I examined an important indicator of the digital divide, which is attitudes 
towards ICT. I discussed Tunisian culture in particular and Arab cultural values in general. My 
analysis revealed that my informants had strong culture-based attitudes towards technologies. 
Skype was regarded in a positive light because of its transnational communication features that 
allows it to fit within the structure of the Tunisian family, culture, and values. In contrast, there 
was either an ambivalent or a negative view of Facebook as the informants feared its usage in 
morally inadmissible behavior such as voyeurism, exposure, and dishonesty. This is significant 
from a digital divide perspective, as the informants’ culture-based views towards the two 
communication platforms shaped their overall views of information technology. On the one ICTs 
are valuable because they allow for the transnational continuity and preservation of family ties 
and solidarity. On the other hand, information technologies seem, or are perceived to be, morally 
corrupting because of the effect of Facebook and the Internet. In a way, Facebook and Skype 
represented the differences between the weak ties and strong ties.  Skype serves as the platform 
for the maintenance of the strong ties, which consist of family, community, and other 
acquaintances with whom people have an emotional bond. Skype assists in the maintenance of 
the essence of the strong ties, which is the solidarity, the sense of shared identity. On the other 
hand, Facebook represents the weak ties, which are the acquaintances that people occasionally 
communicate without a significant and close relationship (Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 2000; 
Chen, 2013).  In other words, the informants in this study use ICT mainly to maintain the 
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relationship with their strong ties and have not yet found a significant interest and motive to 
maintain and expand their networks of weak ties. To link this observation with the previous 
chapter, one can argue that, at this particular moment of the ICT trajectory in Tunisia, the strong 
ties emerge as the main source of social capital, leading to literacy opportunities and 
psychological well being.  
Interestingly, many overlooked the social and development benefits of ICT as a 
consequence of their strong views and relative intolerance of the perceived negative effects of 
the Internet on their cultures. The rupture between the technologies and the cultural values 
instigate feelings of exclusion from the digital sphere, since a community views itself included 
when they see the technologies reflecting their values and culture (Gere, 2002). Feelings of 
exclusions may lead the potential users to perceive the technologies as “not for them” or not “a 
place” that can contain and respect their values. The homogeneous attitudes coupled to the 
linguistic similitude and argument conformity indicates the emergence of a group habitus that 
fosters the adoption of certain platforms and the rejection of others. That is why, I reiterate 
previous scholarly argument that the understanding and consideration of cultural traits are 
indispensable to the examination of the digital divide, as cultural values contextualize not only 
the perceptions but also the technological practices of the respondents.  
Cultural attitudes function as a techno-disposition that developed into a group habitus. 
This indicates the extent to which individuals use and value information technologies, and the 
degree to which they are willing to invest time and resources to learn how to use them. I am 
inclined to believe that raising awareness about the relevance and benefits of the Internet to the 
individual and community wellbeing and development could translate into a faster and larger 
adoption rates. This study’s group of informants as well as their broader communities could 
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integrate the techno-acquisition process into their family activities as in the case of some of the 
respondents who acquired techno-competencies through their children and relatives.  
Barney (2004) contended that Arab societies are in a technological transition period, 
learning to transition and adapt their morals and values to the network society and technological 
changes. I am leaning to agree with this statement. The informants’ ambivalence towards the 
cultural values and effects of information technologies reflects this transition. As a matter of fact, 
doubtful perceptions of the benefits and negative effects are part of the ICT domestication 
process. People carefully consider and weigh the negative and positive contextual usage of the 
new media then slowly negotiate and articulate their place and roles in their lives and societies 
(Silverstone 1994; Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992). Thus, I argue that this study’s group of 
informants are in a technological acculturation process. They are slowly adjusting to the 
technologies and the change they bring to their lives, while searching for ways to integrate them 
into their social web of morals and for practices that do not damage their most valued basic 
cultural structure.  
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Chapter 4: The Digital Divide and Political Participation 
This chapter examines the effect of the digital divide on online and offline political 
participation. It explores the underlying factors driving the attitudes towards, as well as the 
decision to join or not to join, the political digital sphere. On December the 17th, 2010, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit and vegetable street vendor immolated himself in his hometown, Sidi 
Bouzid. His act came as an immediate response to the daily harassment by municipality workers 
and as an act of revolt against the declining social, economic, and political situation in Tunisia. 
Bouazizi’s immolation immediately turned into a popular protest beginning with the town of Sidi 
Bouzid and slowly spreading to the whole country.  Facebook and other SNS played a significant 
role in spreading the word about the events that took place in Sidi Bouzid, immediately after he 
immolated himself. Several Facebook groups were created to follow the events, spread the news 
and updates from the revolting regions to the rest of the country and within hours they were 
followed by thousands of Tunisians (Nouri, 2013; Kuebler, 2011). Videos of the protests and 
demonstrations invaded the Tunisian cyberspace. Within a few days, the unrest had spread to the 
whole nation. Connected Tunisians from different parts of the country defied the strict Internet 
censorship and used mobile phones and Facebook (and to a lesser degree Twitter) to inform the 
rest of the country about the events taking place in their hometowns through videos and 
breaking-news-like information. During the events of the revolution, many Tunisians were glued 
to their computers and their Facebook accounts following all the news coming from Tunisia 
about the social and political uprising that took the country and the world by surprise. The 
 151 
revolution was not televised55 because of the government’s control over the Tunisian broadcast 
media, but it was indeed Facebook-ized with instant news updates, pictures and videos 
constantly flowing from the revolting streets to the online sphere.  
The fall of the regime may not have been a surprise to those following the Tunisian 
political and social landscape (Nouri, 2013; Bouhaffa, 2011; Kuebler, 2011), but the rapid pace 
of the events and the promptness of the news coming through connected Tunisian citizens who 
transformed themselves into citizen journalists were fascinating and worth an in-depth 
examination. Tunisians on the online sphere continued using Facebook to discuss the new 
political scene, actors, and parties, and the future of the country in general. For instance, 
Facebook and other media were also used to spread the news and updates about several sit-ins 
that took place in the government square “Al-Qasbah”. Tunisians continued to put pressure on 
those leading the country at the time to change both the government and the constitution, which 
led to elections to form an interim government and a Constituent Assembly (Nouri, 2013)56. 
Following these events, researchers studied ICT and SNS as a vehicle for social change 
and key channels in the diffusion of information during unrests. A group of scholars theorize that 
the Internet is transforming online spaces into public spheres (Blumler and Coleman, 2009; 
Papacharissi, 2002; Dahlberg, 2001). The idea of a public sphere stems from Habermas’ work on 
the sites where non-formal deliberation processes that may have impact on official decision-
making take place. Habermas focused on the limitations of these sites such as the highly 
exclusive nature and the bourgeois dominance of the decision-making process (Coleman & 
                                                
55 Al-Jazeera was one of the few Arabic channels to provide news about the Tunisian uprising. However, it was 
limited to using videos and feed from the social media, as it was not allowed to operate or have correspondents in 
Tunisia (Harb, 2011).  
56 On March, 3rd, 2011, the Prime Minister at the time, Mohamed Ghannouchi stepped down and the interim 
President Fouad Mbazaa announced the formation of a new government and nominated Beji Caid Essebsi as the 
Prime Minister. He also announced the scheduling of a legislative elections to take place in summer 2011 (it was 
postponed later on and took place in October 2011). 
 152 
Blumler, 2009; Buckingham, 2009). Buckingham (2009) argued that Habermas did not foresee 
the impact of the Internet and other technologies, which transferred the discussion spaces from 
the physical place of the village square or elite salon to the online and virtual space (Culver and 
Jacobson, 2012). However, many others build on the Habermasian notion of the coffee houses 
and intellectual salons, as places for public's exchange of opinions and deliberation, to argue that 
this process of public deliberation is transferring to the online space (Blumler and Coleman, 
2009; Zayani, 2015).   
Many scholars view the online space as a deliberative camp where a rational and critical 
citizen discourse takes place (Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Dahlberg, 2001). However, to 
transform the Internet into a public sphere, more elements must be taken into consideration than 
the mere ownership and access to the Internet. First, scholars argue that it is impossible to 
theorize for effective deliberation processes and to construct an online public sphere without an 
informed citizenry (Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Buckingham, 2009; Putnam, 1995). Another 
trajectory of arguments suggests that it is not enough to have the technology to produce 
responsible engaged citizens; there are in addition integral skills in media and information 
literacy for effective digital media use (Culver and Jacobson, 2012; Khonder, 2011; Moeller, 
2009;  Jenkins, 2007; Stern and Dillman, 2006; Livingstone, 2004; Delli Carpini, 2000). Besides, 
Aday et al., (2010) argue that the new media coexist with other channels of communications and 
should not be treated in isolation. According to the authors, the new media should be grounded in 
their historical and social contexts. Brassari and Trere (2005) contended that the web should be 
discussed as an integrated socio-technical system and that its usage and effect is interwoven with 
other social, cultural, political, and economic elements.  
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I build on this line of research to explore my group of informants’ level of participation in 
the Tunisian online political sphere. Political participation is defined as actions attempting to 
influence government decisions and election outcome (Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Zhang et al., 
2010). Political scientists measure participation with activities that include activities such as 
voting, being active in a political party, attending protests and political events and rallies. Recent 
scholars measure online political participation with activities that include forwarding political 
messages, or signing online petitions (Anduiza et al, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga, 2012).   
A large part of the research conducted about the Tunisian revolution (and the Egyptian 
one as well) documents the events and discusses/analyzes the role played by ICT during and 
prior to the uprisings that lead to the Arab Spring. I am concerned that the growing fixation on 
SNS and online participation will obscure other important aspects of the political participation 
narrative, as much of the scholarship has focused on those “connected” and active online and 
only a few focused on the large number of the non-connected Tunisians and Arabs in general.  
Faris (2013) studied the Arab Spring from the digital divide perspective. He examined the 
social inclusion potential of the public sphere and contended that in Egypt, the tech-savvy youth 
and urban elites were the main actors in the digital sphere and the amplification of their voices 
obscured the voices of other social actors. Kuebler (2011) asserted that the Internet provides a 
free space for the well-educated and the already active politically and socially. He points to the 
traditional media’s role in reaching the general public in a way [unmatched] by the Internet 
because of its exclusiveness to those who are already active online and have a decent level of 
digital skills.  
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In an article titled “Arab revolution and social media: the digital divide as a barrier to 
democracy” (2012),57 Elkamel echoed Kuebler’s statement and questioned the contribution of 
the Internet to the knowledge gap between the tech-savvy youth and the millions of Arabs who 
are on the lower end of the digital divide and remain reliant on state and privately owned media 
as their main source of information. She stated: “A knowledge gap emerges, between the 
educated and the illiterate, the elite and the underprivileged; and it is the tech-savvy youth who 
are at the forefront of the fight for freedom.” Elkamel also argued that a fundamental social and 
political change can only take place offline because of the high rates of illiteracy in the Arab 
world. That is why, the digital divide is no longer concerned with access but with different usage 
gaps that includes both information exposure and political participation as some of its 
dimensions.  
In this chapter I examine the informants’ offline and online political participation 
behavior as well as their attitudes towards the new political atmosphere in the country. I also 
explore their attitudes towards government services such as paying bills online or taking digital 
literacy courses if offered by the government in order to sketch a more comprehensive picture of 
the informants’ political attitudes and behavior.  
4.1 A NEW POLITICAL CONTEXT: “NO MORE FEAR”  
I open the analysis by exploring the informants’ attitudes towards the revolution and the 
new political context in the country. A new sense of pride is clearly obvious in the informants’ 
discourses. The majority of the group were aware that the revolution has brought about 
perceptible change. Some of the social and economic changes were not greatly appreciated. For 
                                                
57 Published by Future Challenges. Retrieved on 01/30/2016 from https://futurechallenges.org/local/arab-revolution-
and-social-media-the-internal-digital-divide-as-a-barrier-to-democracy/  
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instance, despite the fact that she got to vote for the first time in her life, Layla (72 years old) 
found it difficult to accept the economic consequences of the revolution. She noted: “Yes, I 
voted… But I swear to god, when we were under Ben Ali, life was better… life was easier in 
everything... Everything got very expensive all of a sudden. Now, the electricity bills come 
showing 300 (TND)58 and 400! What could I have done [to consume that much light?]... 300 for 
electricity! That’s more than a celebration hall59? My son used to pay 35 max for his house. My 
son only goes up to his house at night. My daughter only goes up to her house at night60. Yet, 
they have to pay 95 now! Why?? ” As she was talking, her daughter in law who was attending 
the interview was nodding in agreement with Layla and shaking her head in exasperation. The 
others remained silent and I couldn’t decide whether they had a problem agreeing with part of 
the statement and disagreeing with another. None of them however, was shocked to hear her 
voice a nostalgia for Ben Ali’s era. After the post-revolution inflation, the numerous terrorist 
attacks in the country, and the general loss of a sense of stability and safety, it is not uncommon 
to hear people complaining about the situation and expressing their nostalgia for Ben Ali’s times 
(Benstead et al, 2012). Feelings of frustration with the failures of the post-revolution 
governments to meet pressing demands began to emerge as early as 2012. Benstead et al (2012) 
claimed that about half the population reported feeling that the economic and social situation was 
better before the revolution. This is probably due to what Desai et al (2009) refer to as the 
                                                
58 Tunisian Dinar (TND) is the Tunisian national currency. It used to equal around 0.80 USD before the revolution, 
now it equals 0.49 USD.  
59 Tunisians rent big ballrooms that they call celebration halls for their weddings and other types of traditional 
celebrations. They are usually big to host the large numbers of guests (sometimes several hundred guests), have a 
stage for the traditional music bands and a stage for the groom and bride (in the case of weddings). They are usually 
expensive given the amount of electricity they consume each night and Tunisians often use them as a metaphor for 
high electricity consumption.  
60 Layla lives in a 3 story house with 2 independent apartments on top of her house. Her son and daughter, each lives 
with their own family upstairs, and all of them spend most of their days in her house. In fact, I interviewed her with 
one of the biggest crowds I have had around me during the interviewing process.  
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“authoritarian bargain” in pre-revolution Tunisia (and in other MENA countries governed by 
authoritarian regimes). The authors argue that authoritarian governments subdue citizens into 
trading political freedom and reform for financial stability, mainly through subsidized essential 
goods. Given that this was largely implemented under both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, 
Tunisians may have developed- and experienced- a sense of false stability and economic 
prosperity61 (Zayani, 2015). Hence, the increasing nostalgia of some of the population for the old 
regime and discontent with the current economic, political, and media situations (as this chapter 
will demonstrate).   
 To the contrary of Layla, Qassem, the 72 year old retired public servant did not express 
any regrets despite his previous attachment to the old regime: “I voted. I have my political roots 
in the RCD62. I expected the revolution, you know... I expected that it would happen... the 
country was on the edge of revolting. I was about to retire then. When the revolution started, I 
wasn’t with it... to tell you the truth... I mean... I never thought it was a ‘revolution’... it wasn’t 
like the French Revolution or the Bolshevik revolution. It was people moved by the oppression 
of Ben Ali and the decline of the country's values, like the education system and economy... it 
was declining... the nation-state was declining.” Despite his ideological disagreement with the 
uprising, Qassem clearly understands the underlying reasons for the people’s anger and 
legitimizes their desire for a change. That is why, Qassem and Layla were the only two who 
expressed a contentious view towards the uprising or its aftermath. The majority of the 
                                                
61 although they were unaware of the heavy reliance of their governments on debt 
62 The Democratic Constitutional Rally or RCD as Tunisians refer to it (Rassemblement Constitutionel 
Démocratique) is the former ruling party in Tunisia since independence (1956). The party was officially dissolved 
on March the 8th, 2011, by a court order after a strong, persistent pressure online and offline as protests in front of 
the RCD headquarters were very frequent from January 2011 until it was dissolved. All those who work in official 
positions or in the government offices were compelled to have an RCD membership and to participate in the RCD 
organized events. For the general public, applying for job positions with the government, registering for graduate 
courses, and getting a license to open a business required showing a proof of membership in the party.   
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informants expressed contentment with the change, especially with their newly found freedom. 
Hadir (59 year old from Zouhour) also mentioned the change in freedom of speech: “Now? Yes, 
I am interested (in politics). Ever since the revolution we all became interested in politics... 
Before, you couldn’t even talk. You could go to jail.”  
Many informants articulated the changes as observed on both the community and national 
levels. For instance, Monji (61 year old from Kalaa) illustrated what could easily be described as 
a general trend in the country since the revolution, which is newfound tendency to closely follow 
the news and politics. He said: “I’m not interested but I follow all the time. I watch different 
news channels to get different opinions and I read newspapers.” I note that Monji exhibits a 
consciousness of the post-revolution plurality of opinions, also newfound among Tunisians. 
Nacira from Zouhour was one of the most outspoken informants about the new political scene. 
She said: “Of course I’m interested in politics. Since the revolution of course. We weren’t 
interested before. I’m speaking for all Tunisians. The very old were the only ones who followed 
news. But now even the youth follow the news.”  
When I transitioned from questions regarding ICT ownership and use to questions about 
political participation, I first asked about news in general and narrowed the interview down to 
questions about politics. The majority of the informants brought up politics and political news 
spontaneously before being asked about the two issues. For many, following the news (5 years 
after the revolution) is strongly tied to politics. What is worth reflecting upon is the statement 
that the person is “not interested in politics but I follow political news” overwhelmingly repeated 
across the interviews. Interest in politics and following political news are two different notions in 
the mind of the informants. For the majority, interest in politics equates to interest in political 
work. Because of the current situation in the country and the close link between the political 
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atmosphere and the social condition, Tunisians have been closely following political news even 
with a perceived lack of interest in political work or ‘politics’ to use their own words.  
4.2 NEWS: THE NEW KNOWLEDGE GAP 
For decades, the news in Tunisia were limited to a daily praise touting the magnanimity 
of the “father president” (Ben Ali, and Bourguiba before him), and blatantly depicting an image 
of a successful regime rising to the challenge of ensuring the people’s prosperity and wellbeing.  
Tunisian became used to the newscast they watched on a daily basis with very similar content, 
and grew both skeptical about and uninterested in the national news (with the exception of sports 
news).  The newscasts also focused on international events as a way to divert the public from the 
national news, and also to give a false sense of stability and content with the peaceful situation in 
the country compared to the countries shaken by conflicts.  
Al Jazeera took the Arab audience away from their local national media, including the 
Tunisian audience. This was mainly because of the novelty of its content and because it was the 
first TV channel that addressed issues of social, political, and human rights nature in the Arab 
world (Zayani, 2015).  
Today, the media scenery is at the complete opposite of the pre-revolution one. Nacira 
described the new political news sphere saying: “You know how it is like in Tunisia now. It’s all 
about the news now. Ever since the revolution, “ رنرابخلااعاوموقن و اودق ” [Norkdu w n’kumu ‘al 
akhbaar] (a phrase that literally translates to: we go to sleep and awaken with news). We were 
never interested in news before. Even those who don’t know anything about politics, now follow 
political news.”  
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The revolution sparked an interest in news and a desire to closely follow what is going on 
in the country. Farmanfarmaian, (2014) affirmed the recent popularity of news in Tunisia 
following the revolution, as Tunisians have been more interested in local news and the general 
state of their country. The interest is continuous, but peaks during particular circumstances such 
as the elections, or when major events takes place as in the case of the terrorist attacks on 
Tunisia. Baraa illustrated this point by explaining how his interest fluctuates depending on the 
political situation and events: “I do [follow the news]. A little bit. Especially when the situation 
of the country is kind of agitated, when something is going on, you are compelled to follow the 
news... obviously… when something is going on in the country, I seek news.... If nothing is 
going on, I stay... I always stay as far away as possible from politics.”63 
The question about the type of media use for news divided the informants into two 
groups: those who rely on the traditional media, mainly non-users of the Internet, and those who 
rely on the Internet as their main source of information, mainly Facebook; this group obviously 
gathered the Internet users.  Baraa named the Internet on top of the list of media he uses for news 
information: “[I follow political news] through the Internet, TV, radio, newspapers. Newspapers 
on the Internet… all kind of media.” Other Internet users in the group reported similar patterns 
regardless of age and gender. Nacira (in her 30s) stated Facebook as her main source of 
information. She said: “I follow the news on my FB newsfeed. On Facebook, you follow a lot of 
groups and get different points of view... Competing views and then you form your own 
opinions. I follow some people too who write statuses and opinions better than some 
newsgroups. I follow the president’s group, the ministries pages, etc.”  Farook (30 year old taxi 
                                                
63 The point Baraa makes about “staying as far away as possible from politics” is likely linked to old pre-revolution 
reflexes among the populace in Tunisia to avoid questioning or even thinking about politics because it often led to 
retribution by the regime. 
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driver from Zouhour) echoed Nacira’s view: “The TV… and TV hosts they have masks on their 
face… they take us for idiots... But on the Internet... There is everything... The Internet shows 
you everything.”  
Scholarly literature has revealed an increased pattern of SNS usage for news information 
(Zhang et al, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2012). In Tunisia, the users rely on Facebook and the 
Internet in general not only because of their constant exposure to online news feeds, but also 
because they perceive the Internet as more credible than traditional news media (Ivey, 2014). For 
more than half a century, the traditional media have been a propaganda tool under the tight 
control of the authorities. Tunisians therefore grew cautious and distrustful of all forms of 
traditional press. This may have fed into the continuous distrust of the traditional media even 
after the revolution, despite statistics showing that 47% of people over 12 years old reported an 
improvement in the news quality since 2011 (Farmanfarmaian, 2014). Nevertheless, existing 
literature stresses the need for a fundamental media reform in the post-revolution Tunisia 
(Farmanfarmaian, 2014).  
The traditional media remain the main source of information for the non-user informants. 
Basma (55) said: “for news, I use TV. For entertainment too... I use TV.” Many echoed her 
media usage and stated TV as their main or only source of news information. Hajir (58) named 
the radio in the first place: “I listen to radio for news... All kind of news. Radio and TV... I listen 
to political news on the radio.”  
Seeing the disparities discussed above between users and non-users, I am more concerned 
with the knowledge gap resulting from the continuous usage of traditional media by the older 
generations while the younger are exposed to additional sources of information, political 
discussion and debates. Ivey (2014) argued that the connected Tunisians are not only exposed to 
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a wider range of domestic and international political news but also have a faster rate of access 
and control over the traditional media news through their online versions or outlets, resulting in a 
large information advantage of the connected over the non-connected. .  
Van Deursen and Van Dijk (2014) contend that the knowledge gap is a predecessor of the 
digital divide, as more privileged segments of the population necessarily have more and faster 
access to information, as well as better manipulation and usage of this information. The authors 
claim that the gap widens between the users of traditional media and users of the Internet. The 
former don’t require the same literacy skills as the latter. Traditional media rely on reading skills 
at the most, while the Internet requires a set of skills in addition to the basic literacy skills. That 
is why, “the more sophisticated citizens” (Gibson and McAllister, 2016, p. 245), i.e., the younger 
and more educated citizens, have a knowledge advantage over the rest of the population. 
Besides, through continuous use of the Internet, users develop more skills in a fashion that 
snowballs the knowledge gap (Van Deursen and Van Dijk, 2014; Gibson and McAllister, 2016).  
Research about the political news information and the knowledge gap they engender was 
conducted in many countries through longitudinal studies. The existence of a knowledge gap was 
revealed in almost all of them (Prior, 2007; Fraile, 2011; Gibson and McAllister, 2016). In one of 
these studies, Gibson and McAllister (2016) measured the knowledge gap stemming from 
political news in Australia over a period of 3 election campaigns (2001, 2007, and 2010). They 
revealed an increasing socially concentrated news information resulting in a widening 
knowledge gap. In other words, citizens who are part of the more privileged segments of the 
society are more exposed to a variety of news from the Internet than less privileged segments 
whose news sources are limited to traditional media. 
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That is why, I argue that in Tunisia too, the difference in the informants’ types of media 
used for news information will entail a knowledge gap between those who use traditional media 
for news and those who use the Internet (in addition to other sources of news information). That 
being said, I must bring attention to the potential role of the social capital in reducing the gap of 
outcome, as the younger generations broker news from the digital sphere to their parents. Several 
informants reported that they follow the online politics through family members as in the case of 
Hadir, the 59 year old lady from Zouhour: “Yes! I did (vote)... I followed the news on TV... and 
my daughter showed me news on Facebook.” Aya, the 58 year old high school teacher who only 
uses the Internet to download the exams and lesson plans, also follows the online political scene 
through her son: “My son showed me. He showed me the presidents and government and their 
news. He shows me videos on news websites about their activities and what they do.”  
Although they keep their parents updated with news from the digital political sphere, the 
younger generations’ constant exposure and usage of the Internet and SNS will maintain the 
digital disparities between the groups. Moreover, the users are more selective as to what points 
of view and what news sources they are exposed to. Facebook users have substantial control over 
their news feed and can block or allow any source of news. Those who are not on the Internet are 
exposed to a news agenda set by those who own and control the traditional forms of media. The 
users are aware of this trend and thus turn to the Internet to find “different points of views” as 
stated by Nacira.  
Several research studies (Ivey, 2014; Gibson and McAllister, 2016) criticize the literature 
that emphasizes the potential of the Internet to increase political awareness and civic education 
arguing that these benefits will remain limited to the privileged segment of the society. 
Nonetheless, a few research studies use the exclusiveness of the digital political and information 
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sphere as a basis to criticize the determinist arguments that amplifies the role of the Internet and 
SNS in altering and influencing political participation (Ivey, 2014). As a matter of fact, the 
following section supports this claim as it demonstrates that both users and non-users of the 
Internet voted equally in the recent Tunisian elections and that the context was the most 
influential drive for voting rather than the media exposure.  
4.3 VOTING BEHAVIOR 
While media use for political information revealed the informants’ differences, their 
voting behavior united them again. Almost all of them, except for three who didn’t vote, took 
pride in the fact that they have voted. “Of course, I voted” was the response I got from most of 
them (as will be shown throughout this section). They all said it with a proud tone. It was 
impossible to miss the pride in their tone and discourse about voting for the first time ever in 
their life. Ilham, a 68 year old stay at home mom, was proud to report her consistent voting. She 
said: “I voted in every election! I made my opinions by myself. I watch the news and knew who I 
want to vote for.” During the reign of Bourguiba, Tunisians almost never voted as he appointed 
himself president for life, and parliamentary elections were always rigged. Ben Ali reformed the 
constitution and re-introduced presidential elections. However, none of the elections that took 
place during his 27 years of presidency was free or transparent, and they were staged with 
chosen candidates to run against him. Ben Ali and his party would often declare victory with 
record high and notoriously questionable numbers (89% of the votes in the general elections of 
2009 was the lowest result Ben Ali claimed, after having “won” the previous 4 elections since 
1989 with an average score of 99%)64.  
                                                
64 http://www.businessnews.com.tn/details_article.php?t=520&a=19191&temp=1 
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Thus, Tunisians seized the opportunity of the 2011 election and exercised their citizen 
rights for the first time, and then again in the 2014 elections. According to Malouch et al., 
(2014), during the first post-revolution election 73% of voters of the 40 years and younger age 
group, voted for the first time ever. Images of Tunisians standing in long lines in front of the 
election bureaus made the news all over the world (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
Figure 6: Lines of Tunisians waiting to vote in the 2011 elections roamed the world. 
Picture taken by Amine Landoulsi/Associated Press65 
 
                                                
65 Picture retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-helping-tunisia-to-make-sure-democracy-
delivers/2015/05/20/05b029e4-fe75-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html 
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Figure 7: In the 2014 elections, the lines were also so long they went very far in the street near the voting 
center66.  
 
Voting is probably the most popular and important political participation activity, but it is 
not the sole component of the concept. That is why, I attempted to explore other forms of online 
and offline political participation behavior. I began with a question about involvement in 
political parties or in political work in general.  All but three respondents relayed a complete 
absence of such involvement or interest in politics. The lack of interest narrative is not culturally-
specific. Extensive research has been undertaken in the area of voters’ interest in politics in 
different cultures (mostly Western) and demonstrated a continuous decline in the public’s 
interest in politics (Gil de Zúñiga, 2012). Scholars reported that in Western countries, voting 
rates also dropped continuously. On the other hand, voting turnout in Tunisia peaked following 
                                                
66 Picture retrieved from CNN Arabic website: http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/10/26/tunisia-elections-pix 
Photographer unknown.  
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the political change of 2011. The new political context created a sense of patriotism and 
Tunisians felt that they “had to vote,” as Yasmine (25 year old) said. However, the change did 
not prompt an interest in other forms of political participation. Many articulated that they are not 
interested in politics but interested in political news. For instance, a few respondents, deemed 
politics to be ‘not for them’ and thus were not interested in politics. Dhiaa (53 from Zouhour) 
stated: “Not really interested. I am a very simple man. I work and come home. I only like sports 
news and I watch it on TV.” I argue that the culture of participation prior to the revolution in 
Tunisia plays a significant role in this “lack of interest” narrative.  
In Tunisia political participation was part of the government's decisions and agenda, not 
the opposite. Only those active in the governing RCD party used to be active politically and it 
was viewed as part of their jobs. While the participation of the average citizens was limited to 
major events, as the government used to rally people in the streets during national celebrations 
for news purposes in order to broadcast a positive image of the country and the regime. Thus, 
many Tunisians as in the case of Dhiaa perceive ‘real’ participation to be limited to the 
‘sophisticated political figures and party members’. In fact, one of the respondents used to take 
part in these rallies. Monji (61 year old) laughed as he described his experience with being 
involved in politics. He reported: “I voted. I relied on my own convictions. But they all 
disappointed me... I worked in the capital and I know all the parties. But I don’t have a liking for 
a group over another... I actually... I was more involved in politics when I was a Boy Scout. They 
would dress us up and take us to make the ceremony when the president or a minister was 
coming (he laughs).”  
Qassem was involved in politics before the revolution, but his political activities at the 
moment are limited to voting. He voted based on his history as a member of the former ruling 
 167 
party. He remarked: “I followed what each government was doing, on TV. Very few people talk 
honestly about the country and the people and their interests. I followed everybody’s meetings 
and speeches and discussions on TV and then voted for Beji67. I thought he was the best for the 
country. And also because of my political roots. I’m from the RCD and not all RCD is bad.” 
Baraa was also involved in politics, however, for a very short time during his college years.  He 
stated that he soon quit for reasons related to his values and his religiosity. He disclosed: “I was 
interested when I was in college, when I was a student. I used to take part in politics. I was in a 
good political status [position]. I used to do political work. I was at a point where I was doing a 
conference. I was lecturing. I talked about reality. I said the truth. A [responsible] came to me at 
the end and asked me about what I was saying. I told him: that was just the truth. He said no, you 
have to lie and not say that. I told him this is the politics of lies! And I told him goodbye! Right 
there... Good bye! Never went back to political activities ever since. The politics that’s going to 
teach me to lie, I don’t want it.”    
Nevertheless all Qassem, Monji, and Baraa exercised their right to vote and so did many 
others regardless of their interest or involvement in the political sphere. I attempted to explore 
the decisive factors in their voting decisions and found that family members and traditional news 
outlet played an important role in voting behavior. Shokri (63 years old from Zouhour) 
remarked: “I voted in the last election. I just learned from people about the parties and from the 
campaigns. I read their programs and the one I liked I thought he was going to do that, so I voted 
for him. I didn’t get in much discussion with people, I hear them out and that’s it.” Ayat (32 
                                                
67 Beji Caied Essebsi is the current president of Tunisia after winning the 2014 presidential elections. He is a former 
RCD official and held many administrative and government positions under both regimes (Bourguiba then Ben Ali). 
That is why, he is perceived with his Party, Nidaa Tounes, as the face of the old regime. Many, however, perceived 
Nidaa Tounes to be the strongest secularist party despite the history of its members, which led to the party and its 
president winning the 2014 legislative and presidential elections respectively.  
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years old) was exposed to her father’s opinions about politics but what she learned from him 
prevented her from voting altogether: “No, because I wasn’t convinced with anybody. I mostly 
learned about them from my father. He is very interested... And he voted but... but I didn’t (she 
laughs). I am not interested... yeah... I don’t get involved in discussions about politics.”  
Yasmine, the 35 year old high school teacher was also directly influenced by a family 
member, her husband. She said: “I’m not interested at all. I only voted because I had to vote. I 
don’t even know what the person or party I voted for are like exactly. I watched my husband and 
family and friends. I literally asked my husband when he came out of the booth: who did you 
vote for? He told me and I just voted for that person.” Ahlam (71 years old) went to vote despite 
her lack of interest, also influenced by her family views: “I didn’t really follow the campaigns 
but I went to vote like everybody else. I heard people talk, people around me or during family 
gatherings, I heard them talking about someone in particular so I voted for him.”  
The lack of involvement in political work, beyond the act of voting, is closely related to 
years of oppression under one-party rule. The political scene was very exclusive; only those 
close to the regime could take part in politics. Others, who dared express different views, were 
faced by a notoriously ruthless persecution. That is why, I also argue that it will take time for the 
general public to develop a positive attitude towards different forms of political participation and 
involvement and to consider them an act of citizenship that could affect the decisions made by 
the government. I argue that close networks of relationships will play an important role in 
changing the attitudes and popularizing other forms of participations, as family and community 
members prove to be most influential on voting behavior. In my group of informants, the only 
person who reported participation beyond voting is Hamed (55 years old), an electrician from 
Zouhour. He explained his cousin’s influence on his decision to join Ennahda party. He noted: “I 
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am a member of a party. Here in Sousse. The regional office of the party. Ennahda, voilà, the 
Ennahda party. I helped in the campaign... When it was the elections I helped, just like 
everybody. I gave fliers to my neighbors and other people... I helped in the meetings too. I go 
and we prepare the room, we put the chairs, we put the slogans up on the wall... Yeah, that’s it. 
That’s what we do.” Without being asked, Hamed continued to explain how he joined the party 
and how he got involved in their campaigning activities. He said: “I voted for Ennahda. Like 
everybody else. Basically everybody in the family likes Ennahda. A lot of Tunisians like 
Ennahda. That’s a well-known fact... That’s why we won the first elections and the last ones too. 
You know my cousin is in Ennahda. That’s how I got in it [the party]. Even before the revolution 
I liked Ennahda. He [his cousin] got in trouble with the [Ben Ali] government because it was not 
a ‘legal’ party. You know how it was ‘with’ Ben Ali... So my cousin got in trouble. But now we 
are both in the party.”  
The influence of family figures’ discourse was reiterated in other informants’ speeches. 
Dhiaa also has a cousin who influenced his voting decision. He said: “Most of my family 
members are ‘Nahdawee’ (a word used by Tunisians to refer to those who vote Ennahda or are 
members in the party), so we voted for ‘Ennahda’... Our vote was Nahdawee (he giggled). My 
cousin is active in the Ennahda party, so my whole family voted for Ennahda party.” The 
influence of the family and friends in the informants’ voting behavior was not specific to a 
certain age, gender, education, or usage level. For instance, Farook, the 30-year-old high school 
dropout reported that his offline social network was the most influential in his voting decision. 
He said: “I went to vote... Of course... I only knew who to vote for from my friends and my 
family. We sit together at the café and we talk together.” Being a taxi driver, Farook was also 
exposed to political discussion through people who ride with him, which is very common in 
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Tunisia. He said: “Online, I get into a lot of discussions but mostly sports discussions, I get into a 
lot of debates... You know about teams and so on... I discuss politics mostly in the streets, not 
much on the Internet. Even during the elections, I got into a lot of political debates, mostly with 
people who ride with me in my cab.” Others, especially from the Zouhour area listed political 
campaigns in their neighborhoods as another influential factor in their decisions. Layla (72 years 
old) reported: “Yes, I voted. From people... from TV... from the Internet... and from the 
campaigns...  and there were people who came roaming the neighborhood... here... to tell us to 
vote for this person or that person.” 
The role of family and community members in political engagement and voting behavior 
could be understood through Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) two-step model. The authors argued 
that mass media messages are channeled “from radio and print (the media of the time) to opinion 
leaders and from them to less active sections of the population” (p. 32). The opinion leaders can 
be any influential member(s) in the social network of the audience (family members, friends, 
famous figures, etc…). Relying on opinion leaders results in networks of homogeneity (Schenk, 
1994) where political discussion circulates among the close network (family or friends), who 
share similar cultural values resulting in a large conformity of opinions and political behavior. 
The opinion leaders often represent the social norms of the group and thus, they filter the news 
and information to fit the standards and culture of the group. To a large extent, this explains the 
agreement within clusters of respondents about one of the parties (Nidaa represented by “Beji”, 
or Ennahda). The Arab world in particular, is an oral communication-based culture. People 
continue to value the word of mouth, their community, national, and religious figures and place 
more trust in them than they place in mass mediated information (Fandy, 2000). Consequently, 
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the influence of the close networks of relationship was clearly stronger on the reported voting 
and engagement decisions of the informants.  
The same pattern of political information flow is relevant and applicable today to the 
online political sphere. In their examination of the influence of SNS on political attitudes and 
behavior, Zhang et al (2010) explored how peers affect each other’s attitude and foster 
engagement among each other. That is why I argue that over time, members of the family or the 
community who are active in political parties may play the role of gatekeepers and introduce 
people from their social network to the political sphere through different forms of participation, 
both offline and online. However, as of now, the “I’m not interested” narrative is limiting the 
informants’ participation to voting for various reasons. For the limited offline participation, I am 
suggesting that the lingering dark history associated with political engagement, i.e., either as a 
member of the RCD and a propaganda tool in the hands of the regime, or as part of a clandestine 
opposition and victim of brutal retribution. Second, which is most important, there appears to be 
a negative attitude towards online participation, stemming, largely, from the negative value-
based attitude towards the digital political sphere.  
4.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION 
Ivey (2014) claimed that many Tunisians are not as trustful of SNS, especially Facebook 
as they used to be during the revolution and shortly after it. Ivey’s Tunisian sample group 
reported that the proliferation of false news and the aggressive political atmosphere on Facebook 
are the main reason for its lost credibility. Many of my respondents echoed the claim of their 
fellow Tunisians from Ivey’s 2014 study. Walid, 31 years old from Kalaa, is a regular 
Facebooker but does not take part in the so-called Facebook public sphere. He responded to my 
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question about online participation: “Never! I don’t share or get in political discussion online. I 
do that with my friends at the coffee shops. Never with anybody else.” The same discourse was 
reiterated by other users. Yahya said: “No, I never participate in online discussions about 
politics... Never... I talk with my friends... Face-to-face I mean... But not on the Internet... No.”  
Walid and Yahya’s statements could be understood as a lack of trust in strangers 
preventing them from sharing political views or opinions. It may also due to feelings of fear of 
voicing political opinions, a feeling that still lingers after decennia of political oppression. 
Besides, cultural values play an important roles in their online behavior. Many of them were 
particularly concerned with the proliferation of immoral acts in the political sphere: lies, gossip, 
and spreading rumors. Nacira was one of the few to report patterns of online participation. She 
said: “I write and comment and voice my opinion all the time. I share what I think is worth 
sharing too. I participate in online polls. I sign petitions, any way I can participate, I participate.” 
However, when discussing others’ behavior on Facebook, Nacira had a very strong attitude 
towards the general political atmosphere on the medium.  “On the Internet, there is an open 
competition. Everyone reveals the lies of the other. I had my Facebook before the revolution. But 
there was no news then, it was all controlled. Now, because it’s supposed to be a democracy... 
now everything in there is insults over insults.” Nacira has two clear stands towards the online 
freedom of speech; while she appreciates the Internet presentation of the “whole truth” and 
different political points of views, she dislikes and disapproves of the personal attacks and lies. 
Nacira continued on with the previously discussed value-based view of the Internet sphere68 and 
so did many other respondents.  
                                                
68 While I was interviewing Nacira, she misunderstood my position as a media studies student for being a journalist 
and she insisted on telling me about a Tunisian TV channel product that completely bothered her. “Please, I really 
want you to write about this drama series, I really want you to write what I’m telling you right now.” She then talked 
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For instance, Farook (30 years old) said: 
Farook: I follow political news. There were people who tried to recruit me to a party, but 
I just followed my convictions. I watched news, I followed on the Internet, at that time, I 
bought newspapers too to read what they say. On FB, I just comment, I never share 
anything.  
Interviewer: Why?  
Farook: I don’t know... I write... I write simple things... But I don’t talk about others. I 
don’t like to talk about others. The TV... the TV and TV hosts... they have masks on their 
faces, they take us for idiots, but on the Internet there is everything. I follow the 
ministries like the sports ministry... and the government’s website... the president’s 
website... Never everything else.  
Farook, viewed sharing the news he reads on Facebook as a way of talking about others 
or recycling what he considers doubtful news about others. Thus, he renounced engaging in what 
he considered an immoral activity. Yasmine the high school teacher, also in her 30s, only once 
made a comment in a political discussion, also driven by her values. She reported the experience: 
“I only commented one time, I watched a video about a candidate (one of the finalists) on FB on 
our teachers’ group, and I really liked his speech. Then I saw my colleagues saying something 
unacceptable... they were calling him names! They called him ‘animal’! I commented and got 
                                                                                                                                                          
at length about her disgust of a private TV channel drama that, according to her, portray the Tunisian women in a 
bad light and in a fashion that does not fit within the Tunisian cultural and value framework. “I don’t care what they 
say, I don’t care about all the modernity speeches and arguments... I think as a conservative society we have to 
respect our values and not show the women in that light.”  
Nacira’s conservative view of drama production was also reflected in her view of the political digital sphere. What is 
most fascinating about Nacira’s case is that she was one of the few non-veiled women I interviewed. Popular 
neighborhoods have a high rate of veiled women and thus most of my female interviewees were veiled. However, 
Nacira was quite liberal in her clothing code, a great contrast to her conservative ideas, which shows the complexity 
of the Tunisian society as people filter what they appropriate from Western features of modernity (clothing, 
technology, food, and so on) without removing and disowning the essence of their cultural values.    
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into a discussion with them. I couldn’t hold myself. I was very disappointed, they’re educators! 
They shouldn’t be doing something like that. That was the only time I ever made a reaction to 
something political.”  While Nacira, Farook, and Yasmine were from the same age cohort, value-
based views of online political participation was also prevalent among older users. Baraa did not 
report regular online participation also for value-centric reasons. It fascinated me at the time of 
the interview that he remembered exactly the instances when he was involved in political 
discussions on Facebook.  
Interviewer: Do you ever get involved in political discussions online?  
Baraa: (after he thought for a moment) hmmm... After the elections... yes... One time, I 
entered a discussion about Bourguiba... One time about Marzouki69, and one time about 
Ennahda. When something really interests me, I react... But I don’t really get involved... 
It’s risky.  
Interviewer: What do you mean by risky? What kind of risks are you fearing?  
Baraa: Risk that one may be gossiping... You know? Talking about someone without that 
person even knowing that we’re talking about him/her... They would say: someone said 
or did and you make a comment or share it... but it’s not true! If you know the speaker 
100% then you can trust... but if you don’t know the person, you can’t share or comment.  
Interviewer: I see. When you said risk, I thought you mean fear of the government kind of 
risk.  
Baraa: no, no... There is no more fear. No... No more fear.  
This value-based view of the SNS political sphere could be understood as part of the 
adaptation to the newfound freedom of speech in Tunisia. Tunisians are still in the process of 
                                                
69 Mohamed Moncef Marzouki is the previous president of Tunisia (2011-2014).  
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learning how to politically participate beyond voting. They are not used to personal political 
attacks and aggressiveness.  For example in Western cultures, people are used to candidates 
attacking the history and policy-related issues of other candidates and sometimes even their 
personal lives. However, in Tunisia, because of the tight control of the previous ruling party, the 
RCD, people have never witnessed a debate, let alone an aggressive political atmosphere. In fact, 
campaigns in the Ben Ali era, used to take the shape of a national celebration, whether in the 
streets or in the mass media.  
Thus, while some Tunisians considered the newfound freedom to be favorable to a new 
society and freedom of speech, others deemed it to be too aggressive and immoral to be part of, 
even by sharing or relaying political news. As a matter of fact, a Tunisian media researcher, 
Hizaoui (2013) discussed the term “media of shame,” which is a popular phrase among 
Tunisians used to describe the post-revolution media. Hizaoui asserted that the perceived 
aggressive online political sphere resulted in nostalgic feelings for censorship and press 
restrictions among many Tunisians. Nevertheless, the majority of Tunisians as well as the civil 
society remain supportive of the freedom of press and freedom of speech (Farmanfarmaian; 
2014). Farmanfarmaian (2014) argues that the misunderstanding of certain political concepts and 
the cultural disagreement with certain media practices are a natural result of the novelty of the 
political Tunisian scene. She contended that the new atmosphere will create hybrid political and 
media forms that are universal in their values, but cultural in the way they function.  Hence, I am 
more concerned with the divide between groups exposed to a wider variety of information and 
political debate, than I am concerned with the freedom of speech.  
That being said, it is noteworthy to mention the absence of correlation between being a 
user of the Internet and SNS, and political participation. Those who are connected are not 
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necessarily active politically while those who are not connected are not necessarily isolated from 
the political sphere. As a matter of fact, the only person who reported being active in a political 
party, Hamed, is one of the few who does not have access to the Internet at home70. This 
observation was previously made in a study about Tunisians and political participation. Ivey 
(2014) interviewed 40 Tunisians about their SNS use for political information and participation 
and found that only 4 Tunisians in his sample did not have Internet access at home, 2 of those 
were among the most active politically in his sample group. However, while, Ivey’s informants 
reported online participation activities such as sharing news, writing statuses, discussing political 
issues, my group of informants refrained from engaging in the same tasks. This could be due in a 
large part to the age difference between the groups, the median age for Ivey’s study was 24, 
which is the age reported to be most active in the online digital sphere and the age group that 
Zayani (2014) labelled as the “youth factor” of the Tunisian online social movement. Given that 
my group consists of rather older informants (the youngest being 30 year old), it is not surprising 
to sense the existence of a usage and online political participation gap between the two study 
groups.  
4.5 TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
In the following section I discuss what I consider to be another most fascinating 
revelation in the collection of interviews. In order to understand the techno-dispositions of the 
informants, I included a question about willingness to take digital literacy courses if offered by 
the government. The idea of literacy courses for adults in Tunisia is nothing new; in 1992 the 
government launched a program entitled: “National Literacy Strategy” (NLS) aiming at reducing 
                                                
70 Hamed is the father who reported walking with his son to his sister’s house often to use his nephew's’ computer, 
Internet access, and assistance with his son’s homework.  
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illiteracy rates among Tunisian adults. In 2000, the program and its results were revised and a 
new initiative was implemented under the title “National Adult Education Programme” (NAEP). 
Both programs offered late afternoon courses for adults who wished to learn how to write and 
read. While the illiteracy rate fell slightly as a result of the NLS, the overall evaluation of the 
program deemed it ineffective with poor attendance and a lack of commitment from the learners, 
especially women from rural areas, mainly due to the lack of awareness of the existence and the 
importance of the courses.  
The second program, NAEP, focused its efforts on girls and women, particularly in rural 
environment. The NAEP was coupled with a mass media campaign targeting prospect learners 
all over the country. The new program also included incentives for the learners and the teachers 
in order to maintain attendance (e.g. end of the year prizes, free meals, free excursions, and 
reimbursement of the travel cost for those who live far from the centers). Furthermore, the 
program provided more flexible settings and rules in respect to the social situation of the learners 
(for example, mothers were allowed to bring their children along, classes offered at different 
times in the same area to meet occupational requirements, etc…) (Journal of Adult Education 
and Development report, 200471). The new program proved to be more effective contributing to a 
drop of the illiteracy rates from 27% in 2000 to 18.5% in 201572. A new Initiative has been 
launched in October 2015 focusing mainly on the women from rural areas and women and youth 
in high density popular neighborhoods73 (Webmanager Center report, 2015).  
                                                
71 Retrieved from: https://www.dvv-international.de/adult-education-and-development/editions/aed-622004/literacy-
and-basic-education/education-for-adults-in-tunisia/ 
72 CIA Factbook, Tunisia.  
73 http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2015/10/31/166839/societe-une-strategie-nationale-d-
alphabetisation-et-d-enseignement-pour-adultes-en-tunisie 
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Adults with their notebooks and sometimes with their children walking to the schools in 
the late afternoons are not strange to the Tunisian communities. When asked about her 
willingness to attend digital literacy courses, Hadir (the 59 year old retired hotel housekeeper) 
said: “I would be the first one to go learn. Who would be offered courses and say no? People 
used to be illiterate and when they made those illiteracy courses everybody went to learn. Late in 
the afternoon, you would see all the ladies with their Quffa [ّةفق]74 heading to the adult literacy 
classes. So if they make something like that, everybody will go to learn.” I relied on this 
informant’s familiarity with the adult literacy courses, to ask the rest of my group about their 
willingness to attend digital literacy courses if offered by the government. Although many of the 
respondents were reluctant to let their younger family members transfer their techno-
competencies to them, almost all of them affirmed that they would go take digital literacy 
courses offered by the government.  
Dhiaa reported at the beginning of the interview that his daughter “really” wants to teach 
him how to use the computer and the Internet but he refused to learn. “I’m not into it, I just don’t 
care,” he said. However, Dhiaa asserted that he would go to courses organized by the 
government if offered at proximity to where he lives: “I would go unless it is problematic... 
like... if it’s too far from here, I won’t go. But if it’s here in the neighborhood, yes I would go.” 
Shokri (63 years old) was very enthusiastic about the idea, to which he responded: “I would go 
of course. I would be the first to go... if I find someone to teach me... of course I would go.” The 
same “of course, I would go” was reiterated with the same enthusiasm in the majority of the 
informants’ responses regardless of their educational level. Hajir (58 years old) foresaw the 
potential benefits of acquiring techno-competencies as she remarked: “Maybe... I don’t know... 
                                                
74 A Quffa is a traditional basket made with palm tree dry leaves.   
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Actually, it’s good, I would go learn. You never know... one of my kids can move abroad and I 
will have to use it.” The age of the respondents did not influence their willingness to learn. In 
fact, Nahla, the 62 year old retired nurse, viewed her age as a positive factor to learning. She 
said: “Yes, I would go to learn. I want to learn. I don’t have anything else to do. I would love to 
learn. Especially at my age, I could learn a lot of things.”    
Younger respondents also, who are already users of the information technologies 
welcomed the idea. They considered digital literacy courses an opportunity to improve and 
advance their skills. Yahya, the techno-savvy, responded to my question about taking digital 
literacy courses saying: “Yes, why not? Even though I know a lot of things already… but on the 
Internet you learn a new thing every day.” The female younger respondents weighted the idea 
based on their assigned gender roles, nevertheless, the answers were eventually positive. Ayat 
(32 year old stay at home mom) remarked after thinking for a moment as if she was 
contemplating the idea in her head: “If I find a place to put my daughters or someone to watch 
them, I would go. It would... It would actually be a very good idea.” She then expanded on her 
point of view: “I’m with courses offered to learn how to use the Internet. Because I want to learn 
everything. In my opinion a person who doesn’t know how to use the Internet is an illiterate 
person. And I don’t want to be one of those illiterates.” Being a college graduate Ayat had the 
terminology and a view of the digital gap that matches scholarly views about the digital literacy 
gaps.  
Qassem’s strong educational and occupational background resulted in a more broad and 
analytical view of the idea of digital literacy courses. He said: “I would go of course! It’s 
extraordinary! And we need something like that... You know, it was Bourguiba who reduced 
illiteracy. I was sad to see that illiteracy actually rose under Ben Ali. And we made those adult 
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illiteracy courses but they [adult learners] don’t come75. People don’t come. Not because they 
don’t want to learn but because the method of teaching is from the 60s and 70s, that is not 
effective anymore. If you use a computer and a screen, they would come, especially women. 
Illiteracy is higher among women. Bourguiba used to use technologies, he used to screen movies 
in the streets. Cinema in the street. I... I consider myself to be ignorant in computer and the 
Internet... Without any ‘complexes’, I say it: I am ignorant in digital technologies... even though 
it is extraordinary. I am trying to teach myself but formal courses would be great...” Qassem not 
only described the importance of acquiring digital literacies in the information society but also 
tackled an important educational issue in the new age, which is the conflict between the old 
methods of teaching and the requirements of the network society.  
In fact, many media literacy and education scholars argue that the new classrooms should 
be designed on a multi-dimension literacy basis that includes media, digital, and information 
literacies, in addition to the basic reading and writing skills (Culver and Jacobson, 22012; Tyner 
and Gutierrez, 2012)76. The positive reception of the digital literacy courses may be attributed to 
the fact that education is highly valued in Tunisia. The young as well as the elders were willing 
to learn and attend formal courses. Given that education in Tunisia is free (including college) and 
accessible to all, Tunisians have over time developed a culture and a habitus that expects the 
younger generations to acquire university diplomas, which they equate with social and financial 
success (Mills, 2005). Besides, one can argue that education and accumulation of formal 
diplomas have become a habitus as their value has not changed despite the recent ten years of 
                                                
75 Qassem was the head official in the regional government administration during the late 1990 and early 2000, 
which is the period of the not so effective first adult literacy program, NLS.  
76 A new initiative for literacy courses has been announced in November 2015 by the Tunisian 
Ministry of Development. However, the announcement was made in a press conference without 
much details about the new program that explains whether new methods and new literacies will 
be included in the new adult educational program.  
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soaring college graduate unemployment. I often hear people complain that graduates now can’t 
find anything to do, but then they quickly state that “a college diploma is better than nothing”, or 
tell their kids that “even if you don’t find a job, at least you are ‘educated’ and have a diploma.” 
Both statements, often heard even in TV series and talk shows indicate that in the popular mind 
anything less than a college diploma is equivalent to nothing and is equivalent to being illiterate 
or at least uneducated. In fact, when I piloted my study, the initial question about the level of 
education was phrased in a literal American survey and interview protocols: “What is your level 
of education”? However, after I received a few “manish qariya” [ شينام ةيراق ] (I’m not educated) 
responses, even though the informants later stated that they went to school for a number of years 
(one actually finished primary school), I changed it to: “did you go to school?’ in order to better 
adapt to the Tunisian state of mind.  
However, it was somehow puzzling to observe that people rejected their children’s offer 
to teach them but were very receptive of the idea of formal courses. For instance, Layla (72 year 
old), who had an exasperated tone when explaining her rejection of her granddaughter’s offers to 
teach her, had an enthusiastic tone about the idea of government courses. She said: “I want to 
learn, I would go learn. Yeah, I would go... But I would go learn if the government creates 
courses.” “If the government creates courses” caught my attention. I wondered why learning 
through the government courses is more appealing or more acceptable than instructions offered 
by a granddaughter in the comfort of one’s own home. Two ways to interpret this tendency to 
accept something offered by the government is the observed is the fact that a formal setting is 
viewed and valued as Education and the observed effectiveness of the adult literacy courses77. 
This creates a trust in any program implemented by the government. Besides, in a way, digital 
                                                
77 Adult literacy courses is the phrase used in the Tunisian daily discourse about the adult education program 
courses.  
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literacy courses offered by the government validates the importance of learning to use 
information technologies. In contrast, the grandchildren offering to teach does not generate a 
significance or relevance factors in the mind of the older informants, especially those who 
reported a complete lack of motive and those who perceive information technologies to be 
appropriate only for the younger and well-educated.  
In fact since the independence, Tunisians have generally been responsive to government 
campaigns and quickly adopted change even when fundamentally related to social and religious 
beliefs. For example, even though fertility and the high number of offspring was considered to be 
a sign of prosperity, Tunisians quickly responded to the government’s campaign of family 
planning78. Family planning was part of the post-independence agenda to reform the society and 
thus was heavily advertised through the media of the time, through opinion leaders and through 
mobile campaign events (campaign vans that roam the country and meet with villagers). The 
Tunisian mass media constantly reminded the public about the benefits of family planning to 
their immediate lives and to their nations as whole. The campaign included other forms of 
advertising such as postcards and post stamps celebrating the program and popularizing the 
idea.79 The campaign led to a significant drop in the birth rates (from 7.2 children per woman in 
1956 to 2.9 children in 1994) leading to a stabilization of the population growth over the 
following years (Curtiss, 1996; Mills, 2005).  
Al-Kandari and Gaither (2011) argued that Arab people highly respect their government 
authorities and the national decisions they take. Thus, it is within the norms of the culture to be 
more receptive to government-implemented programs, especially when accompanied by a strong 
                                                
78 I report the Tunisians’ response to the family planning campaign with caution about its real purposes as many 
scholars argue that it was an imposed form of modernity for government’s control purposes.  
79 Family Planning in Tunisia: Foundations Results Prospects ONFP, Ministry of Public Health Republic of Tunisia 
March 1995, p .19 
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and pervasive mass media campaign. That is why, I believe that the inclusion of digital literacies 
in the new adult literacy initiative will engender positive outcomes in terms of reducing the gap 
between the older and the younger generations80.  
4.6 ONLINE GOVERNMENT SERVICES  
To further explore the digital divide within the group and examine their attitudes towards 
government offered services, I asked the informants about their usage of online billing services. 
The responses varied between the groups and the gender. Most of the men in the groups 
welcome the idea, the women, not as much for various reasons. Dhiaa (the 53 year old from 
Zouhour) said: “I think it would be a great idea. I have to go to the city81 to pay bills sometimes. 
It would be great if I can pay bills from home.” The men were more excited about the idea, the 
idea of not standing in long lines at the beginning of each month to pay the bills was quite 
appealing to them. Ahlam (71 years old) who can’t write and read, articulated the problems faced 
by those with no to very limited education and no digital literacies, as the implementation of 
such programs assumes the acquisition of certain levels of digital competencies. She said: “It 
depends, I’m not sure how that is going to work. Some people will have the Internet and can pay 
online, for others who can’t read or write like me, it’s easier to go to the post office and pay the 
bills. You can’t do something you don’t know how to do. I don’t do it anyways, my husband 
does it but I guess it’s easier to go to the post office.”  
The men in my group disagreed with Ahlam’s last statement. Shokri (63 years old) said: 
“It would be great to pay the bills online. We don’t have to stand in lines. You just sit at home 
                                                
80 At the moment (Spring 2016), there are no information about the curriculum or the nature of the courses offered to 
the learners neither in the popular media nor in the scholarly literature.  
81  Zouhour is about 7 Km from Sousse 
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and pay the bills. It’s just great.”  Basma, 55 years old from Kalaa, on the other hand, did not 
care much since she was not the one responsible for the task of paying the bills: “I don’t really 
care, my husband pays the bills. When we get bills he goes and pays them. If it’s something for 
my sons, they take care of it too, so it’s not really my issue.” The male informants found the 
online services appealing as it will facilitate a task they already exercise on a monthly basis. 
Thus they weighted the perceived attributes (Rogers, 1995) of the new function of technology 
and accepted the possibility of using it. Basma, did not have a strong opinion about the proposed 
idea because the function is not relevant to her. However, other women on the group formed 
their opinions immediately either by thinking of the social benefits of standing in lines and 
paying the bills or by the perceived (and sometimes experienced) difficulty of the task.  
A few of the respondents who attempted to pay bills online found the process to be 
complicated. Abir, the 36 year old assistant pharmacist reported her attempt to pay a bill online: 
“They sent me a note once. They said I can pay my electricity bill online. I looked it up and then 
got lazy I didn’t do it. You have to follow up and it seems like a big hustle, so I just thought it’s 
easier to just go and pay it at the post office.” While Abir is a user of the Internet, other 
informants with little education and a complete lack of techno-competencies foresaw the 
complication of the process that Abir discussed. Refka (54 year old) found paying in person at 
the post to be easier. She is so used to the process that it has become similar to a ritual. The 
people at the local post office are used to her and she is used to them and a sense of community 
has been established between the two. “It seems very complicated to pay bills on the Internet, I 
would have to put my money somewhere and get a card and learn how to pay, it’s easier to just 
go to the post office when it’s not busy and that’s it. I would go when it’s almost time to close 
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and I would beg the lady there: Hey “Saida” [the name of the lady], please let me pay. And she 
would let me pay. It’s that easy.”  
According to Rogers (1995), the perceived complexity of the innovation in addition to the 
degree to which it fits in the social norms could be significant barriers to adopting it. Thus, the 
social benefits of paying bills at the post office compared to the perceived complexity of paying 
online, made the former win the debate in Refka’s case. Hadir from the same community as 
Refka, found the idea appealing but explained that the social appeal of paying at the post would 
hinder its implementation: “Before we used to pay bills via phone. But now you can’t do that and 
I don’t pay anything on the Internet. Even the Internet bill, we have to go to the provider to pay 
it. It would be a good idea though to pay from my house. I would be sitting in my house and can 
pay my bills. It’s great. But here people like standing in lines. You can see this or that person on 
the way to the administration and you can talk and gossip (she laughs).” In a way, the socializing 
aspect of paying at the post office makes one questions the necessity of the implementation of 
such services. Besides, it also explicated and justifies the tendency of Western countries to offer 
services on different forms (by mail, online, and in government offices) as it respects the literacy 
and cultural differences and characteristics of different communities and groups.  
Naima (52 year old) summed the problem of negative perceptions of online services, she 
said: “There are some things you can pay on the Internet but we’re not really in that state of mind 
yet. People are still scared, they don’t trust paying things on the Internet. I personally would love 
to just pay everything from my own house. You know they showed us on TV how to pay bills on 
the Internet but we still don’t use it yet. I’m talking about us the shaabi-yin [نّييبعّشلا] (people from 
popular neighborhoods). I’m not talking about the others who use it.” Naima brings up an 
important point, which is the community members’ influence on one another in developing 
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perceptions and attitudes about a certain technology, program, or usage. Community members 
develop and perpetuate ideas about who they are and what they can or cannot do. In fact, one of 
the informants, Ilham (58 years old) thought for a moment and then as if she had figured out the 
condition on which she would start paying bills online responded: “If everybody starts paying 
their bills online I would do it too. I would do like everybody else, if everybody else is doing 
something, I would do it too.” In other words, once again, culture and communities emerge as 
the most significant factor in the adoption or rejection of a technological platform or feature.  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter is grounded in the theoretical frame that the Internet is transforming online 
spaces into public spheres (Blumler and Coleman 2009; Dahlberg, 2001). Besides, social 
movement scholars who examined the Tunisian post-revolution digital context argue that, “the 
stakes involved in Internet governance are higher under the current regime than they were 
previously.” (Artaud de La Ferriere and Vallina-Rodriguez, 2014, p. 641). That is why I 
attempted to investigate the social inclusion of these spheres and the overall attitudes of the 
informants towards political participation, digital political spheres, and government services.  
A few behavioral and attitude traits emerged from the analysis. First, Online participation 
and voting behavior do not go hand in hand. Being the first free election in the history of the 
country, both the 2011 and 2014 elections attracted international press and scholarly attention. 
Much research has hitherto been conducted. While the youth are claimed to be the most active in 
the online political sphere, their voting turnout is rather low compared to older generations. 
Statistical data demonstrating that only 48% of the 18 to 24 year old age group voted during the 
October 2011 elections. On the other hand 68% of the 48 to 63 year old age group voted in the 
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same elections (Lefèvre, 2015). The disparities could be attributed to the youth dissatisfaction 
with the post-revolution governments.  
According to Benstead et al, (2012) the youth in particular report being dissatisfied with 
the current government (60% dissatisfied in the 18 to 33 age group). However not unlike the 
majority of the population, they view the country to be increasingly democratic and are rather 
optimistic about its political future. Hence, despite their dissatisfaction with the government, 
Tunisians reported that they would vote in the next election (Benstead, 2012).   
It appears that for a long time Tunisians have developed a negative attitude and a bitter 
stance towards politics, which is why despite their overwhelming voting and interest in political 
news, the informants reported that they “are not interested in politics.” They viewed voting as a 
duty as a result of the new social and political context, not as a form of engagement in politics. 
The newfound enthusiasm about participation (even though they don’t perceive voting as 
participation) could be nurtured into a more active and comprehensive view of political 
participation. Digital media can become a driver of civic engagement and political participation. 
Besides, given that the youth are the largest population on the digital political sphere (Ivey, 
2014; Zayani, 2015), they could be brokers of civic skills and can spread positive attitudes 
towards politics within their families and communities.  
The second important finding is the importance of government validation of programs 
and innovations. According to Martin (2015) democracy is a collection of values, skills, and 
practices established gradually, in which the culture interacts with universal democracy features 
to produce a cultural model of democracy. A fully democratic model must encourage citizens’ 
participation in policymaking through positive beliefs, attitudes and perceptions. In fact, culture 
emerged again as central to the narrative of politics and political participation, and an appropriate 
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framework for understanding the acceptance of certain political practices and the rejection of 
others. Understanding political participation disparities and negative attitudes may be further 
enhanced by linking the cultural values of the informants to their trust in governments and 
authorities (in regard to programs and projects).  
I argue that the inclusion of digital literacy courses in adult educational program and 
promoting their benefits to the general public may lead those who refuse to learn from their 
family members to change their attitudes towards the acquisition of techno-competencies. 
Developing techno-capital by the marginalized population groups could be a response to the 
information gap stemming from the media exposure divide between the information technology 
users and the non-users.  
In regard to the role of the media, Farmanfarmaian (2014) contended that “agency is 
being exercised by and through the media as Tunisians develop new tools to discern who they 
are in an evolving and freer political environment.” She argued that the revolution has created an 
unsettled space where “people exercise free agency and spontaneously improve what they do 
through practice and experience” (p. 614). Thus, addressing the attitude and usage gaps could 
turn the digital sphere into a space for exercising and developing political skills and 
competencies that could translate into an offline civic and political engagement, through time 
and across all population groups.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Final Remarks – 
The Tunisian Techno-Context 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS: THE TUNISIAN TECHNO-CONTEXT 
I conclude this dissertation with a summary of the findings and a discussion of the 
Tunisian contextualization of information technologies. The overarching goal of this project was 
to examine the digital divide in the Tunisian context. I aimed at situating information technology 
in the social and cultural context of the post-revolution Tunisia, while building on the historical 
background of the country. I began with the assumption that there is a digital divide in Tunisia 
with both scholarly literature and government data claiming that the divide is generational, 
occupational, and regional. The lack of qualitative data about the nature of the divide prompted 
me to engage in an ethnographic research to explore the digital divide in small community 
neighborhoods in the region of Sousse, Tunisia. I relied greatly on my position as a native 
ethnographer who is immersed in the culture, but who has also acquired a detached view and 
ground for cultural comparisons. Kraidy (1999) stated that “native ethnography occupies an 
intermediary position on the border between different worldviews. Because of their hybrid 
ability to negotiate a variety of traditions and contexts, native ethnographers are uniquely 
positioned to understand and conciliate these different cultural systems”. Kraidy adds that the 
native ethnographer has sufficient familiarity with the informants’ culture to understand jokes, 
single words with deep cultural meanings, and body languages.  
I built on Van Dijk’s recent findings that the divide is no longer merely about access, but 
is more usage-based. Therefore, I investigated both issues of access and usage, and examined 
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their indicators and underlying factors. Given my knowledge of the strong infrastructure of 
information technologies in Tunisia, I suspected that access would not be a major contributor, 
except for very low income families. Income turned out to be less of a factor than I anticipated, 
as the Tunisian diaspora plays a major role in domesticating the latest technological devices, and 
balancing access to technology among classes across the households of my informants by 
bringing technology back from abroad to their families in Tunisia. Moving on to the issue of 
usage, the informants demonstrated no particular divide patterns of demographic or social 
stratification nature. Some young informants were non-users while older ones were consistent 
users; likewise, highly educated elderly declined any type of usage while others with barely any 
education reported some to constant usage.   
As a native ethnographer, I am familiar with the family and community solidarity, a 
vibrant and solid attribute of the Tunisian society in particular and the Arab world in general 
(Jandt, 2016). Therefore, I guided the interview to explore the patterns of accumulation of 
techno-capital through my informants’ social capital among their extended families and 
communities. It was not surprising to learn that almost all my informants, regardless of 
educational background, had ample access to a variety of learning resources, mainly through 
family members (especially younger generations), neighbors, community youth centers, and 
publinet staff.  
However, not everyone had the techno-disposition necessary to invest in learning through 
these resources. At this point in the analysis I wanted to push beyond access and usage to map 
the group habitus or collective dispositions towards technology, and explore the motives and 
attitudes behind the usage/non-usage and the learning/no learning decisions. It is only then that 
the indicators of the usage divide started to take shape. Both learning to acquire techno-
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competencies and the decision to use information technology were driven by specific motives 
and perceived relevance. Those who rejected learning opportunities reported no usage motive 
and believed the information technologies had little to no immediate relevance to their lives. 
What further complicated the matter was that many reported a pattern of usage limited to one 
specific task, i.e., to chat with their children and other family members who live abroad. Given 
that the majority of the families I interviewed reported having a family member abroad, they all 
appropriated this communication feature of the Internet and used Skype to maintain the family 
relations, whether by themselves or through an intermediary. The practice produced what I 
referred to as the transnational living room and transnational kitchens, which defy the 
geographical distance to create spaces where family values and solidarity are maintained and 
reproduced.   
Through the discussion of Skype, the effect of the Tunisian cultural values began to 
emerge as the strongest influence in almost all the usage and attitude patterns. The dichotomy of 
Skype and Facebook use conveyed this notion. The former was negotiated as a communication 
platform that fit easily within the tightly-knit family and community relationships and cultural 
values. On the other hand, Facebook was perceived as potentially detrimental and culturally 
inappropriate by the majority of the users, the young and the old, the users and the non-users, the 
men and the women. The fact that Facebook was used as a mass communication channel and a 
resistance platform during the events of the 2010-2011 uprising (Zayani, 2015) did not give it the 
benefit of the doubt. The informants seemed to be oblivious to its role in the social change that 
swept the country and toppled the previous regime. In today’s post-revolution Tunisia, my 
informants appeared more concerned with the chaotic, aggressive and disingenuous nature of the 
political debate they see on Facebook. Most found this to be against what they referred to as “our 
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values”. Over the course of their country’s history and succeeding civilizations, Tunisians have 
developed a set of unconscious believes and values that define them as a group and a community 
and constitute the traits of their culture (Loch et al., 2003). According to Bagchi et al. (2015), 
cultural values refer to the lenses or the balance that individuals of a certain community use to 
weight and evaluate actions and people and distinguish between the right and wrong, the 
acceptable and the unacceptable.  
The same cultural balance was used to weight the positives and negatives of the political 
digital sphere; the verdict was a strong negative view of politics with a majority vote. In fact, in 
this research I demonstrate a complex relationship between Tunisians and their government. On 
the political level, the government was the face of oppression. On the administrative level, it is a 
trusted source of validation. It determines the relevance and validates the significance of new 
cultural and social artifacts. Even for the informants who resist learning through the social 
resources described above, acquiring techno-competencies as part of a government educational 
program appeared highly acceptable and appealing. Techno-competencies transferred by the 
family younger generation is not valued as much. That is unless there is a motive and a perceived 
relevance.  
Based on these findings I revealed several traits of the Tunisian technological context. 
First, the diffusion process was incomplete; the government introduced a technology without 
introducing its benefits and values. Acquisition of the device itself is only part of the process. 
However, given the lack of targeted promotional and educational programs or publicly 
announced technological strategies, acquisition seemed to be the strategy, the process, and the 
end-goal for the Tunisian government.  
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Tunisians acquired computers in a peer-simulation fashion, they did not acquire it 
because of perceived attributes or to fulfill an established need. In other words, both the 
knowledge and the persuasion stages (Rogers, 1995) were bypassed. The younger generations 
domesticated information technology as a means of entertainment (beginning in the late 1990s) 
and for many it is still perceived as a “youth” medium used mainly for homework or 
entertainment. The analysis demonstrates that this perceptions has developed into a community 
attitude and a group habitus, echoed from one informant to the other with almost identical 
responses as if scripted, indicating a strong sense of community and community influence. 
Consequently, many informants declined the acquisition of techno-competencies, while others 
explicitly articulated that they view information technology to be “not for them.” Their attitudes 
and behaviors are circulated and recycled in a way that disrupts the claims of the powerful and 
undisputable integration of ICT regardless of the context (Martinez, 1999; Leaning, 2009).  
Several researchers argue that the sociocultural factors represent a risk to the diffusion of 
technologies in developing countries (Straub et al, 2001; Albrini, 2006). While I agree, to some 
extent, with this argument, I would also like to bring attention to the deterministic and 
technological imposition tone in it. I argue that the interaction between the technology and the 
culture has to be examined, understood, and applied from a cultural perspective. We have to look 
at the technology from the people and the culture’s lenses. What do they need it for? I argue that 
technological theories need to be further decentralized and need to be grounded in the cultural 
values of the specific contexts and emerge from the developing countries not the other way 
around. In fact, I sensed firsthand the simple user's agency over the technology (Bakardjieva, 
2005), appropriating what fits their needs and making informed, well thought out usage choices 
and strategies based on specific needs and cultural values.  
 194 
Leaning (2009) argues that information is only given meaning by the social functions 
assigned to it. In fact, the Tunisian user maintained control over the technology and what aspects 
of it could be included in her/his daily life. When there is no motive for daily usage, information 
technology was rejected or reduced to one task as any other household device, even by the most 
skilled informants. Nevertheless, my argument towards emphasizing cultural empowerment is in 
no way an attempt to underestimate the technological power with its scholarly demonstrated 
educational, economic, and development benefits. Instead, I am attempting to lay the ground for 
a cultural contextualization of the technology in Tunisia and a cultural negotiation of the 
meaning and the need for technology.  
From a theoretical point of view, I argue for the localization of the theoretical 
understanding of information technologies. In other words, we need a more culture based 
operationalization and conceptualization of the interaction between the technology and the social 
context. An overview of the findings of the study reveals a moment of contact between tradition 
and modernity; the conflict that takes place between an imposed development and the local 
values. The government, with its consecutive EU-inspired initiatives, continues to ignore the 
specific cultural needs and attitudes of the populations and the disparities in attitudes, behaviors, 
community dynamics that exist between them.  
I have yet to find an indicator of a qualitative or ethnographic research conducted as part 
of the government’s process to develop and implement its digital initiatives. This could be 
attributed to the Tunisian government’s long tradition of importing modes of modernity82. In her 
study of the politics of family planning in Tunisia, Mills (2005) demonstrated the adoption of a 
                                                
82 In addition to the remnants of 75 years of French colonization, Bourguiba was deeply influenced by the French 
system and rebuilt the country after the independence based on French ideologies and notions of modernity (Mills, 
2005; Charrad, 2001).  
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Western-made notion of modernity by the Tunisian government. She stated: “Official Tunisian 
discourses replicate the notion of a linear progression from a state of tradition to as state of 
modernity, leaving tradition in the past except when needed for tourism or proof of authenticity. 
Both ideologies of tradition and modernity are commoditized and disseminated broadly, but in 
different contexts.”  
The people’s technological behavior produces a different trajectory through strategies of 
usage to localize the modernity represented by the Internet. In other words, Tunisia is going 
through a period of transition not only socially and politically, but also culturally. Tunisians’ 
interaction with the technology is creating a moment of negotiation of the meaning of the 
technology, its place in their culture, and its effect on it. Jenkins (2006) argues that each new 
technology engenders a period of slow adjustment. In Tunisia, some have already accepted and 
adjusted to the technological changes, others are more resistant and are still gauging the 
technology to determine the possibility of accepting it within their cultural values, system, and 
structure. That is why I believe that a more appropriate discourse about this period is to view it 
as a transition, as the cultural agents exercising their agency over the technology and considering 
how much of it to allow in.   
5.2 LIMITATIONS 
While this research contributes an ethnography-based knowledge about the digital divide 
in Tunisia, Tunisians’ interaction with technology and their relationship with the changing 
political sphere, it has some shortcomings that could be addressed in the future to provide a more 
comprehensive depiction of the issue at hand. My research was constrained by time limitations. 
Thus, when families brought up learning from other family members or offered to be taught by 
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other family members I immediately saw the importance of interviewing the brokers of techno-
competencies to listen to their voices and explore their own articulations of the underlying 
reasons behind their desire to transfer their techno-competencies to other family members.  
While my position as a native ethnographer facilitated the interviewing process and the 
analysis of the informants’ discourses, it may was also be limiting in some instances. For 
example, during the interviews, I may have skipped follow up questions because I knew, or 
anticipated, the answers as I belong to the culture. However when analyzing the transcribed 
discourses, I identified instances where I could have explored in more depth the informants’ 
discourses and attitude about the subject. Besides, although I am familiar with the Tunisian 
pattern of strong community relationships, I have been away for a long time and somehow, I 
started to underestimate the closeness of the relationships and the small home-feel that these 
communities have. While I argued at the beginning of the second chapter that the crowds of 
family members and neighbors were valuable to the observation of community interactions and 
attitudes, at times, they may have interfered with the interviewing process. Many times, I had to 
break serious and sometimes heated debates that took place because those around us did not 
agree with something the interviewee said.  
A few times, I had to reassure family members that it was the interviewee’s opinion I am 
interested in, not the degree of correctness of their statements. Another time, I silently and 
awkwardly watched as a couple engaged in a heated argument because the interviewee stated 
that he had an account in another SNS besides Facebook (which the spouse did not know about). 
Besides the humorous aspect of these situations, I was concerned about a potential effect of the 
spiral of silence and the interviewees’ overthinking what they were saying in order not to 
aggravate the crowd. Another constraint is the location. I initially wanted to investigate a rural 
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area, however, the limitation of the time and the lack of access limited my study to suburban, 
popular neighborhoods, and one middle-upper class neighborhoods. Nevertheless, I believe my 
group of informants revealed patterns of behavior that are broadly relevant to the Tunisian 
culture and society as a whole.  
Finally, what I found most constraining was the limitation of the written language to 
transfer different modes of communications such as body language, tone, and feelings. It is 
without doubt the most challenging aspect of the analysis process. It was difficult to transfer the 
strong emotions they voiced through the facial expressions and tone of voice (as when talking 
about people’s conduct on Facebook, or when reporting about their voting). The translation was 
also a challenging and limiting element as many of the words the informants used were loaded 
with linguistic, cultural, and emotional meanings. In many instances, it was difficult to find 
English words that capture all the meanings of the Tunisian words they used. But as Spradley 
(1976) notes, this is the ethnographer’s responsibility, to learn the often very local and particular 
ways that people talk about key issues, and to translate them both linguistically and conceptually 
for the reader. Thus, I only hope the words I chose do justice to their careful articulations and 
word choices and efficiently translate their voices to the outside world.   
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
I believe this research can develop into a broader and bigger endeavor. During the 
interviews, I captured discourses that were not directly relevant to the ICT divide problem but 
that could lead to meaningful understanding of the social and cultural interactions. Follow up 
research should first investigate other geographic areas to identify cultural traits vs. small 
community traits. Accessing a rural area and replicating this study among other communities 
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would enrich the analysis and develop a broader picture of the Tunisian cultural interaction. I 
believe ethnographic research is an integral heuristic tool to the understanding of the culture and 
the technological practices of specific social contexts.  
To map the digital divide in Tunisia, it is indispensable to examine different cities in 
different regions of the countries. Sousse is in no way representative of the whole country. It is 
one of the most economically advantaged Tunisian cities with a strong economy and more 
developed infrastructure. That is why, assuming that similar results may be encountered in the 
interior cities and the rural villages of Tunisia is highly misleading. Replicating this study in a 
variety of regions is beneficial not only to assess the digital divide within the country but also the 
social, economic, and literacy gaps as well.   
I also believe that the voice of younger generations must be heard to examine their points 
of view in order to draft a more comprehensive picture of the techno-capital. In fact, the 
intersections between social capital, cultural capital, and techno-competencies within the 
Tunisian context are worth further investigation. It is a unique dynamic of rich resources with 
endless possibilities for educational opportunities, engagement, and citizenship. In chapter 3, I 
discuss how the informants mentioned again and again the difference in usage patterns between 
Arabs and the West. Unfortunately, at the time I did not explore this point further during the 
interview. However, for future research I think we need to account more for Tunisians’ 
understanding and articulation of themselves as Tunisians and as Arabs vis-à-vis the Western 
Other. Indeed, most informants gave hints that issues of identity have informed their attitudes 
towards technology, which in turns informed the levels of usage. The informants made assertions 
about what the technologies means to them and how it affects their societies. For future research, 
the examination of the way they negotiate the intersection of identity and technological 
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development should lead to a more comprehensive overview of the cultural interactions with 
technological development.  
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Appendix 1: Participants Information (All names were replaced with pseudonyms) 
 
# Pseudonym Age Residence Occupation Education 
R1 Baraa 56 Kalaa High school teacher, currently works as an 
administrative educator staff 
College graduate 
R2 Yahya 36 Zouhour Lab chemist, clothing dye expert College graduate 
R3 Habib 74 Khezama Owns multiple business that he rents out and 
runs a restaurant  
None 
R4 Ayat 32 Kalaa Stay at home mom. Currently unemployed and 
has a college degree in performance arts 
College graduate 
R5 Hadir 59 Zouhour Retired hotel housekeeping High school (1 year of High school)  
R6 Refka 54 zouhour Stay at home mom None 
R7 Naima 52 Zouhour Stay at home mom High school graduate 
R8 Molka 34 Kalaa Stay at home mom High school  
R9 Kahina 57 Zouhour Stay at home mom Elementary school 
R10 Ahlam 71 Khezama Stay at home mom None 
R11 Dhiaa 53 Zouhour Works at a bakery  Elementary school 
R12 Adam 64 Zouhour Retired kitchen-assistant Middle school 
R13 Yasmine 35 Zouhour High school teacher College graduate 
R14 Nahla 62` Zouhour Retired nurse/hospital help High school 
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R15 Aya 58 Kalaa High school teacher College graduate 
R16 Samia 61 Kalaa Stay at home mom Elementary school 
R17 Walid 31 Kalaa Electricity technician  College graduate 
R18 Nacira 30s Zouhour Travel agency staff High school graduate 
R19 Abir 36 Zouhour Stay at home mom College graduate/pharmacist 
assistant 
R20 Amira 54 Kalaa Stay at home mom Formation Professionnelle - sewing 
R21 Layla 72 Zouhour Stay at home mom None 
R22 Wafa 60 Zouhour Stay at home mom Elementary school 
R23 Basma 55 Kalaa Stay at home mom Elementary school 
R24 Ilham 68 Kalaa Stay at home mom None 
R25 Nourane 74 Khezama Stay at home mom Middle school 
R26 Hajir 58 Kalaa Stay at home mom Elementary school 
R27 Qassem 72 Khezama Retired government employee College graduate 
R28 Yosra 76 Zouhour Stay at home mom None 
R29 Mohamed 82 Khezama Retired judge Post college graduate (Bachelor’s 
degree from Zeituna University and 
a post graduate degree from Law 
school) 
R30 Monji 61 Kalaa Retired high school staff High school 
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R31 Chokri 63 Zouhour Retired truck driver Middle school 
R32 Farook 30 Zouhour Taxi driver High school 
R33 Hamed 55 Zouhour Electrician  High school 
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